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ABSTRACT 
 
Intermediating between farmers and development projects, farmers’ organizations 
(FOs) have the potential to improve rural market access and promote equitable growth by 
reducing transaction costs, strengthening producer bargaining power, and enabling collective 
action. Capacity building of FOs is a cornerstone of rural development policies and 
programs, such as the United Nations World Food Programme’s Purchase for Progress (P4P) 
project, which partnered with 830 FOs representing 1.7 million farmers from 2008 through 
2014.  
Despite significant donor investment, a unifying framework defining the concept and 
measurement of capacity building has eluded development practitioners. The core challenge 
originates from the paradigm shift away from top-down development toward participatory 
capacity building. Motivated by the practical difficulties encountered in ceding control to 
beneficiaries to enable their empowerment and self-determination, this study seeks to clarify 
conceptualizations of FO capacity and FO capacity building, to refine monitoring and 
evaluation of capacity building initiatives, and to develop and validate indicators and indices 
of organizational maturity and capacity.  
Drawing on a critical review of the capacity building literature, this study develops an 
integrated, multi-level, capacity building framework and elaborates different levels of FO 
participation at each stage of the capacity building process. Through this lens, the research 
analyzes 11 organizational capacity assessment (OCA) tools and methodologies, and 
constructs 33 indicators of functional organizational capital to address OCA content gaps in 
conflict resolution, member participation, adaptive capacity, and the drivers of organizational 
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change and collective action. The research further proposes methodological changes for 
increasing member participation in OCA to reduce reporting bias, to build knowledge and 
planning capacities, and to engender empowerment.   
The indicators developed are tested on primary data gathered from P4P (treatment) 
and non-P4P (control) FOs in Ghana and Malawi. Results show that P4P has positively 
impacted the organizational capacity of participating groups, although there are regional 
differences. The statistical analysis validates most of the indicators and indices developed 
from this study’s participatory capacity building framework. Overall, this research 
contributes to the understanding of what FO capacity building means and how to measure it. 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
More than two-thirds of the three billion people comprising the developing world’s 
rural population live on small farms of two hectares or less (Hazell, Poulton, Wiggins, & 
Dorward, 2010). Smallholder farmers (SHF) constitute more than half of the world’s 
undernourished people and the majority of people living in absolute poverty (IFPRI, 2005). 
Due to high transaction costs, immediate cash needs, lack of access to financial services, and 
inaccessibility of more remunerative markets, SHF traditionally have sold their crops to 
intermediaries at the farm gate after harvest (Fafchamps & Vargas Hill, 2005). Selling at 
harvest when prices are low for lack of liquidity, then buying when prices are high for lack of 
household stock (Stephens & Barrett, 2011), the majority of SHF participate in markets as 
net buyers of the very food they produce. (Barrett, 2008).  
Governments, development organizations, and private sector actors along the supply 
chain have formed multi-stakeholder partnerships aimed at altering the “sell low, buy high” 
dynamic by shifting producers from informal to formal markets (Ferris et al., 2014; Neven, 
Odera, Reardon, & Wang, 2009; WFP, 2012). Efforts captured under the umbrella of local 
and regional procurement (LRP) focus on increasing the quantity and improving the quality 
of commodity marketed, bolstering storage infrastructure and technology, and strengthening 
linkages bridging farmers to the network of actors along the value chain, including input 
dealers, financial service providers, and formal market buyers.    
1.1 Problem Statement 
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Farmer’s Organizations (FOs) serve as an important platform through which LRP 
and other rural development projects reach their target population (Collion & Rondot, 2001; 
World Bank, 2003). In recognition that FOs promote equitable growth and poverty 
reduction (Chen, Jhabvala, Kanbur, & Richards, 2007; World Bank, 2008), as well as 
decrease transaction costs, strengthen producer bargaining power, and improve market 
access through collective action (Berdegué, 2004; Rondot & Collion, 2001), capacity building 
of FOs has become a cornerstone of rural development policies and projects, including LRP.  
Though most capacity building efforts narrowly focus on augmenting technical 
capacities to produce and market commodities through investments in storage, equipment, 
and trainings, this study draws attention to the functional capacities of FOs. Organizational 
capacity to manage conflict, to generate consensus, to adapt to dynamic conditions, and to 
cultivate trust not only enables collective action such as group sales, but also impacts the 
distribution of program benefits and influences project viability beyond the funding cycle.   
 
 
This study seeks to clarify the conceptualization of FO capacity and capacity 
building, to refine monitoring and evaluation of FO capacity and capacity building projects, 
and to highlight the relationship between capacity building and capacity assessments. 
Further, this study aims to develop and validate indicators and indices of FO functional 
capacity, the abilities which enable FOs to achieve their strategic objectives.  
To contextualize FO capacity building, this research hones in on the United Nations 
(UN) World Food Programe’s (WFP’s) Purchase for Progress (P4P) program, a pilot 
program launched in September 2008, which contracted 450,102 metric tons (mt) of SHF-
1.2 Study Scope and Objectives 
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produced commodity from 20 pilot countries valued above $177 million through the pilot 
period ending in December 2013 (WFP, 2013b). Procurement from SHF is being 
mainstreamed into WFP operations (WFP, 2013c), with 120,000 mt of SHF-produced 
commodity, valued at over $42 million, contracted in the first year of post-pilot operations 
(WFP, 2015). Though implementation strategies vary across countries, all 20 P4P pilot 
countries utilized FOs as a conduit to SHF for collective marketing and capacity building. 
This research includes field work designed to investigating the functional organizational 
capacity of P4P and non-P4P FOs in Ghana and Malawi.   
 
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 frames the challenge of SHF market access, 
presents ways to categorize SHF and FOs based upon their market participation and 
function, and reviews evidence related to FOs and collective marketing. The chapter 
explores the group factors and rules enabling collective action, drawing attention to rules-
based trust and the impact of trust on organizational performance. Chapter 2 concludes by 
extending the sustainable livelihoods analysis framework to enable meso-level analysis 
through the adoption of organizational capital, the structures, processes, and motivation of 
organizations generating trust and social capital.  
With the significance of FOs as entities with the potential to transform SHF market 
access established, Chapter 3 structures a nuanced conceptualization of FO capacity and 
explores the intersection between beneficiary participation and capacity building. The 
chapter examines the role of training in capacity building, key drivers of capacity building, 
and the time horizon required to build different types of FO capacity.  
1.3 Overview of  Study 
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Successful FO capacity building necessitates information about current capacity to 
compare against futures visions, yielding capacity gaps to be addressed through strategic 
planning and project implementation. Organizational capacity assessments serve a variety of 
purposes at different level, as developed in Chapter 4. After surveying different types of 
assessments used by organizations working to build FO capacity, the chapter compares tool 
content against the organizational change, organizational capital, and collective action 
literatures. It further develops functional capacity indicators and indices to complement the 
SCOPEinsight Basic assessment tool, which P4P intends to adopt to standardize FO 
capacity assessments across countries.  
Chapter 5 broadly reviews the P4P pilot, with a focus on the P4P experience in 
Ghana and Malawi. Utilizing primary data gathered from FOs in those countries, this 
chapter presents findings on functional capacity, including analysis of the indicators and 
indices proposed in Chapter 4. Secondary data sources include procurement data collected 
by WFP headquarters from both countries through December 2014, FO records from 
Ghana, and transaction records from the Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ACE) in 
Malawi.  
Chapter 6 reviews how a multi-level participatory capacity building framework shifts 
our understanding of the objectives, methods, and outcomes of FO capacity building, 
summarizing recommendations, and presenting areas for further study. 
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Chapter 2 
 THE ROLE OF FARMERS’ ORGANIZATIONS IN IMPROVING MARKET ACCESS 
FOR SMALLHOLDER FARMERS  
  
Market access shapes the livelihood strategies of smallholder farmers. Barriers to and 
enablers of market access exist at multiple levels, such as trade and production policies at the 
national level, infrastructure at the regional level, standards for weights and measures at the 
district level, number of buyers and sellers at the location level, and transaction costs at the 
individual level. This chapter explores the challenge of market access for smallholder 
farmers, utilizes market orientation to segment the smallholder sector, and examines the 
multiple roles and functions of FOs in improving farmer outcomes, including access to input 
and output market through collective action. This chapter concludes with an investigation of 
the factors and rules enabling individuals to address coordination challenges through 
collective action.     
 
 
Market access determines whether or not prospective buyers and sellers are able to 
exchange goods or services on terms which enable transactions. De Janvry, Fafchamps, & 
Sadoulet (1991) describe lack of market access as a “missing market”, or a market failure 
occurring at the household level, rather than the location or commodity level. Though the 
transaction space exists, individual households opt out of participation when transaction 
costs outweigh the benefits potentially captured from the foregone exchange. Market access 
2.1 Smallholder Segmentation and Market Access 
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is heterogeneous across households due to different transaction costs of market participation 
and varying degrees of spatial integration (Barrett, 2008).  
Though specific households face unique constraint sets, Canigiani (2005) identifies 
nine barriers broadly limiting SHF market access: awareness, technology, organization and 
management skills, production, productivity, financial resources, infrastructure, information, 
and policy environment. Lack of connections to established market actors, distortions or 
absence of input and output markets, and credit constraints further hamper SHF access to 
markets (Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009), with farmers in remote 
locations characterized by inadequate transportation and storage infrastructure particularly 
disadvantaged (IFAD, 2003). In eastern and southern Africa, high transaction costs and poor 
infrastructure manifest in lack of spatial and temporal market integration, weak producer 
response to price signals, and high price variability (Rapsomanikis, 2009). 
Market access influences production and investment decisions, constraining 
opportunity sets, livelihood strategies, and well-being. As summarized in the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development’s (IFAD’s) (2001) Rural Poverty Report 2001,   
Farmers’ inability to market produce means lack of income for production 
inputs, consumer goods and immediate cash requirements, and prevents 
asset accumulation. Market access thus influences farmers’ production 
systems: those who live close to better roads and have more frequent and 
direct contact with the market are willing to produce more systematically for 
the market, while those with poor market access are forced to produce for 
domestic consumption. (p. 161) 
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The relationship between market access, production systems, and welfare enables 
classification of the world’s 400-500 million smallholder households. Though smallholder 
households can be segmented by asset holdings or income (International Finance 
Corporation, 2011; Nagayets, 2005; World Bank, 2008), degree of market orientation has 
emerged as a primary characteristic differentiating between smallholders with different types 
of market engagement and decision-making (Jayne, Mather, & Mghenyi, 2010; Seville, 
Buxton, & Vorley, 2011; van Manen et al., 2012). While subsistence farmers diversify their 
crops and livelihood strategies, making production and marketing decisions based upon 
household food requirements; commercial farmers specialize production, rely more heavily 
upon agriculture as a livelihood strategy, and allow market signals and comparative 
advantage to guide production and marketing decision (Jaleta, Gebremedhin, & Hoekstra, 
2009).  
Peck, Anderson, & Anderson (2013) further distinguish between commercial SHF in 
tight value chains and those in loose value chains. Well-capitalized smallholders in tight value 
chains, producing primarily cash crops on a contract basis, typically have access to value 
chain financing, equipment leasing, long-term loans, and innovative types of production and 
weather insurance. Commercial SHF in loose value chains produce staple crops with some 
cash crops, regularly market their surplus production in informal spot transactions, but rarely 
engage in formal contracts with traders of specific commodities. This segment may have 
access to savings and input financing through agricultural banks, microfinance institutions, 
savings and loan groups, full-time traders, and input suppliers. The authors estimate that 7% 
of the global smallholder population are commercially-oriented and in tight value chains, 
  
8 
 
33% are commercially-oriented though in loose value chains, and 60% are non-commercial, 
subsistence producers.  
Differences in productivity, access to finance, and market participation manifest in a 
high degree of market concentration within the smallholder sector. A review of 12 studies 
investigating SHF participation in staple food markets across eastern and southern Africa 
finds that between 2 and 10% of producers account for 50-75% of staple commodity sold by 
smallholders (Barrett, 2008). These sellers are relatively wealthy, with larger landholdings, 
and greater market access, representing both commercial SHF in tight value chains with 
some staples to market, and better-off commercial SHF in loose value chains. 
 Empirical studies highlighting the results of alternate livelihood and investment 
strategies stemming from different levels of resources and access to markets reflect the 
multiple equilibria posited in the theoretical work on poverty traps. Trapped in a cycle of 
low-return investments designed to mitigate risk, poor smallholders rely on negative coping 
strategies to weather negative shocks, eroding their productive potential and resulting in 
persistent poverty (Bardhan, Bowles, & Gintis, 2000; Barrett, Bezuneh, Clay, & Reardon, 
2005; Dercon & Krishnan, 1996; Ellis, 2000). By contrast, better-off households are able to 
generate a buffer to protect against negative shocks by investing in higher-risk, higher-return 
strategies, leading to a virtuous cycle of asset investment and accumulation.  
By providing access to productive assets, financial services, production and market 
information, and higher-value markets, FOs broaden the range of strategies available to 
members, potentially propelling SHF trapped in the viscous cycle of low-risk, low-return 
investments toward more remunerative strategies. Collective marketing through FOs enables 
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members to aggregate their surplus into a single tradable lot, which reduces the per-unit 
costs of transaction limiting SHF access.  
 
 
Organizations from local to international levels can be classified according to 
ownership sector and purpose. While public organizations are owned by the government and 
serve collective interests, individually-owned private organizations are driven by profit. 
Uphoff (1986) identifies a third sector of organizations which promotes common interests, 
yet operates with private sector flexibility. Though it does not wield the authority of public 
sector, this participatory middle sector is not primarily motivated by profit-seeking.  
Hobley and Shields (2000) identify role and function as an additional dimension of 
organizational delineation, differentiating between enabling, delivery, and user/client 
agencies. The authors distinguish between constitutional enabling agencies which establish, 
monitor, and enforce the framework and guidelines for all organizations, and collective 
choice enabling agencies which aim to change policies and institutions to their favor. 
Delivery agencies provide goods and services to groups and individuals, while user/client 
agencies increase members’ access to resources and benefits. Table 1 presents examples of 
agricultural organizations organized in a matrix comprised of enabling agencies, delivery 
agencies, and user/agent agencies across the spectrum of public to private organizations.   
 
2.2  Farmers’ Organizations and Smallholder Access to Markets 
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Adapted from Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Sourcebook with Cases, by N. Uphoff, 
1986, and The Reality of Trying to Transform Structures and Processes: Forestry in Rural Livelihoods, by 
M. Hobley and D. Shields, 2000. 
 
As participatory organizations, FOs perform the across the entire spectrum of roles 
and functions: lobbying for farmer-friendly policies as enabling agencies, providing inputs 
and collective marketing services to members as delivery agencies, and facilitating member 
Role and function Public Participatory Private
Enabling
Constitutional Ministry of 
Agriculture;    
Bureau of Weights 
and Measures
Advisory committees   
to the government
Inspection 
companies
Collective 
Choice
District Assembly Community-based 
resource management 
groups;                       
Third-tier FOs 
advocating for improved 
market access
Lobby groups
Delivery Strategic grain 
reserves; 
Government 
marketing boards
Non-governmental 
organizations 
distributing assets or 
services;             
Outgrower schemes;       
FOs providing      
services to members
Enterprises; 
Agrodealers;           
Commodity 
exchanges 
User/Client Consumer 
protection groups
School feeding 
committees;               
FOs connecting 
members to finance 
institutions
Consumers;       
Trader 
associations
Sector
Table 1.  
Typology of  organizations 
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access resources and benefits as user agencies. Beyond role and function, FOs can be 
categorized according to the layers of their internal structure. While first-tier, or primary, 
FOs organize farmers into community-based organizations (CBOs) with limited geographic 
range primarily to purchase inputs collectives, secondary FOs unite primary FOs into unions 
at the district level, and tertiary FOs aggregate secondary unions into federations at the 
regional or national level. Table 2 presents features of these different FO types.    
 
Adapted from “FO selection and progression” by D. Fontaine, in P4P Guidance (draft), by 
World Food Programme, 2016. 
 
Feature First-tier: Grassroots CBOs Second-tier: Unions Third-tier: Federations
Structure Grassroots and    
community-based
Umbrella structure of 
first-tier FOs
Super umbrella body 
of second-tier FOs
Membership 10 to several hundred Several hundreds to 
several thousands
Thousands
Geography Locality District Regional, national
Leadership Elected from membership 
base
Elected from 
representatives of first-
tier FOs
Elected from 
representatives of 
second-tier FOs
Management Executive committee 
leaders
A few paid employees Highly trained 
professional and 
technical staff
Function Basic collective action, 
primarily the joint    
purchase of inputs
Provide first-tier FOs 
with access to market, 
credit, inputs, extension 
and other servicecs
Advocate for farmers; 
Connect second-tier 
FOs to markets, 
credit, and inputs
Marketing Collective sales on spot 
markets
Collective sales through 
contracts and spot 
market transactions
Link second-tier FOs 
to national and 
international sales 
opportunities
FO type
Table 2. 
Features of  different types of  FOs 
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While all three levels of FOs provide combinations of goods, services, and collective 
sales opportunities to members as delivery agencies, third-tier FOs advocate for institutional 
changes conducive to producers as collective choice enabling agencies, while first-tier FOs 
focus on member access to resources as user/client agencies. While these categories frame 
an understanding of the role, function, and features of FO types, it should be noted that 
FOs conduct business in a myriad of unique ways. The range of services, goods, and 
opportunities available to members reflects not only production possibilities defined by the 
biophysical environment, incentives offered and constraints imposed by the institutional 
environment, but also member priorities, objectives, and goals which shape the structures, 
processes, and motivation of the FO. Effective capacity building strategies are adapted not 
only to the different functions and features characterizing FO tiers, but also to FO-specific 
objectives.    
To achieve economies of scale at the FO level and service delivery efficiency at the 
partner level, development organizations working to build FO capacity often strive to 
aggregate primary FOs into secondary unions (IFAD, 2013). While broadening membership 
has the potential to decrease marginal costs of input and output market transactions, it 
increases coordination costs, particularly if the expansion increases heterogeneity in terms of 
members’ interests in FO operations (Bernard & Spielman, 2009). Bernard et al. (2010) find 
tradeoffs between inclusive membership, participatory governance, and marketing 
performance, with market-oriented FOs likely to exhibit strengths in only two of the three 
dimensions.  
Evidence substantiates the ability of FOs to compensate for market imperfections 
such as high transaction costs, missing credit markets, and coordination gaps and to improve 
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SHF access to markets (Markelova et al., 2009). Empirical studies find that collective action 
through FOs reduces barriers to market entry, improves SHF bargaining power with buyers 
and intermediaries, and opens previously inaccessible high-value markets to SHF (Devaux et 
al., 2009; Kherallah, Delgado, Gabre-Madhin, Minot, & Johnson, 2002; Thorp, Stewart, & 
Heyer, 2005). 
However, FO membership is exclusive. Members, and to an even greater extent 
leaders, are better off than the general population from which the membership base is 
derived (Rondot & Collion, 2001). Non-members do benefit from spill-over effects such as 
knowledge transfer from members to non-members, participation in collective sales through 
FOs (Bernard & Spielman, 2009), as well as through utilization of FO capacity building 
investments in infrastructure and equipment, which generate efficiencies at the locality level 
(Humphrey & Navas-Alemán, 2010). 
Membership in FOs does not automatically propel SHF to higher-level equilibria. 
The high concentrations of assets, access to input and output markets, and marketed surplus 
within the smallholder sector render an estimated 50% of SHF unable to participate in 
formal markets (Ferris et al., 2014), regardless of FO membership or supply-side support. 
Participation in FO activities is frequently uneven through the membership base, with 
better-off, more diversified members physically proximate to FO headquarters or collection 
points more likely to benefit from the formal market opportunities generated by FOs relative 
to their poorer, more remote peers without alternate means of income (Amani, 2014a).  
While collective action among SHF generates efficiencies through bulking, quality 
control, and access to storage and inputs, the transaction costs of organizing which include 
establishing rules, as well as monitoring and enforcing the rules, may offset cost savings 
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gained, particularly for staple foodgrains with slim profit margins (Berdegué, 2004; 
Stockbridge, Dorward, & Kydd, 2003). Collective marketing of staple cereals and pulses 
poses unique challenges in sub-Saharan Africa, including generally low returns to producers, 
non-differentiability on local markets, and a history of political market interference favoring 
urban populations (Bernard & Spielman, 2009). In a context characterized by limited spatial 
and temporal price integration resulting in high local price variability, low barriers to entry 
and many traders, and lack of contract enforcement mechanisms, collective sales on formal 
markets requires overcoming ample opportunities for side-selling to traders at higher prices 
than contracted.  
Due to the high costs of organizing and relatively low transaction costs of marketing 
undifferentiated commodity destined for informal spot markets, FOs marketing staple 
foodgrains realize poor economic and financial outcomes relative to FOs in specialized 
markets with higher transaction costs (Coulter, 2007; Hellin, Lundy, & Meijer, 2009). 
Barham and Chitemi (2009) find that in the absence of relationships with buyers providing 
steady and significant demand, FOs marketing grains and pulses are less likely to improve 
market performance relative to FOs commercializing high-value perishables, such as 
vegetables and fruits.  
In addition to the challenges unique to groups marketing staple foodgrains, 
successful FOs must navigate the hurdles facing all collective action organizations, including 
technical competence, generating group consensus and commitment, fostering trust within 
the FO and between the FO and other actors, as well as creating, monitoring, and enforcing 
rules of membership and participation. Cooperation requires assets relatively scarce among 
SHF such as basic education and financial literacy, management and entrepreneurial skills, 
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and financial capacity (Hulme & Shepherd, 2003; Pingali, Khwaja, Meijer, & Meijer, 2005; 
Stringfellow, Coulter, Lucey, McKone, & Hussain, 1997). Cooperation further requires trust 
and transparency (Ostrom, 1990), as mistrust between members or between members and 
management can sabotage FO viability (Masakure & Henson, 2005), as can corruption and 
political hijacking (Key & Runsten, 1999). Close social relations also threaten to interfere 
with rules enforcement, eroding the credibility and function of community-based 
organizations (Berdegué, 2004; Mude, 2006). 
Despite these challenges, some FOs focused on staple foodgrains improve market 
performance. Factors enabling success include financial support from partners and 
diversification into specialized markets with high transaction costs (Barham & Chitemi, 
2009; Berdegué, 2004; Chirwa et al., 2005; Coulter, 2007; FAO, 2001). Thorp et al. (2005) 
attribute FO success in rectifying market failures to the identification and exploitation of an 
economically viable market opportunity, social legitimacy, appropriate leadership which does 
not threaten cooperation, supportive ideology and institutional design, and an appropriate 
catalyst for group formation.  
Shifting producers from informal to formal markets necessitates organizational-level 
commitment to collective marketing, an endogenous desire to change how the FO conducts 
business, and consensus at the member level to contribute commodity for collective sales. 
Though traditional marketing channels offer lower prices at harvest and non-standardized 
weights unfavorable to producers, informal markets offer seller benefits such as 
instantaneous cash payments for spot transactions of multiple commodities with minimal 
quality standards, as well as flexibility in the timing of transactions and cash inflows  (Amani, 
2014b). Formal market contracts reduce the uncertainty of prices, weights, and measures, 
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however producing specific commodities with rigid specifications necessitates investing to 
attain quality standards, sacrificing individual choice regarding the timing of transactions, and 
waiting through the lengthy transaction process. In P4P, wait times between deposit and 
distribution of payment averaged between 30 and 60 days (Bymolt, Decaterina, & Krieger, 
2011), a challenge for cash-strapped smallholder producers to endure. To organize collective 
marketing on formal markets, FOs must to establish, monitor, and enforce rules regarding 
aggregation and side-selling.  
 
 
Consensus has been reached on the contextual variables influencing the likelihood of 
groups overcoming social dilemmas. These include a common understanding shared among 
group, the size of the total collective benefit, the marginal contribution made by individual 
members, the cost of failure to cooperate, the temptation to free ride, the choice to 
participate or not, the presence of leadership, the autonomy to make binding rules, the 
history of past experience, and the level of social capital (Ostrom, 2000a).  
The above factors influence the severity of coordination problems and the 
distributional struggles associated with collective action in well-documented ways, however 
the impact of group size and internal heterogeneity remains strongly contested (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999; Esteban & Ray, 2001; Hardin, 1982; Heckathorn, 1993; Keohane & Ostrom, 
1995; Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999; Molinas, 1998; Olson, 1965). The lack of consensus 
reflects challenges in isolating the influence of group size, multiple dimensions of 
heterogeneity, and conceptual and practical problems with the hypothesized links between 
small size, homogeneity, and collective action (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004).  
2.3  Group Factors and Rules Enabling Collective Action 
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The prospects for successful collective action may be inversely related to group size. 
As membership numbers increase, coordination costs rise, opportunities for frequent 
interaction and monitoring decrease, the threat of sanctions diminishes, and individuals 
perceive their contributions as negligible relative to the group’s requirements (Axelrod, 1984; 
Olson, 1965). On the other hand, larger groups can achieve higher levels of collective 
provision than smaller groups (Esteban & Ray, 2001), and individual decisions about the size 
of contributions may be less sensitive to group size than anticipated (Brunner & Sonstelie, 
2003). The debate is confounded by imprecision regarding the threshold dividing large and 
small groups, and the degree to which context influences assessment of group size (Poteete 
& Ostrom, 2004). 
Assumptions regarding the positive impact of group homogeneity upon collective 
action outcomes reflects the myth of community (Guijt & Shah, 1998), which is a failure to 
perceive the differences within communities and their effects upon local politics (Agrawal & 
Gibson, 1999). Multiple dimensions of heterogeneity have been investigated, including 
socio-cultural backgrounds, ethnicities, economic interests, endowments, wealth and 
entitlements, and political alliances (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Keohane & Ostrom, 1995), 
with the impact of diversity along these dimensions dependent upon context. Group 
homogeneity in social class and ethnicity may support consensus building and norm 
enforcement (Blair 1996), though heterogeneity in interests may generate a few key 
individuals extremely committed to coordinated action even if the majority are not (Hardin, 
1982; Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985; Olson, 1965). Heterogeneity in political capital can 
yield local elite providing leadership and necessary authority for rules enforcement (Vedeld, 
2000), and heterogeneity across multiple dimensions may enable groups to draw upon 
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complementarities to build a strong foundation for collective (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). 
“Field research shows that, despite the recurrent argument that homogeneous groups are 
more effective, heterogeneity does not have a uniform effect on the likelihood of 
organization collective action and little, if any, effect on the sustainability of such collective 
actions” (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001, p.750). 
The diversity of institutional and biophysical environments in which groups of 
different compositions and sizes have overcome a broad array of collective problems 
suggests that rather than one rules-based solution, local knowledge can be harnessed to 
overcome specific coordination problems by crafting institutions that generate customized 
incentives perceived by participants as legitimate and fair (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). 
A great deal of work has been done on the rules which enable self-organized groups 
to successfully address collective action problems. Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom (1990) 
attributes failure to successfully manage collective action problems to internal factors such as 
lack of communication, lack of trust, lack of shared vision/mission, and elite capture, as well 
as external factors, including authorities, policies, and rapid changes made without sufficient 
response time.   
Ostrom’s research into how groups survive for long periods of time and overcome 
collective action problems yields a set of locally-created institutions adhering to design 
principles. Her institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework is supported 
through empirical research on rule-based trust enabling individuals to overcome a wide 
diversity of social dilemmas and collective-action problems (Berkes, 1989; Bromiley & 
Cummings, 1998; Bromley et al., 1992; Fairhead & Leach, 1996; Fine & Holyfield, 1996; J. 
G. March & Olsen, 1985; McCay & Acheson, 1990). Stockbridge et al. (2003) adapts these 
  
19 
 
design principles for application to FOs, as elaborated in the bulleted list below, and further 
developed in Section 4.5.1 as indicators proposed for FO capacity assessment tools.  
 Clearly defined boundaries. To incentivize cooperation, membership in 
FOs should confer exclusive benefits valued by members. Extending 
services, goods, and opportunities beyond the membership base reduces 
member privilege and incentives for self-monitoring.  
 Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs. Rules governing 
access to FO services should reflect not only local norms and conditions, but 
also the rules guiding member contributions. For example, restricting use of 
FO equipment to members current on annual dues provides incentives for 
members to respect the terms of membership.  
 Collective-choice arrangements. Rules governing member behavior should 
be subject to a transparent and democratic process enabling members to 
change the rules. Leaders cannot change rules affecting members without 
their input, and members need access to a channel for broadcasting, within 
the group, their concerns about the rules and their application.  
 Monitoring. Good rules ensure good results only if effectively monitored by 
all parties. The cost of monitoring decreases with repeated interactions, 
transparency, cooperation, and trust which serve to assure each party others 
are upholding their end of the bargain. In successful FOs, regular meetings, 
financial literacy, and clear communications build trust within the group and 
reduce the cost of monitoring.  
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 Graduated Sanctions. Sanctions reflecting the severity of the offence 
provide incentives for stakeholders to cooperate. Members who serially break 
their promise to contribute commodity to group sales should face stricter 
penalties than those occasionally unable to fulfill their obligations due to 
poor harvest. Sanctions should be clearly communicated, enforceable, and 
deemed appropriate by the group.   
 Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Whether stemming from internal issues 
such as charges of corruption, or external issues such as a buyer failing to 
pay, unresolved conflicts threaten to erode trust and social capital within 
groups. Members and leaders of FOs should have rapid access to low-cost, 
local arenas to resolve conflict.  
 Minimal recognition of rights to organize. As the priorities of external 
authorities and FO likely conflict, members need long-term rights to FO 
services, goods, and opportunities unchallenged by external authorities. Field 
work revealed numerous instances of external interference including 
crowding out member contributions on P4P contracts, orchestrating and 
compelling unfavorable FO sales to unscrupulous buyers, forcing FOs to 
extend loans to non-members, and forbidding loan repayment.     
 Nested enterprises, for resources that are parts of larger systems. FO 
unions and federations should to be built from the bottom up, rather than 
the top down, with well-organized and effective primary groups serving as 
the foundation for higher-tier FO success.  
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The IAD framework focuses on rules-based trust, though organizations can generate 
other types of trust, including dispositional trust, history-based trust, category-based trust, 
role-based trust, and third parties as conduits of trust (Kramer, 1999). Within organizations, 
levels of trust include affective trust between members and other members, generated by 
feelings or emotions about the trustworthiness of peers; and cognitive trust between FO 
members and leaders, based upon a rational process of evaluating leaders’ ability to advance 
member interests (Hansen, Morrow Jr., & Batista, 2002).  
Developed to reflect local norms and conceptualizations of fairness, “shared 
prescriptions (must, must not, or may) that are mutually understood and predictably 
enforced” (E. Ostrom, 2010, p. 262), either by members themselves or by agents responsible 
for monitoring and enforcement, foster rules-based trust. Defined as “the extent to which 
one believes that others will not act to exploit one’s vulnerabilities” (Hansen et al., 2002, p. 
42), trust enables broad public participation in collective problem solving and decision 
making (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993), rendering “collective action of various sorts more 
feasible” (Uphoff, 2000, p. 229). Trust brings a host of benefits to organizations including 
improved information flows within the group (Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2002; Lin, 2001; 
Serageldin & Grootaert, 2000), better and more complete data collection (Tschannen-Moran 
& Hoy, 2000), more productive conflict resolution (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000), as well as 
increased acceptance of dispute resolution procedures and outcomes (Tyler, 1994). In the 
context of organizational change, trust supports workplace learning by creating a climate in 
2.3.1  Rules-Based Trust, Social Capital, and Organizational Capital.  
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which learners feel safe to seek feedback and help, to vocalize concerns and mistakes, and to 
adopt innovative behaviors (Edmondson, 2004).  
Trust further enhances organizational performance by reducing transaction costs 
through spontaneous sociability and voluntary deference. Spontaneous sociability refers to 
cooperation within the parameters established by the formation of new associations 
(Fukuyama, 1995). Examples of spontaneous sociability include individual contributions of 
time and effort to the achievement of collective goals (Murnigham, Kim, & Metzger, 1993; 
Olson, 1965), sharing useful information with other members (Bonacich, 1987), and utilizing 
restraint when accessing valuable, but limited, organizational resources (Messick et al., 1983; 
Tyler & Degoey, 1995). For FOs organizing collective action, spontaneous sociability 
reduces coordination costs by preventing conflicting member priorities from escalating into 
coordination hurdles for FO leaders and structures to negotiate.  
Trust enables hierarchical relationships by reducing the costs of monitoring through 
individual willingness to comply with organizational rules and to voluntarily defer to 
organizational leaders (Arrow, 1974; G. J. Miller, 1993; Ostrom, 2000), giving leaders the 
freedom to make decisions without having to justify every action to members (Creed & 
Miles, 1993). Among the FOs sampled in Ghana and Malawi, those whose leaders lost the 
trust of their members suffered from stagnation and passive member resistance including 
refusal to attend meetings and to participate in FO activities.  
Trust is a valuable asset for FOs and a primary component of social capital, “the 
shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expectations about patterns of 
interactions that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity” (E. Ostrom, 2000, p. 
176). Alternate definitions of social capital reference additional facets such as dense 
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interlocking networks of relationships between individuals and groups (Portes, 1998; 
Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 1998), reciprocity (Oakerson, 1993; M. Taylor, 1982), and social 
norms (Coleman, 1988; DFID, 1999; Ostrom, 1990). IFAD finds that FOs “with weak 
social capital are not sustainable and often fail to bring real and shared benefits to their 
members” (Anyonge et al., 2014, p.2). 
Social capital is central to not only to understanding how individuals coordinate to 
achieve collective action, but also to our conceptualization of the assets enabling people to 
achieve positive livelihood outcomes. The sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) recognizes 
the seasonal and cyclical complexity of livelihood strategies, and guides rural development 
policy and practice by drawing attention to shocks, coping strategies, and access to assets 
(Scoones, 1998). In the SLA framework, the range of livelihood strategies available to an 
individual is determined by their access to five different types of assets: human, financial, 
physical, natural, and social capital (DFID, 1999). Access to assets is determined through 
transforming structures and processes, also referred to as policies, institutions, and processes 
(Hobley & Shields, 2000).  
Sustainable livelihoods is integrated into development approaches and data collection 
at both the micro and the macro levels (Bellon et al., 2005; Bigman, Dercon, Guillaume, & 
Lambotte, 2000), and can be harnessed to explore linkages between macro- and micro-level 
assets and vulnerability contexts (Krantz, 2001). At the meso level, a great deal of work has 
been done in spatially aggregating household economy analysis (HEA) into livelihood zones 
(Boudreau et al., 2008), which have been integrated into Rome-based agency (RBA) 
assessments such as WFP’s comprehensive food security and vulnerability analysis (WFP, 
2009), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and International Labor 
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Organization’s livelihood assessments (FAO & ILO, 2009), and WFP and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ joint assessment missions (WFP and UNHCR, 
2008). Livelihood zone mapping can complement meso-level analysis in poverty mapping 
(Erenstein, Hellin, & Chandna, 2010; Kristjanson, Radeny, Baltenweck, Ogutu, & 
Notenbaert, 2005), however the role of local governments and organizations as the 
“interface between the down-flow of national or federal policy and the up-flow of local 
aspirations and demands” (Carney, 2003, p. 45) is not well developed. 
The study augments the SLA body of research at the meso-level with a focus on the 
role of FOs in organizing smallholder farmers and mediating the complex and highly 
differentiated process of capacity development. Though the concept of organizational capital 
did not arise from SLA, emerging rather from the field of production economics (Prescott & 
Visscher, 1980; Tomer, 1987), it provides a mechanism for meso-level SLA analysis. 
The literature has not yet converged on a singular definition of organizational capital 
and how to quantify it (Lev, Radhakrishnan, & Evans, 2016), however it is broadly agreed to 
share characteristics such as intangibility and non-transferability with social capital, and 
similarly plays an integral role in organizational outcomes (Ludewig & Sadowski, 2009).  
Varying conceptualizations of organizational capital arise from different disciplines. 
A resource-based approach to organizational capital emphasizes the organizational structures 
and processes activating organizational capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997); while the 
intellectual capital approach accentuates the organizational culture and structures which 
transform learning into applied knowledge (Bueno et al., 2011). Extending the theory of the 
firm, an additional definition of organizational capital encompasses training, the design of 
incentives and organizational processes, and “voice”, the “organizational structures that give 
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workers, especially non-managerial workers, input into the decision-making” (Black & 
Lynch, 2005, p. 4). Organizational capital influences the effectiveness of social capital in 
enabling innovation (Carmona-Lavado, Cuevas-Rodriguez, & Cabello-Medina, 2010), and an 
empirical review finds positive correlations between the trust and member commitment 
inspired by workplace practices and incentives, and improved productivity and growth (Lev 
et al., 2016).    
This research does not attempt to disentangle the complex interrelationships 
between human, social, and organizational capital, but rather acknowledges the linkages, and 
utilizes organizational capital to refer to the organizational structures, processes, and 
motivation which preserve the shared interpretation of the organization’s history and 
purpose through dynamic changes (Lev et al., 2016).    
 
 
Though SHF face systemic market limitations, market access is heterogeneous across 
households. Commercialized SHF in tight value chains are well-connected to services and 
market actors, enabling them to engage in farming as a business; this characterization can be 
extended to commercial SHF in loose value chains to a lesser extent. However, 60% of SHF 
engage in low-risk, low-reward production and marketing strategies reflecting food security 
and cash flow constraints rather than market signals. Production and sales among SHF is 
highly concentrated, and though FOs can improve farmer outcomes by reducing transaction 
costs and improving market access, output market linkages are unlikely to impact the 50% of 
SHF unable to commercialize. 
2.4  Conclusion 
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Farmers’ organizations lobby for farmer-friendly policies as enabling agencies, 
provide inputs and collective marketing services to members as delivery agencies, and 
facilitate member access resources and benefits as user agencies. Primary, secondary, and 
tertiary FOs offer different functions to farmers, and require different capacity building 
strategies. Farmers’ organizations have the potential to improve rural market access and 
promote equitable growth by reducing transaction costs, strengthening producer bargaining 
power, and enabling collective action. However, FO membership is exclusive, and the 
benefits of FO coordination are not evenly distributed, neither through the locality from 
which members are drawn, nor through the membership base.  
Group factors positively impacting the likelihood of successful collective action 
include a common understanding and purpose shared by the group, autonomy to make 
binding rules, and level of social capital. The impacts of group size and heterogeneity remain 
unclear. Rules adhering to Ostrom’s design principles enable collective action and generate 
rules-based trust. Trust enhances organizational performance by improving information 
flows and conflict resolution processes, creating the space for FOs to adopt changes, and 
reducing coordination costs through spontaneous sociability and voluntary deference.  
Though all conceptualizations of social capital refer to trust, definitions differ in the 
secondary dimension of social capital emphasized, with candidates including networks, 
reciprocity, and social norms. Social capital is one of five assets central to the SLA 
framework, which can be extended to meso-level analysis through adoption of an additional 
asset: organizational capital. The research adopts a working definition of organizational 
capital as the structures, processes, and motivation of organizations which preserve the 
shared interpretation of the group’s history and purpose through dynamic changes     
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Trust, social capital, and organizational capital are integral to the performance of 
organizations and to the success of capacity building projects, as developed in Chapter 3. 
During his term as Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz noted that “The 
relatively easy part of capacity development is providing the human capacity, the education, 
the skills and the knowledge required for development. The hard part of capacity-building is 
the development of the organizational and social capital” (Stiglitz, 1998, p. 22). Chapter 3 
draws upon the participatory development literature to present a multi-level framework of 
FO capacity building, which emphasizes the organizational and social capital components of 
FO maturity. Chapter 4 develops indicators of organizational capital and bonding social 
capital, which are tested on primary data collected from FOs in Ghana and Malawi in 
Chapter 5.    
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Chapter 3  
PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES TO FARMERS’ ORGANIZATION CAPACITY 
BUILDING 
 
In recognition of the critical function FOs serve in organizing SHF for collective 
action, governments, donors, and development organizations provide significant resources 
to FO capacity building. Donors contribute between $15 to $20 billion annually to capacity 
building in developing countries (OECD, 2006; Otoo, Agapitova, & Behrens, 2009), and 
almost all World Bank and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) projects support 
capacity building (Constantinou, 2007; FAO, 2010). Between 2006 and 2011, 58% of IFAD-
approved projects included FO participation, accounting for $2.42 billion, or 62% of IFAD’s 
project budget (IFAD, 2014). 
Both capacity development and beneficiary participation are integrated into 
development, however the relationship between the two concepts remains implicit, 
confusion in their working definitions persists, and challenges in measuring the impact of 
capacity development and participation remain. This chapter outlines the historical context 
of capacity building and beneficiary participation, establishes key concepts and definitions, 
and explores participation within the FO capacity building process, including the evidence 
for and limits of participatory capacity building.  
 
 
Institution building in the 1950s and 1960s focused on exporting models of public 
sector functioning from developed to developing counties, reflected donor priorities, and  
3.1 The Evolution of  Capacity Building and Participatory Methods  
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utilized rigid, top-down methodologies derived from the assumption of a linear progression 
from undeveloped to developed states (Easterly, 2007; Mosley, Harrington, & John, 1995). 
With hindsight, it is easy to criticize these crude attempts to utilize macro-economic policies 
as tools for development, however in the late 1950’s and 1960’s many countries emerging 
from a non-democratic colonial past with a high degree of centralization and low degree of 
participation lapsed into dictatorships with similar features (Morse, 2007). Top-down 
development efforts focused on physical infrastructure fit into the framework of highly 
centralized planning and limited freedoms, and research focused on projections of national 
production data and general equilibrium models.  
By the late 1960s, discontent with this development approach began to foment, due 
to ineffectiveness, inefficiency, and propensity toward corruption (Morse, 2007; Robertson, 
1984).  By the 1970s, development efforts shifted from establishing to strengthening public 
institutions primarily by building the capacity of key individuals (DFID, 2002; UNDP, 2009). 
During this time, development initiatives began experimenting with action research designed 
to contextualize and solve social problems (Brown, 1985), leading to solutions deemed 
contextually appropriate (Leach & Scoones, 2006; Sesan, 2014), and World Bank projects 
diversified into education, disease eradication, agricultural and rural development, and 
poverty alleviation (Staples, 2006). 
In recognition that support to public ministries did not generate the expected boosts 
in production and income, people-centered development emerged in the 1980s, focusing on 
self-regulating organizations empowering citizens and local leaders (Korten & Klauss, 1984; 
Korten, 1987). This change in focus accompanied the rise of the Washington Consensus, the 
neoliberal approach to development which promoted liberalization and free trade, while 
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marginalizing the role of governments through privatization of the health, education, energy, 
and agricultural sectors (Gore, 2000). In this context, aid was linked to conditionalities such 
as decreasing public expenditure, eliminating agricultural subsidies and marketing boards, 
and revising prices (Mosley et al., 1995) intended to change the macroeconomic structure of 
the economy, through a process known as structural adjustment. Reflecting this change, 
capacity building efforts shifted from individuals within the public sector to non-public 
organizations, focused on reforming and strengthening private and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) by supporting analysis, asset management, production, and service 
delivery (DFID, 2002; UNDP, 2009). In terms of methodology, action research gave way to 
participatory research, a people-centered learning process of joint inquiry, knowledge 
production, and problem analysis intended to transform local awareness and distribution of 
power (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995; Freire, 2000; Whyte, 1991).  
New institutional economics emerged in the 1990s (Harriss, Hunter, & Lewis, 1995; 
North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990), shifting the focus of capacity building away from organizations 
and toward institutions (DFID, 2002; UNDP, 2009). In tandem, the influential rise of Nobel 
Laureate Amartya Sen’s capability approach resulted in the creation of the Human 
Development Index (UNDP, 1990), emphasizing the role of institutions as enabling or 
inhibiting individual freedoms. In 1992, the United Nations Conference in Rio de Janeiro 
endorsed sustainable development as a guiding principle and stakeholder participation as an 
important means toward sustainability (United Nations 1993 from (Barnaud & van Paassen, 
2013), leading to the enthusiastic adoption of various participatory approaches (Chambers, 
1994; Pretty, 1995) promoting dialogue between local stakeholders, development 
organizations, and researchers (Lélé, 1991). By the early 21st century, participation was 
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enshrined into mainstream development praxis (Mansuri & Rao, 2004), representing, for 
example, over 70% of the World Bank (WB) portfolio by 2006, whereas only 6% of WB 
projects included a participatory component in late 1980s (Werker & Ahmed, 2008).  
During the rise of the participatory methodology, four High Level Forums on Aid 
Effectiveness (2002, 2005, 2008, and 2011), convened representatives of governments, civil 
society organizations, and donors. Though the first meeting in Rome did not explicitly refer 
to capacity building, signatories committed to delivering development assistance in 
accordance with recipient country priorities, to contextualizing development programs, and 
to enhancing demand-driven technical cooperation (OECD, 2003), the tenets of 
participatory capacity building. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness committed 
countries to integrating capacity strengthening objectives into their national development 
strategies and donors to aligning their analytical and financial support with capacity building 
objectives and strategies (OECD, 2005). The follow-up 2008 Accra Agenda for Action 
recommitted to demand-driven capacity building at the national, sub-national, sectoral, and 
thematic levels (OECD, 2008).  The 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation gained even more signatories and reaffirmed commitment to capacity building, 
highlighting the need for capacity assessments and improved monitoring and evaluation 
systems (UNDP-OECD, 2011).   
Capacity building and beneficiary participation represent a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 
2012) away from top-down approaches to development toward empowering beneficiaries to 
take control of  their own capacity development (Chambers, 1995; OECD, 2005). This shift 
reframes the role of outsiders as one of conveners, catalysts, and facilitators, rather than as 
experts, directors, or paternalistic judges (Chambers, 1994). Once designers of standardized 
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technical solutions, development agencies now facilitate and support beneficiaries in 
cultivating and implementing their own technical solutions (Rocchigiani & Dhamotaran, 
2012).  
This shift in power from donors and development agencies to beneficiaries places 
the terms “beneficiary” and “beneficiary participation” on awkward footing, as these 
connote passive recipients rather than active designers. For this reason, the power neutral 
term “partner” has come into use to describe all the actors in the multi-stakeholder capacity 
building process (Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013). For the sake of clarity, this research 
continues to differentiate between different types of partners, using “beneficiary” to refer to 
the final recipients of support, and “implementing partner” to refer to local partners 
receiving project funding to provide technical support to beneficiaries.    
 
 
Capacity building and beneficiary participation have been broadly adopted in 
international development but what does a commitment to these concepts mean? Starting 
with organizations as the unit of analysis, this section differentiates between capacity, 
capacity development and capacity building, presents a multi-level model of capacity, and 
presents the theory of organizational change underlying the participatory capacity building 
process.    
 
 
As the unit of analysis, this section begins with organizations and the process of 
organizational change. In his classic book establishing a framework for new institutional 
3.2 Key Concepts and Definitions  
3.2.1 Capacity and capacity building in a multi-level model. 
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economics, North (1990) defines organizations as “groups of individuals bound by some 
common purpose to achieve objectives” (p.5). With identifiable boundaries, structures, and 
functions, organizations advance the interests of their members and influence the 
institutional environment binding the set of decisions available to them (Aldrich, 2008; 
IFAD, 2008).  
Figure 1 presents an open systems model (Scott & Davis, 2016) in which FOs 
transform inputs into outputs within the operating space defined by the institutional 
environment, itself embedded within the biophysical environment. The FO transformation 
process is constrained by both formal and informal institutions, and FOs attempt to 
influence the institutional environment to create conditions conducive its success and that of 
its members. Uphoff (1986) defines institutions as “complexes of norms and behaviours that 
persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes” (pp. 8-9). North (1990) refers to 
institutions as "any form of constraint that humans devise to shape human interaction" (p. 
4), distinguishing between formal institutions, such as laws and rules, and informal 
institutions, such as norms, guidelines, and codes of conduct. Ostrom (2010) distinguishes 
between rules as “shared prescriptions (must, must not, or may) that are mutually 
understood and predictably enforced in particular situations by agents responsible for 
monitoring conduct and for imposing sanctions,” while norms are “shared prescriptions that 
tend to be enforced by the participants themselves through internally and externally imposed 
costs and inducements” (p. 263). 
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By defining the range of choices available to actors, regulating risk and uncertainty, 
and determining transaction and production costs, institutions determine the feasibility and 
profitability of engaging in economic activities (North, 1990). The ability of FOs to respond 
to the incentives framed by the institutional environment depends upon the capabilities of its 
individual members, as well as the structures, processes, and culture of the FO which 
influence the motivations, incentives, and constraints of individual members.  
Figure 1.   Open systems model of  farmers’ organizations 
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Organizational capacity is defined as “the capability of an organization to achieve 
what it sets out to do” (Fowler, Goold, & James, 1995, p.3). Pact’s broad definition includes 
notions of financial viability and social relevance, “an organization’s ability to achieve its 
mission effectively and sustain itself over the long term” (Pact, 2010, p. xi). IFAD broadens 
the definition of organizational capacity to include institutional elements influencing 
organizational operations and performance: “a combination of human, technical and 
institutional elements (culture, laws, rules, procedures, etc.) which enable an organization to 
achieve its objectives, especially in relation to its vision” (IFAD, 2015, p.7).  
These definitions focus on the ability of organizations to achieve their mission and 
vision, a departure from WFP’s definition of FO capacity, the ability to successfully engage 
in formal market sales (WFP, 2012). Lack of alignment between WFP’s goals for FOs and 
participating FOs’ mission and vision may generate tensions in partnerships, challenges in 
achieving WFP’s procurement goals, and road blocks in capacity building. The importance 
of linking capacity building activities to FO mission and vision runs through this research.   
The concept of capacity has roots in Sen’s capability approach, a normative 
framework emphasizing the substantive freedom available at the individual level which 
enables people to achieve the “beings and doings” (known as “functionings”) they value 
(Sen, 1999). The capability approach shifts focus from individual-level acquisition of skills 
and knowledge toward the freedoms individuals have to apply these skills and knowledge in 
pursuit of their preferred choices. Capabilities, then, are the set of functionings individuals 
have the freedom to achieve, and an agency-focused capability approach seeks to harness 
participation and empowerment to expand the range of economic, social, and political 
actions available to individuals (Crocker, 2008).   
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Though Sen’s capabilities focus on individual-level freedoms to achieve lifestyles 
they value, the concept can be extended to organizations in multi-level systems. In the 
context of FO capacity building, capacity at the individual level reflects members’ ability to 
apply information acquired through trainings and other learning initiatives to improve their 
outcomes (de Rosa & Belman, 2012). Organizational capacity reflects the ability of FOs to 
achieve their mission and vision, and includes access to resources, the systems and processes 
in place to manage resources, and skills such as leadership, communications, negotiation, 
consensus building, and conflict resolution, which generate group cohesion and trust (IFAD, 
2015; Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013). Institutional capacity reflects the ability of formal and 
informal institutions to support organizations and individuals in achieving their desired 
performance levels (USAID, 2010). This definition of institutional capacity is relational, 
rather than an objective description of the institutional environment. The assessment of 
institutional capacity is relative to individual and organizational strategic objectives; a 
particular institution such as an export ban may support the objective of some groups, such 
as urban consumers and governments seeking to keep prices low, while sabotaging the 
objectives of other groups, such as rural producers and traders seeking higher prices across 
borders.       
The influence of Sen upon the conceptualization of capacity building is evident in 
the Figure 2, which depicts FAO’s capacity development framework. Within this framework, 
functional capacities such as the capacity to influence policy, to access and exchange 
knowledge, to initiate and sustain networks, and to manage projects and programs support 
the actualization of technical capacities relevant to achieving strategic objectives, which 
reflect member consensus on organizational vision. In their working paper on capacity 
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building, the Department for International Development draws attention to adaptive 
capacities, which encompass “flexibility to experiment and adopt novel solutions, and 
development of generalized responses to broad classes of challenges,” (DFID, 2008, p. 3), as 
well as the diversity that provides the building blocks for adjusting to change, the capacity to 
learn about how systems multi-level systems work and change, and the capacity to effectively 
govern through the selection, communication, and implementation of appropriate and 
broadly-supported solutions  (Chapin III, Folke, & Kofinas, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
As technical capacities reflect strategic objectives, learning initiatives focusing on 
information transmission and skills development support technical capacities only if the 
Figure 2.    The FAO capacity development framework, reprinted from Enhancing FAO’s 
Practices for Supporting Capacity Development of Member Countries, Learning Module 1, by FAO, 2015, 
p. 24.  
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knowledge imparted reflects the strategic objectives of the FO. For example, technical 
capacity in grading commodity to achieve codex standards is a relevant technical capacity for 
a specific FO only if their strategic objectives include sale of graded commodity to buyers 
with formal quality standards. Strategic objectives embody the vision, mission, and identity 
of the FO, and activities extraneous to an FO’s strategic objectives are less likely to continue 
after the project lifecycle (Fowler et al., 1995).  
By contrast, functional capacities are broadly applicable across strategic objectives, 
and reflect organizational structures, processes, and motivation which build trust, enhance 
group cohesion, improve individual and organizational effectiveness, and enable 
empowerment. Skills supporting functional capacities include management, leadership, 
budgeting, marketing, information and communication technology; processes such as 
communications, negotiations, consensus building, conflict management, and advocacy; and 
the norms, networks, reciprocity, and trust comprising social capital. Functional capacities 
are “perceived to be a necessary complement to technical (capacity development) 
interventions as they empower the actors to effectively apply the new knowledge/skills and 
upscale the results of the intervention” (FAO, 2015, p. 26).  
Further developed in Section 4.1.2, FO maturity reflects the organization’s functional 
capacities, while the broader notion of organizational capacity encompasses FO maturity, 
technical capacity, institutional capacity, and the biophysical environment.  
Though critical to the success of enduring organizations mobilizing successful 
collective action (Ostrom, 1990), functional capacities are more challenging to develop and 
languish behind technical capacities in capacity building initiatives (IFAD, 2013). Capacity 
building refers to the external interventions or supports intended to facilitate or catalyze 
  
39 
 
change (Simister & Smith, 2010). This contrasts with capacity development, “a necessarily 
endogenous process of unleashing, strengthening, creating and maintaining capacity over 
time” (OECD, 2006, p. 39). Capacity building supports capacity development through a 
multi-stakeholder process of planning, designing, implementing, and monitoring 
interventions designed to change power, identity, and relationships (Pritchard, 2014). If the 
goal of capacity building is to stimulate and support the endogenous process of capacity 
development, capacity building must necessarily include some degree of beneficiary 
participation to effect change process internal to the beneficiary. Writes Clarke (2010), 
“capacity building can … be understood as the inevitable and logical conclusion of 
community participation” (p. 113). 
However, not all beneficiary participation is equal. Beneficiaries sitting for a meeting 
to receive information about an upcoming intervention participate by virtue of attendance, 
however this passive type of participation does not serve the goal of capacity development 
and differs drastically from a participatory process in which beneficiaries contribute to and 
share control of the planning, design, implementation, and monitoring of capacity building 
initiatives. Section 3.3 explores different levels of beneficiary participation in the FO capacity 
building process.  
As outlined in the previous section, the focus of capacity building has shifted from 
individuals to organizations to institutions. The current conceptualization frames capacity 
building within a multi-level system in which individuals, organizations, and institutions 
interact and influence one another. As presented in Figure 3 typical representations of this 
multi-level system include Venn diagrams or hierarchical representations, drawing attention 
to different levels of capacity. 
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While the representations in Figure 3 draw attention to different levels of capacity, 
they obscure the fact that organizations are comprised of individuals, and that formal and 
Figure 3.    Examples of  representations of  different levels of  capacity, reprinted from 
UNESCO’s Capacity Building Framework by A. Matachi, 2006, p. 7, and UNDP’s Capacity 
Development Practice Note, by K. Wignaraja and L. Yocarini, p. 6.  
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informal institutions influence and are influenced by the ways people relate to one another. 
Figure 4 presents an alternate multi-level representation, highlighting the role of individuals 
as elements of organizations and the institutional environment. The biophysical environment 
is not represented in Figure 4 as capacity building cannot directly target natural resources. 
Rather capacity building interventions can seek to influence access to and usage of natural 
capital at the individual level, the resources organizations secure as inputs and transform into 
outputs, as well as the policies, laws, regulations, and norms governing natural resource use.   
 
 
 
 
The role of training. Individuals can acquire information across a variety of 
platforms, however retaining information and transforming it into knowledge and behavioral 
change requires reinforcement through application (de Rosa & Belman, 2012). Stand-alone 
trainings of individuals do not in and of themselves generate behavioral change and capacity 
development, though capacity building necessarily involves expanding the competencies and 
capabilities of people, even if the targets of change are organizations and institutions. 
Figure 4.    Three dimensions of  capacity building. 
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Designing organizations such that the structures, processes, and culture of the group aligns 
with the objectives and goals of its members requires individual-level skills building as well as 
changing the structures, culture, norms, expectations within the organization to support the 
individual making the changes. Similarly, strengthening institutions to support smallholder 
producers requires changing the formal and informal rules that govern the ways people relate 
to one another.  
As an example, changing gender norms in agriculture to enable women to more fully 
participate in commercial crop sales and to control the resources generated from such sales 
requires changing attitudes and perceptions of women: their self-perceptions, the 
perceptions of women within their household, the perceptions of women in the marketplace 
and in transit to market, as well as within the community at large (Somé, 2014).  
Specific barriers learners confront when attempting to apply new information 
include missing physical capital; lack of social support from the community, managers, 
colleagues, or organizational culture; lack of follow-up and organizational support for 
implementing changes; and insufficient individual-level motivation or incentives (de Rosa & 
Belman, 2012).  
 
 
Implicit in capacity building is a conceptualization of the change process and the 
assumption that outside interventions can influence capacity development through 
organizational design, the process of aligning FO components toward the achievement of 
FO goals (Stanford, 2007).  A multitude of frameworks for organizational change exist 
(Aldrich, 2008; McNamara, 2005; Poole & Van de Ven, 2004). Van de Ven & Poole (1995) 
3.2.2 Organizational change. 
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categorize these into four families of change process theories: life-cycle, teleological, 
dialectical, and evolutionary. Table 3 presents defining characteristics of these families. 
 
Adapted from “Explaining Development and Change in Organizations,” by A. H. Van de 
Ven and M. S. Poole, 1995.  
 
In this typology, the capacity building process belongs to the teleological family of 
organizational change theories in which development occurs through a repetitive sequence 
Life cycle Evolution Dialectic Teleology
Key metaphor
Organic 
growth
Competitive 
survival
Oppositional 
conflict
Purposeful 
cooperation
Logic
Prefigured 
sequence
Natural 
selection
Contradictory 
forces
Envisioned end 
state
Event 
progression
Linear & 
irreversible 
sequence
Recurrent, 
cumulative & 
probabilistic 
sequence of 
variation
Recurrent, 
discontinuous 
sequence of 
conflict & 
synthesis
Recurrent, 
discontinuous 
sequence of goal 
setting, 
implementation, 
& adaptation 
Drivers of change
Institutional, 
natural, or 
logical 
program
Competition 
for scarce 
resources
Conflict & 
confrontation
Goal 
implementation, 
M&E, 
modification 
based on 
learning
Barriers to change Cannot Extinction
Inability to 
synthesize
Lack of vision 
and/or 
consensus
Family
Table 3. 
Families of  organizational change theories 
  
44 
 
of goal formulation, implementation, evaluation, and modification of goals and process 
based upon learning (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). These models do not assume pre-
configured rules or sequential stages, rather progress is non-linear and defined by obtaining 
objectives leading to a desired end state. Common names for this family of models include 
planned change, scientific management, strategic planning, organizational development, 
adaptive learning, and total quality management (Kezar, 2001).   
A great many teleological models of organizational change exist (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967; Chakravarthy & Lorange, 1991; Etzioni, 1963; J. G. March & Olsen, 1985; 
J. P. March & Simon, 1993; Merton, 1968; Parsons, 2005), with a good deal of consensus 
between them (Hobley & Shields, 2000). The well-established Kotter (1995) model identifies 
the following steps to achieving organizational change in an iterative process: establish sense 
of urgency, create a change team, create and communicate an explicit vision, empower 
individuals to act on the vision, plan for and create short-term wins, consolidate 
improvements, and institutionalize change (p. 4). Barriers to change include a vision of 
change which is unclear, too complicated, or vague; lack of bonding social capital, 
undermining individuals’ ability to take risks; lack of empowerment, which frames change as 
a threat rather than an opportunity; and failure to create new norms, values, and structures 
consistent with the desired change. The latter barrier highlights the importance of adaptive 
capacity in establishing enduring organizational change.    
Teleological models of the organizational change process have implications upon FO 
capacity building. Teleology frames development as progression toward organizational goals, 
however, the goals of FOs vary, reflecting the interests and needs of their members, the 
objectives which drew the group together, the evolution of group identity, and the 
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distribution of power within the FO. Heterogeneous goals, technical capacities, and 
functional capacities highlight the need for capacity assessments and capacity gap analysis to 
inform customized capacity building strategies. Participatory in nature, organizational 
capacity assessments (OCAs) measure organizational maturity and capacity, while achieving a 
broad array of functions, as developed in Chapter 4. 
Teleological models also identify elements which indicate FO capacity to progress 
toward their goals: a clear and compelling vision, a relevant mission, empowered change 
agents, and consensus on direction. They further offer insights into effective capacity 
building management, namely starting with empowerment, complementing the long-term 
change process with short-term objectives, creating multi-level supports to incentivize the 
change process and empower change agents, and customizing monitoring and evaluation. As 
developed in the next section, these themes are embedded in a participatory capacity 
building framework.  
 
 
For participatory research such as capacity assessments, key dimensions of 
participation include information flows, control over the research process and the data 
collected, the research methods employed, and the time required to participate (Barreteau, 
Bots, & Daniell, 2010). After decades of external researchers descending into communities 
to extract information from people without providing them access to the data, the findings, 
or the processes supported by the data, participatory research highlights the control of 
information. This section explores the intersection of participation with the capacity building 
3.3 Participation in the Capacity Building Process 
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process by first establishing a typology of participation, then exploring participation through 
the stages of a capacity building framework.  
Multiple typologies of beneficiary participation exist (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980; 
Cornwall, 1995; Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin, 1987; N. Nelson & Wright, 1995; Pelling, 
1998; White, 1996), with most building upon Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation, 
developed to describe participation within the urban redevelopment processes. Arnstein’s 
ladder includes eight rungs representing the degree of power devolved to beneficiaries, as 
presented in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Ladder of  citizen participation, reproduced from “A Ladder of  Citizen 
Participation,” by S. Arnstein (1969).    
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According to Arnstein’s typology, the lowest two rungs on the ladder represent 
participation as a pretense, with beneficiary non-participation masquerading as a means for 
external experts to educate passive beneficiaries about their problems and exogenously-
designed solutions. In the middle three rungs, representing degrees of tokenism, information 
is extracted from beneficiaries, while the information is utilized by decision-wielding 
outsiders to varying degrees. In the highest three tiers, control is ceded to beneficiaries. 
Beneficiaries have the power to negotiate with development agencies in partnership 
participation; make the majority of decisions in delegated power participation; and hold full 
managerial power in citizen control participation.  
In participatory capacity building within the agricultural sector, Sperling et al. (2001) 
find three degrees of participation utilized in practice: consultative, collaborative, and collegial. An 
in Arnstein, consultative refers to extracting information from farmers. Collaborative signals task 
sharing between outsiders and farmers, corresponding with Arnstein’s partnership; while 
collegial represents outsiders supporting programs accountable to the farmers rather than 
outsiders, in line with Arnstein’s delegated power and citizen’s control. This research adopts the 
Sperling et al. typology, which reorganizes the upper half of the Arnstein ladder into three 
categories well-suited to describing farmer participation.  
As with participation, a multitude of frameworks of the capacity building process 
also exist. Most share conceptual elements such as interdependence between the individual, 
organizational, and institutional levels; capacity building as a long-term goal requiring 
contextualized, participatory, multi-level strategies; and the endogenous process of capacity 
development which can be facilitated, but not defined, controlled, or expedited by outsiders 
(ADB, 2008; Matachi, 2006; Otoo et al., 2009; Rocchigiani & Dhamotaran, 2012; UNDP, 
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2009; USAID, 2010). Reflecting teleological models of the organizational change process, 
the steps of the capacity building process established in these frameworks are similar, though 
differences arise in the aggregation of steps into stages. For example, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and FAO approaches separate visioning 
and capacity gap identification as distinct stages (Rocchigiani & Dhamotaran, 2012; USAID, 
2010); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009) framework enfolds 
these steps into the capacity assessment stage; while the World Bank includes them as steps 
in the capacity building strategy stage (Otoo et al., 2009). To draw attention to the well-
established role of visioning in building consensus around long-term goals, in enabling 
collective action, and in strategic planning for sustainable development (Conroy & Berke, 
2004; Loorbach, 2010; Rudd, 2000; Weaver & Rotdams, 2006; Arnim Wiek & Iwaniec, 
2014), this paper utilizes the stages identified in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.     Stages in the capacity building process. 
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Despite similarities across capacity building frameworks, imprecise definitions of 
capacity, participation, and capacity building generates disparities in the ways projects 
understand FO capacity development and participation within the capacity building process 
(World Bank, 2012). Involving beneficiaries as early as possible enables a local definition of 
needs and priorities (Pelling, 1998), promotes ownership, responsibility, and sustainability 
(Chambers, 1994), and improves impact (Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin, 1987). Continuous 
participation early in the project is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of 
empowerment (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980; N. Nelson & Wright, 1995). Drawing upon the 
Sperling et al. (2001) typology, Table 4 presents the range of FO participation within the 
capacity building framework developed in this section.  
Though Figure 6 presents the capacity building process as an iterative lifecycle, and it 
is developed as such in this section, the seven stages identified can run concurrently, and do 
not necessarily occur sequentially. For example, though monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is 
identified as the final stage, decisions regarding M&E are considered throughout the entire 
capacity building process.  
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Consultative Collaborative Collegial
1. Planning FOs congregate 
participants for 
assessment
FOs participate in 
scheduling the 
assessment
FOs participate in 
scheduling the assessment, 
selecting appropriate 
modules and indicators
2. Assess 
capacity
Assessment 
conducted by 
partners;                                 
FOs provide input
FOs conduct 
assessment;         
Facilitator scoring
FOs conduct, score, and 
analyze assessment
3. Visioning None FO leaders offer 
facilitator futures 
visions
Members offer futures 
visions;                                          
FO builds consensus on 
values, priorities, and goals
4. Capacity 
gap
Gaps identified by 
implementing 
partners
Facilitator assists 
FO in gap analysis
FO compares visions with 
current situation, identifies 
and prioritizes capacity gaps
5. Capacity 
building 
strategy
Partners generate 
strategic plan aligned 
with project 
budget/goals
Facilitator-led 
process, FOs 
participate in 
aligning strategic 
plan with project 
budget/goals
FOs generate and own 
strategic plan aligned with 
FO goals
6. Implemen-
tation
Partners implement 
plan;                                 
FO members attend 
trainings, workshops, 
and other activities
Partners and FOs 
jointly implement 
plan
Partners and FOs jointly 
implement plan;                    
FO designs incentives to 
implement changes;                                
FO seeks additional partners 
to address gaps beyond 
project budget/focus
7. M&E Partners ask FOs 
about progress on 
key indicators, 
formulate 
recommendations 
FO monitors some 
indicators;         
Partners conduct 
analysis;                         
FO participates in 
validation workshop
FO monitors indicators, 
conducts analysis, adjusts 
course;                          
Findings validated for 
external use through 
triangulation 
Level of FO participation
Stage
Table 4. 
Range of  FO participation in the capacity building process. 
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The planning process begins with engaging stakeholders to generate enthusiasm for, 
commitment to, and ownership of the capacity building process. The priorities of donors, 
development agencies, implementing agencies, and beneficiaries differ, resulting in divergent 
views about the objectives of capacity building (de Rosa & Belman, 2012; Eversole, 2003; 
Michener, 1998). For example, donors may value trainings as proof that development 
agencies are achieving results, while development agencies may view trainings as a 
component of long-term capacity building. Trainings may be a means through which 
implementing partners increase their influence while imparting critical information. While 
properly targeted beneficiaries may appreciate trainings for their content, poorly targeted 
participants likely value trainings as a means of accessing per diem, travel funds, and other 
associated perks. This example illustrates the challenges in generating a shared understanding 
of the goals and objectives of capacity building, and highlights the importance of higher-
order participation throughout the process to generate repeated opportunities for discussion, 
adjustment, commitment, and trust building.  It is challenging to incorporate FOs in the 
early stages of planning, though representatives may be able to participate by remote 
consultation.    
Capacity building requires a coordinated strategy between partners with specialized 
expertise in areas as diverse as leadership and management, pro-poor targeting and 
community development, agribusiness and rural finance, M&E, and information and 
communication technology. A review of IFAD projects finds limited coordination between 
partners, poor sequencing of activities, and a lack of management and technical capacity on 
3.3.1  Planning. 
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the part of implementing partners, which constrains their ability to provide services of value 
to targeted FOs (Anyonge & Messer, 2014). Planning for capacity building should consider 
the capacity gaps of implementing partners as well, as “there is a need to provide more 
systematic support to service providers, who often lack the required technical and social 
skills to perform their functions” (IFAD, 2013, p. 33). 
Initial design of M&E systems begins in the planning stage with a logistical project 
framework (logframe) that translates a theory of change into objectives, outcomes, 
indicators, and a budget. Given the complexities of M&E for capacity building developed in 
Section 3.3.7, Simister & Smith (2010) recommend planning for the use of additional tools 
to complement the logframe, such as outcome mapping (Earl, Carden, & Smutylo, 2001), 
most significant change (Davies & Dart, 2005), ladders of change (Chapman & Wameyo, 
2001), and client satisfaction forms.  
A well-developed theory of change informs both relevant indicators to monitor as 
well as the scope of M&E. As seen in Figure 7, the impacts of capacity building 
interventions extend beyond the targeted beneficiaries. In value chain strengthening and 
contract marketing projects, these spillover effects include sales from others through 
targeted beneficiaries, reductions in transaction costs and increased efficiencies stemming 
from improvements in infrastructure and communications, and wider adoption of crops and 
techniques proven successful in the project (Bernard, Spielman, Taffesse, & Gabre-Madhin, 
2010; FAO, 2014; Humphrey & Navas-Alemán, 2010). While desirable from a development 
perspective, these spillovers compromise the integrity of experimental design and render 
challenges in establishing an appropriate scope for M&E, as well as in comparing control 
and experimental groups.   
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Customized to context, existing capacities, and desired outcomes, effective capacity 
building is grounded in an initial capacity assessment which identifies existing strengths, 
ascertains formal and informal institutions constraining operations, and generates a baseline 
against which progress can be measured.   
The capacity assessment process includes design of, mobilization for, and conducting 
the assessment. The design phase requires interactive participation across groups of 
stakeholders, especially the implementing partners selected for their expertise in facilitating 
participatory research. While inclusion of standardized modules enables comparability of 
results, modules assessing technical capacities relevant to specific strategic objectives are not 
Figure 7.    Impacts of  capacity building. Reproduced from INTRAC’s Praxis Paper 23 
Monitoring and Evaluating Capacity Building: Is it Really That Difficult? by N. Simister and R. 
Smith, 2010, p. 8. 
3.3.2  Assess capacity. 
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applicable across all FOs. Famers’ organizations can participate in tailoring the assessment to 
their objectives either in the design stage, or during the actual assessment.  
Farmers’ organizations control the mobilization of their members convened to 
participate in the assessment. Though it is easiest to convene the default group of “usual 
suspects”, typically comprised of FO leaders and active members physically proximate to 
meeting place, members representing all levels, functions, and locations of the group should 
attend the assessment in order to provide a diversity of views and to work toward a shared 
consensus on the goals and objectives of the capacity building process (CRS, 2011; Fowler et 
al., 1995; Pact, 2012). Ensuring that less dominant members have opportunities to express 
their perspectives requires skilled facilitation (Barnaud & van Paassen, 2013).    
Within Sperling et al.’s (2001) typology, assessments can be conducted utilizing 
consultative, collaborative, or collegial participation. Capacity assessments of FO within P4P 
utilize consultative participation in which WFP staff determine FO capacity by posing 
questions to FO leaders. This process represents a missed opportunity to empower FOs 
through greater participation, to build the knowledge capacity of FOs, and to link 
assessment results to an FO-level capacity building strategy.  
Collaborative participation in the capacity assessment would entail extending the P4P 
capacity assessment process to include FO representatives in visioning, identification of 
capacity gaps, and design of a tailored capacity building strategy. Collegial participation 
would comprise FOs conducting a self-assessment, generating data, and analyzing results for 
their own use through the capacity building process.  
Advocates of self-assessment prioritize ownership of the process over validity of the 
data generated, proposing external validation of internally-generated results to provide an 
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additional reference point to enable comparability of results over time and across groups, if 
needed (Fowler et al., 1995; Hailey, James, & Wrigley, 2005; Lusthaus, Adrien, Anderson, 
Carden, & Montalván, 2002; Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013). Advocates of facilitated 
assessment require a greater degree of control over the meanings represented by the data 
generated in capacity assessments. The difference in these approaches showcases the 
distinction between M&E for capacity building and M&E for administrative and donor 
requirements, developed in Section 3.3.7. Figure 8 presents strengths and weaknesses of 
both approaches. Conducting both internal and external assessments can achieve the dual 
purpose of building knowledge capacity and generating an objective basis for comparison.  
Chapter 4 explores the capacity assessment process in further detail, reviews the 
capacity assessment tools and processes used by IFAD, FAO, Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS), and other organizations involved in FO capacity building, and proposes a FO 
capacity indicators and a methodology for P4P.  
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Figure 8.    Strengths and weaknesses of  self  versus external assessments. Reprinted from 
FAO’s Organization Analysis and Development, by M. Rocchigiana and D. Herbel, 2013, p. 37. 
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Aspirational visions describe a desirable future state (Costanza, 2000; Kemp & 
Martens, 2007) and motivate organizational change (Anyonge et al., 2014; Kotter, 1995; 
Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). The process begins with the 
creation of a vision, harnessed to generate long- and medium-term goals through modelling 
backward from the future vision to the present in the process of backcasting (Robinson, 
1982). A host of backcasting approaches to visioning exist, including those designed to 
generate broad and equitable stakeholder participation (Eames & Egmose, 2011; Holmberg 
& Robèrt, 2000; Quist & Vergragt, 2006). Tools to map diversity, negotiate, and build 
agreement can help facilitators channel interactive participation FO members into a 
collective, motivating vision (Fischer, 1993; van Kerkhoff & Lebel, 2006; Wiek & Lang, 
2011).  
A compelling vision internalized by leaders and the membership base drives the 
teleological change process, as dissatisfaction with the current state cannot motivate the 
change process through completion (Hobley & Shields, 2000).  
 
 
The capacity gap identification stage continues the backcasting process through three 
steps: 1) translating the visions elaborated in the previous stage into goals and objectives; 2) 
ascertaining the technical and functional capacities required to achieve the desired objectives, 
and 3) comparing current capacities against the requisite capacities to identify long- and 
medium-term capacity gaps at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels.  
3.3.3  Visioning. 
3.3.4  Capacity gap identification. 
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Relative to institutional-level capacity gaps, individual- and organizational-level 
capacity gaps are easy to identify. As formal and informal institutions structure the 
opportunities available to individuals and organizations, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (2010) recommends root cause analysis of individual- 
and organizational- level gaps as a way to unearth institutional capacity gaps. Socially-
embedded informal institutions are particularly challenging to identify as they are assumed as 
objective truths rather than social constructs (Granovetter, 1985). Failure to account for 
informal institutions has been shown to limit the effectiveness of otherwise well-designed 
capacity building strategies (IFAD, 2013, 2014; Pritchard, 2014).   
Furthermore, gaps in functional capacities are more challenging to identify than gaps 
in technical capacities. It is relatively easy to develop a shared understanding of the need for 
hardware, for example a warehouse, and the technical skills required to utilize the warehouse 
such as production and post-harvest handling and storage (PHHS) skills to boost surplus, 
and warehouse management skills to receive, maintain, and track stocks. It is more difficult, 
however, to identify and build the functional capacities necessary to fully utilize the 
warehouse to bring broad and equitable benefits across the targeted group. Dependent upon 
the FO-specific context, relevant functional capacity gaps may include, but are not limited 
to: partnerships with financial institutions to provide credit to boost productivity; collection 
points to enable utilization from members located far from the warehouse; management 
skills to enable equitable distribution of credit accessed through the FO across the 
membership base; leadership, visioning, and consensus-building skills to create a unifying 
vision and shared identify; trust in the FO to store and market commodity on behalf of 
members; internal monitoring to protect against elites co-opting the warehouse; empowered 
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audit sub-committees to address allegations of corruption in an expedient and efficient 
manner; open channels of communication for members to express dissatisfaction with 
uneven access to FO assets or services; and conflict resolution processes to address tensions 
arising from issues such as aflatoxin contamination spreading through the stored commodity 
due to acceptance of one member’s poorly conditioned crop, or threats of side-selling when 
market prices increase beyond prices contracted for collectively marketed commodity. 
Functional capacity gaps may not be evident until implementation, further highlighting the 
importance of providing additional follow-up support throughout the capacity building 
process.  
Figure 9 presents illustrative examples of types of capacity-focused outputs designed 
to address capacity gaps, such as lack of skills at the individual level; excessive power 
concentration, unclear vision, and weak planning process at the organizational level; and lack 
of participation in local, regional, and national policy fora at the institutional level.   
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Designing a capacity building strategy involves translating the capacity gap into 
objectives and an implantation plan. These steps occur against a backdrop of conflicting 
Figure 9.    Illustrative example of  capacity-focused outputs to address capacity gaps. 
Reprinted from FAO Approaches to Capacity Development in Programming: Processes and Tools, 
Learning Module 2, by M. Rocchigiani & M. Dhamotaran, 2012, p. 38. 
3.3.5  Capacity building strategy 
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priorities, as well as varying conceptualizations and expectations of the capacity building 
process, as initially developed in Section 3.3.1.  
The prioritization of capacity building activities within the strategic plan presents an 
opportunity for the differing priorities of stakeholders to manifest. Rocchigiani & 
Dhamotaran (2012) offer the example of donors and development organizations interested 
in quick and visible results, the Ministry of Agriculture interested in building its own capacity 
to manage the program after handover, implementing partners interested in mobilizing 
farmers into larger groups, FOs interested in securing access to assets for their members, 
and farmers interested in increasing their incomes and expanding their capabilities. Repeated 
opportunities for interactive participation, communication, and empowerment, create the 
conditions for stakeholders to converge around a capacity building strategy designed to 
enable the FO vision. Capacity building strategies unaligned with FO vision risk losing 
momentum during implementation as obstacles along the way erode support for change 
(Hobley & Shields, 2000; UNDP, 2009) 
In addition to aligning the implementation plan with FO vision, the following factors 
increase the likelihood of catalyzing the endogenous process of capacity development: 
building upon existing strengths of FOs and partners (de Rosa & Belman, 2012), striking a 
balance between technical capacities and functional capacities (IFAD, 2013), planning for 
short-term gains to sustain momentum through the long capacity development process 
(Kotter, 1995), and embedding a handover strategy for how activities will be maintained after 
project funding ends (UNDP, 2009).  
 The implementation plan may require recruiting additional partners if existing 
stakeholders cannot address the identified capacity gaps. If the requisite resources cannot be 
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secured, elements of the implementation plan will need to be either postponed or dropped. 
To assist with prioritization, the United Nations Development Programme (2009) 
recommends looking for patterns in capacity gaps to assess whether gaps are consistently 
large across a specific type of functional or strategic capacity.   
Addressing specific capacity gaps likely requires investments in both infrastructure 
and equipment, referred to by IFAD as “hardware”, as well as investments in “software,” 
which includes policies, institutions, organizations and their functional capacities. Capacity 
building tends to focus upon technical skills at the individual level, however, as established in 
Section 3.2.1, stand-alone trainings do not engender capacity building. To catalyze multi-level 
capacity development, capacity building requires integration of learning initiatives into a 
long-term change strategy with complementary measures to facilitate application of new 
information and to enable behavioral change. (DFID, 2006; IFAD, 2015; P. Taylor & Clarke, 
2008; UNDP, 2009).  
A range of learning activities can impart both technical and functional information, 
including traditional trainings, workshops, and seminars, and more innovative delivery 
mechanisms such as farmer field days, FO twinning, and peer exchange visits. A consensus 
has formed around the need for trainings and other learning initiatives tailored to local 
context and aligned with the broader capacity building strategy (ADB, 2008; Baser & 
Morgan, 2008; M. Nelson, 2006; Ramalingam, Jones, Reba, & Young, 2008). Learning needs 
assessments identify the material most appropriate to learners’ needs, the correct participants 
to target, and the multi-level barriers to implementation. Due to time constraints and 
assumptions about what beneficiaries need to learn, these assessment are frequently ignored 
(Rocchigiani & Dhamotaran, 2012), however the consequences of skipping this step are 
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severe. Lack of learning needs assessments is the primary reason individual learning does not 
transfer into practice (FAO, 2010; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2008) 
Table 5 presents the strengths and challenges of different families of learning 
activities: in person, off-site learning, on-the-job learning, and asynchronous self-study. The 
elements appropriate to a specific capacity building strategy depend upon the capacity gaps 
to be addressed, existing capacities of the FO and implementing partners, and the tools, 
skills, and budget available to support the learning initiatives. Some functional capacities, 
such as learning from an externally-produced assessment reports, and some technical 
capacities, such as understanding the components of a contract, require functional literacy 
and numeracy, which may in and of itself represent a functional capacity gap to address.     
From a participation perspective, merely attending trainings can be categorized as a 
degree of tokenism. Drawing learners into the learning needs assessment illustrates the 
benefits of collaborative participation – a deeper understanding of the context allows for 
targeting of the appropriate learners and learning material, as well as the design of 
complementary capacity building interventions which enable learners to transform the 
information learned into practice. Collegial participation in this example might entail FOs 
conducting the learning needs assessment and deciding the content and delivery mode of the 
learning initiative.    
Follow-up support at the organization level to transform information learned by 
individuals into behavioral changes include assistance with the internal processes of creating 
incentives, structures, and procedures to manage change and knowledge; promotion of open 
channels for internal communications and accountability; and facilitating dialogues to 
identify and overcome barriers to change. At the institutional level, follow-up support starts 
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with analysis, information, and empowerment with the objective of enabling interactive 
participatory engagement with influential stakeholders to develop a conducive institutional 
environment (Rocchigiani & Dhamotaran, 2012). 
 
Adapted from FAO Good Learning Practices for Effective Capacity Development, Learning Module 3, 
by C. de Rosa and A. I. Belman, 2012.  
 
 
Activities Strengths Challenges
In person, off-site learning: Engaged participants Cost and logistics
 trainings, seminars, Discussion and reflection Participants taken out of place
 review/synthesis events, Peer-to-peer learning  where they will use new skills
 workshops, Creates networks Wrong participants often attend
 farmer field days, Easy reporting Not for skills learned over time
 policy round tables 
On-the-job learning: Formal or informal events Difficult to report outputs
 mentoring, Learning in place where skills Success depends on skills and 
 coaching,  will be applied  techniques of coach/mentor/
 lead farmers, Implementation problems  lead farmer
 study tours, twinning,  addressed as they arise Mentor/coach must be familiar 
 peer exchanges, Can change focus as needed  with work context of learner
 demonstration farms, Learning can be paced over a 
 assessments, M&E  long-time 
Asynchronous self-study: Learners work at own pace Requires self-motivation
 television, radio Content adaptable to personal One-way flow of information
 internet, CDs,  learning paths
 printed materials
Table 5. 
Strengths and challenges of  different learning activities 
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To strengthen local systems and create ownership, the capacity building strategy 
should be implemented through national, regional, and local systems and processes, rather 
than a parallel system of external partners, (OECD, 2005). The implementation process has 
the potential to build capacity of all stakeholders, including the capacity of implementing 
partners to catalyze capacity development at the FO level and the capacity of development 
agencies to build consensus among and to elicit meaningful participation from stakeholders 
throughout the capacity building process. 
. 
 
 
 
 
Monitoring and evaluation represents an additional stage in which FO participation 
can contribute to capacity development. Intensive monitoring not only provides feedback to 
stakeholders about progress toward product and process goals, but it also builds the capacity 
of the team to observe, analyze, reflect, and make evidence-based decisions to achieve 
medium- to long-term objectives. As with assessments, M&E by outside experts does not 
contribute to capacity building (Rocchigiani & Dhamotaran, 2012). 
An effective M&E system includes plans, methods, and resources for data collection, 
analysis, and reporting, as well as for reviewing and utilizing findings in the iterative process 
represented in Figure 6. The process of defining M&E systems generates discussions and 
clarifications about objectives and proxies for progress toward goals, which may vary across 
stakeholders. In FAO’s Second Learning Module on Capacity Development (2012), the authors 
3.3.6  Implementation 
3.3.7  Monitoring and evaluation 
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identify four separate components of M&E for capacity building projects: 1) monitoring for 
multi-level capacity development, 2) monitoring for administrative requirements, 3) 
monitoring of key assumptions underlying the theory of change to inform mid-course 
adjustments, and 4) monitoring of the motivation and commitment of key individuals 
involved in the exit strategy to ensure sustainability of the activities beyond the project 
horizon.  
Monitoring for administrative requirements focuses upon quantitative product 
outcomes, documenting evidence of concrete results, such as number of members attending 
trainings, number of warehouses constructed, and tonnage procured. Most monitoring 
systems focus on this component, though as UNDP (2009) notes, “measurement of capacity 
development success cannot be reduced to an increase in input resources such as human, 
financial, or physical resources. Availability of input resources does not guarantee their 
contribution to development objectives” (p. 32). 
By contrast, M&E for capacity development determines whether or not the products 
and the process of capacity building partnerships contribute to changes in behaviors and 
attitudes, systems and structures, and relationships. In acknowledgement that institutional 
factors beyond the scope of the project may have a greater impact on FO capacity than 
capacity building initiatives1, M&E for capacity building includes process outcomes capturing 
changes catalyzed by participatory capacity building. Rocchigiani & Dhamotaran (2012) 
                                                 
 
1 Examples of factors influencing FO capacity observed during field work in Ghana and Malawi include such as 
weather, unpredictable export bans, collapse of microfinance institutions, delays in released of tranche 
funding, land grabs/urbanization undermining the land tenure of members, and changes in local weights and 
measures. See Chapter 5 for further details. 
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provide the following examples of process indicators supporting M&E for capacity building: 
how individuals apply knowledge acquired through learning initiatives, FO responsiveness to 
members’ needs, and the formal and informal changes in organizational structures and 
processes that incentivize and shape how farmers do business and how FOs meet their 
goals. Relative to quantitative product indicators, qualitative and quantitative process 
indicators of process are more challenging to capture, however they more accurately measure 
progress toward capacity development goals (ICRAF, 2013). Section 4.5 develops examples 
of functional capacity process indicators for FOs. 
In addition to designing process indicators beyond those typically incorporated into 
traditional M&E systems, M&E for capacity building faces the additional obstacle of 
determining an appropriate level of FO participation throughout the M&E process. 
Monitoring the endogenous process of capacity development goes beyond using 
participatory techniques to gather information and organizing workshops, rather it 
“involve(s) national/local actors intensively in expressing their views about changes and 
reasons for such changes” (Rocchigiani & Dhamotaran, 2012, p. 49). Local perceptions 
about progress and achievement help keep the initiative on track, provide signals about 
implementation problems, and identify needs for adjustments and corrections. 
The degree to which FOs participate depends upon how the M&E process is framed 
within the strategic plan. For participatory monitoring to create desired opportunities for 
learning, self-reflection, evaluation, and planning, FOs need to have already achieved a level 
of empowerment which enables self-mobilization participation. If internal M&E does not 
align with the FO’s strategic objectives, functional participatory monitoring requirements will 
be perceived as an additional burden/requirement of program inclusion rather than an 
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opportunity for growth, sabotaging the empowerment and learning goals of the exercise, in 
addition to threatening the validity of results. Stakeholders will have to generate consensus 
on the level of input FOs have selecting and monitoring indicators, how FOs will participate 
in analysis and validation, and the degree to which FOs participate in crafting 
recommendations from findings. Stakeholders should be clear about the expectations of 
participation and safeguard against onerous participation unaligned with FO objectives 
(Barreteau, Bots, & Daniell, 2010). 
Participatory M&E is not without dangers, as stakeholders may exaggerate responses 
to maintain access to support (ICRAF, 2013). This can occur when FOs perceive M&E as a 
judgement and potential threat to their future benefit stream as opposed to a tool designed 
for them to track their progress. Decoupling funding decisions from M&E for learning 
about the effectiveness of capacity building removes incentives for deceit and supports 
honest representation through the participatory process (Platteau, 2004; Simister & Smith, 
2010).   
  Additional challenges specific to monitoring for capacity building include: different 
time scales of capacity development and the project cycles (The Learning Agenda on Local 
Capacity Development, 2014; UNDP, 2009), results beyond targeted beneficiaries and 
difficulties in attribution (Bernard et al., 2010), and challenges in contextualizing specific 
changes and understanding their impact on FO capacity in the near-, medium-, and long –
term.  Crises that serve to strengthen one FO’s capacity over time may cripple another, and 
perceived stability may mask stagnation (Simister & Smith, 2010). 
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Capacity building for robust and viable FOs is a time-consuming, participatory 
engagement which cannot be rushed (FAO, 2010). Tension arises between the lengthy 
process of capacity building and donor requirements, and a report reviewing USAID 
partnerships with local organizations notes that “the overarching concern for evidence and 
results, for measurement and quantification, has influenced project length, cycle, and funding 
in ways that run counter to six decades of lessons learned about development” (The 
Learning Agenda on Local Capacity Development, 2014, p.15). Ostrom warns:  
If social capital is conceptualized too casually and projects are designed to 
enhance "participation" without substantial changes in the structure of 
institutions, then the concept will become a shallow fad. One does not give 
stakeholders a "voice and real responsibility" by creating short-term projects 
that involve outsiders "organizing the farmers" in sweeping tours of the 
countryside. Participating in solving collective-action problems is a costly and 
time-consuming process. Enhancing the capabilities of local, public 
entrepreneurs is an investment activity that needs to be carried out over a 
long-term period. (E. Ostrom, 2000, pp. 214-215) 
 
Social capital and functional capacities play an essential role in achieving economic 
development, but, like capacity development, cannot be created by external or top-down 
processes (FAO, 2015; OECD, 2006; Ostrom, 2000; Woolcock, 1998). Hobley & Shields 
(2000) advocate giving FOs time and space to change processes, attitudes, and institutions 
3.4 Timeframe of  the Capacity Building Process 
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rather than demanding reviews, audits, and evaluations which put organizations on the 
defensive and threaten to slow or reverse the change process.   
Given the heterogeneity of organizational histories, membership attributes, and 
institutional environments, FO capacity building requires a flexible approach and 
methodology, and IFAD’s (2013) Strengthening Institutions and Organizations: An 
Analysis of Lessons Learnt from Field Application of IFAD's Sourcebook on Institutional 
and Organizational Analysis for Pro-Poor Change warns against predicting the pace of 
organizational change, though estimates that building soft skills and bonding social capital 
requires at least one year of intensive effort.  
Ferris et al.’s (2014) working paper for Catholic Relief Services (CRS) acknowledges 
that one or two years of supply-side support can boost market performance for farmers in 
well-organized FOs with the assets and skills needed to increase production who are 
constrained solely by market access. However, for farmers lacking the requisite skills or 
access to productive land, the market linkage process may take 10 to 20 years. Table 6 
presents examples of FO-level targets associated with short-, medium-, and long-term time 
frames.  
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Reprinted from CRS’s Linking Smallholder Farmers to Markets and the Implications for Extension 
and Advisory Services, by S. Ferris, R. Best, D. Seville, A. Buxton, J. Shriver, and E. Wei, 2014, 
p. 36.  
 
 
 
Participation and capacity building share the goals of empowering people through 
the process of transforming beneficiaries from passive recipients of aid to active partners in 
project planning, design, implementation and monitoring (Clayton, Oakley, & Pratt, 1997; N. 
Nelson & Wright, 1995; Pelling, 1998).  
Though the goals of capacity building and participatory approaches converge, 
capacity building includes broader macro-level objectives such as aligning aid flows with 
Time frames Measurable goals FO-level targets
Short term Services delivered Assets
(1-3 years) Training
Technical assistance
Public works
Medium term Output levels Number of farmers engaged in enterprise process
(3-8 years) Business planning cycles in place
Reduced transaction costs
Increased sales price
Increased sales volume
Longer term Impact and Acquisition of new skills
(8-20 years) sustainable market Application of new skills
limkages Integration of skills to support dynamic 
    engagement in long-term processes
Table 6. 
Capacity building targets and timeframes 
3.5 Goals, Objectives, and Challenges of  Participatory Capacity Building. 
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national priorities, utilizing and strengthening local systems, and harmonizing aid (OECD, 
2005). At the program level, both capacity building and participation aim to enrich the 
quality of information gathered and improve project effectiveness of projects (Cleaver, 
1999; Eversole, 2003; James, 2001); to improve targeting and an equitable distribution of 
benefits (IFAD, 2015; Narayan, 1995); to boost efficiency through cost savings from 
improved information and volunteer contributions (Chambers, 1995; C. Miller, 2010; N. 
Nelson & Wright, 1995); and to enhance the prospects for sustainability, narrowly 
interpreted as longevity of the project after phasing out technical and financial support from 
donors (Dale, 2004; Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin, 1987; James, 2001; Uphoff, Esman, & 
Krishna, 1998).  
Both capacity development and beneficiary participation are well-integrated into 
development practice, however challenges emerge regarding the “tyranny of participation” 
(Cook & Kothari, 2001) and “the romance of capacity building” (Kenny & Clarke, 2010).  
 
 
Despite decades of significant investment in capacity building and participatory 
approaches, benefits are not empirically established (Mansuri & Rao, 2013; OECD, 2005, 
2012; Pozzoni & Kumar, 2005; World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 2005). 
Incorporating beneficiary participation adds a 15 and 20% premium to project costs 
(Narayan, 1995), however the additional expenditures have yet to be justified through 
documented improvements in outcomes. Lack of evidence stems from two problems: the 
absence of unifying frameworks defining the concepts of capacity building and participation 
and how to measure them, and the empirical methods used to assess impact. 
3.5.1  Lack of evidence.   
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Lack of consensus about the operational definitions of capacity building and 
participation undermines comparability across assessments (Paul, 1987; P. Taylor & Clarke, 
2008; World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 2005). Impact evaluations of capacity 
building are hampered by missing linkages between initiatives and development goals, by 
unspecified capacity building objectives, and by challenges in attribution (World Bank 
Operations Evaluation Department, 2005). Impact evaluations of participatory projects tend 
to be limited-scope case studies utilizing qualitative data, or meta-reviews of said case 
studies, which are not rigorous enough to produce valid, generalizable findings (Pozzoni and 
Kumar 2005).  
Though explicit in the capacity building methodology, capacity building projects 
rarely address weaknesses at the organizational and institutional levels, with “activities related 
to the organizational dimension … almost non-existent” (World Bank, 2012, p. 4). Few FO 
capacity building projects explicitly take informal rules and organizational norms into 
consideration, leading to challenges in implementation (IFAD, 2013, 2014; Pritchard, 2014).  
Rather than focusing on multi-level interventions designed to improve capacity, most 
capacity building is limited to universally applied, individual-level trainings which are not 
tailored to address specific capacity gaps (IFAD, 2014). Though most capacity building 
targets individual learning, there is a limited understanding of how developing individual 
capacity contributes to organizational and institutional change (IFAD, 2013). Review of the 
theoretical basis of capacity building coupled with empirical reviews of capacity building 
projects pointedly establishes that stand-alone trainings are insufficient for capacity building 
(Pearson, 2011).  
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Further compounding the problem, development organizations tend to keep 
assessments internal rather than publically broadcasting results (Ebrahim, 2003), prompting 
Platteau (2004) to champion sharing and learning from assessment results, rather than 
penalizing partners for not generating the results envisioned from participation.    
Additional challenges to generating impact include the skill required to navigate and 
assess the participatory process (Mosse, 2001; Stadler, 1995), insufficient expertise and 
resources devoted to the design and monitoring of appropriate indicators (Simister & Smith, 
2010), and a disconnect between assessment results and programming decisions (Darcy, 
Stobaugh, Walker, & Maxwell, 2013). Finally, it should be noted that the impact of 
participation, or any project element, upon sustainability is rarely assessed since monitoring 
ceases after the final evaluation.        
 
 
Critiques of participation build upon three main elements: the myth of community 
and consensus, biased community representation, and naïve assumptions about power 
relations between donors, development organizations, implementing partners, and 
beneficiaries. The participatory process both highlights and generates complexities emerging 
from power asymmetries between partners and within the community. Many researchers 
contend that failure to address power dynamics constrains the ability of participatory 
capacity building to generate benefits (Cook & Kothari, 2001; Eversole, 2003; Kenny & 
Clarke, 2010; Platteau, 2004).  
3.5.2  Challenges in the participatory process of capacity building. 
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Relationships between stakeholders. Unequal power relationships between 
outsiders, including development organizations and implementing partners, and beneficiaries 
threatens sincere participation (Cook & Kothari, 2001). Furthermore, beneficiaries (or 
prospective beneficiaries) have strong incentives to align their expression of needs to the 
project objectives (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Mosse, 2001; Tembo, 2003); to select non-
representative participants with high levels of education, wealth, as well as social and political 
capital (Kumar, 2002; Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Uphoff et al., 1998); and to hide the truth about 
operations and distribution of benefits for fear of reduced access to support (Michener 
1998).  
Though funders and development agencies often neglect to acknowledge the power 
generated by controlling the flow of financial resources (Eversole, 2003), communities vying 
for support cannot ignore this truism. Though participation intends to increase local 
initiative and decentralize control, funders and development agencies retain significant 
control over the process  due to by project management requirements established well 
before the onset of the project (D. Craig & Porter, 1997; Darcy et al., 2013; Mosse, 2001) as 
well as deeply-held individual and institutional values regarding the process and evaluation of 
development (Hocde, Triomphe, Faure, & Dulcire, 2008). Even when projects provide FOs 
with access to funds at the local level, the budgets are managed by implementing partners, 
rather than FOs themselves (World Bank, 2012). 
Participation is most likely to take place at the implementation stage, rather than in 
planning, decision-making or evaluation (D. Craig & Porter, 1997; Pozzoni & Kumar, 2005; 
White, 1996), and Eversole (2003) likens participation to beneficiaries determining the shape 
of the bricks, rather than the destination of the path. 
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Relationships within communities. Participation is solicited in communities 
replete with conflicts of interest and power asymmetries (Barnaud & van Paassen, 2013), 
however by ignoring the complexities of competing interests, development practitioners fall 
victim to the myth of community (Guijt & Shah, 1998), which is the assumption that 
“community” refers to a homogeneous, monolithic group of people.  
With a long history of liaising with outsiders on behalf of the community, local elites 
are adept at framing their personal interests as community concerns and convincing donors 
and development agencies that the collective good motivates their leadership (Platteau, 
2004). Rather than development actors learning about local needs and priorities, Mosse 
(2001) characterizes the participatory learning process as locals learning the language, 
requirements, and boundaries of donor-driven projects.  
Even when broader, more representative samples of communities participate, 
cultural and social norms can prevent meaningful participation by non-elites (Cleaver, 2005; 
Muñoz, Paredes, & Thorp, 2007; Platteau & Abraham, 2002). The public nature of 
participatory assessments denies researchers access to private information which members of 
marginalized communities may not be empowered to share in public fora (Barnaud & van 
Paassen, 2013; Kothari, 2001; Stadler, 1995).  
Elite capture. Given biased representation in the participatory process, it is not 
surprising that participation impedes the equitable distribution of benefits (Cohen & Uphoff, 
1980; Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Stoeker, 2010). Elite capture refers to harnessing the 
participatory process to serve personal interests rather than the common good, and 
manifests in a myriad of ways difficult for outsiders to monitor (Platteau 2004).  
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Elite capture is a well-documented phenomenon in FO capacity building (Cohen & 
Uphoff, 1980), and attempts to limit elite dominance in the FO decision-making process are 
hindered by high concentrations of power in leadership (particularly in the president, and to 
a lesser degree the secretary and treasurer), limited rotation of leadership positions, and a 
dearth of qualified leaders (Elbehri, Lee, Hirsch, & Benali, 2013; IFAD, 2013). 
Preventing or uncovering elite capture requires insiders willing to uncover false 
assumptions about the drivers and distribution of benefits, however community members 
have little incentive to share this information with outsiders. If targeted beneficiaries receive 
even a fraction of intended benefits, their position is improved relative to no project at all 
(representing a Pareto improvement) despite the fact that elites capture almost all of the 
gains (Platteau, 2004). As alerting outsiders to malfeasance risks the future stream of 
benefits, elite capture is frequently tolerated if non-elites benefit even marginally (Chabal & 
Daloz, 1999). In addition, development actors and community members have different 
conceptualizations of equitable benefit distribution. While funders and development 
agencies assume and expect participation to be motivated by the common good, community 
members consider compensation appropriate for intensive involvement in the participatory 
process (Kumar, 2002; Platteau & Abraham, 2002; Rao & Ibáñez, 2005). 
Communities with high concentrations of power are particularly prone to elite 
capture (Platteau, Somville, & Wahhaj, 2014), and physically remote communities, with low 
literacy rates, high poverty rates, and with significant caste, race, and/or gender disparities 
are the most vulnerable (Mansuri & Rao, 2013).  
However, elite capture is not a foregone conclusion; leaders do not always capture 
disproportionate benefits in participatory projects (Alatas et al., 2013; Dasgupta & Beard, 
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2007; Fritzen, 2007; Kutter, 2014). Though elite capture occurs initially, evidence suggests 
that active resistance by initially disadvantaged groups ensures a more equitable distribution 
over time (Classen et al., 2008; Long, 2003; Lund & Saito-Jensen, 2013). Furthermore, 
explicitly informing beneficiaries about the nature, timing, and magnitude of benefits reduces 
elite capture (Platteau et al., 2014). Regular elections coupled with social accountability 
mechanisms such as sharing of financial information, improving channels for members to 
voice concerns, internal audit bodies and processes, and periodic external audits promotes 
downward accountability and greater equity in benefit allocation (IFAD, 2013). The financial 
contributions of members to the group, in the form of share capital and dues or fees, 
incentivize member vigilance in ensuring that FO objectives align with members’ aspirations 
(Crowley et al., 2007; Herbel, Crowley, Ourabah Haddad, & Lee, 2012; Stringfellow et al., 
1997).   
Entrenching interests through consensus. The participatory process is further plagued with 
the myth of consensus (Peterson, Peterson, & Peterson, 2005), a corollary to Gurjit & Shah’s 
(1998) myth of community. Participatory techniques generally render a consensus 
representing “the community” viewpoint, a process which threatens to replicate and 
exacerbate existing power relations by legitimizing the interests of the most influential within 
a community (G. Craig, 2010; Mosse, 2001; Pozzoni & Kumar, 2005). Both communities 
and facilitators have incentives to simplify and arrive at a consensus in line with project goals 
(Eversole, 2003), resulting in a process which generates “local knowledge” about community 
interests reflecting beneficiary understandings about the goals of outsiders (Morse, 2007). 
Writes Kothari (2001) “Participatory research ‘cleans up’ local knowledge through mapping 
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and codification, and marginalizes that which might challenge the status quo or is messy or 
unmanageable” (p.12). 
If facilitators of participatory processes adopt a neutral position with respect to 
power asymmetries within the community, they risk entrenching privileged interests and 
further marginalizing the disempowered (Cleaver, 2005; Guijt & Shah, 1998; Mosse, 1994). 
Alternately, if they adopt a non-neutral position and intervene to give a voice to 
disadvantaged stakeholders (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001), such as women or ethnic 
minorities, they risk intervening in a social system though lacking the legitimacy to critique 
and intercede (Innes, 2004). van Paassen & Baunard (2013) propose a compromise between 
these approaches in which facilitators adopt a critical companion posture, in which they 
explicitly stating their commitment toward an equitable participatory process. The 
researchers further suggest strategically selecting participants, while paying special attention 
to the most powerful and least powerful stakeholders; conducting stakeholder analysis to 
render transparent competing priorities; using tools highlighting the diversity of interests 
rather than forcing an early consensus; alternating between interviews, sub-group, and 
plenary discussions; and aiming toward win-win solutions (Barnaud & van Paassen, 2013).  
 
 
Participatory capacity building is deeply entrenched in development practice. As 
boundary terms (Scoones, 2007), both capacity development and participation are used in a 
wide variety of contexts to convene partners with a broad range of interests. This flexibility 
and universality, though valuable, comes at the cost of imprecise working definitions and 
diverse understandings of what participatory capacity building is and how to measure it.  
3.6  Conclusion  
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Though practitioners have varied conceptualizations of FO capacity and approaches 
to FO capacity building initiatives, these frameworks all adopt a multi-level participatory 
approach on catalyzing capacity development, an endogenous process. This research builds 
upon FAO’s (2015) definition of FO capacity as the combination of functional and technical 
capacities which enable FOs to attain their strategic objectives. 
In an idealized process of FO capacity building, members representing the diversity 
of the FO membership base, alongside partners skilled in facilitating capacity building, 
participate throughout all stages of the multi-stakeholder process, contributing to a 
customized capacity building strategy designed to address gaps identified in the 
organizational capacity assessment. Through their collaborative or collegial participation in 
the process, members develop soft skills such as how to assess, vision, plan, negotiate, 
monitor, analyze, and advocate, broadening functional capacities at the individual, 
organizational, and institutional levels. The capacity building strategy includes tailored 
follow-up supports required to convert learning into applied knowledge, changes in attitude, 
and capacity development. 
This review of the literature indicates that in the actualized process of FO capacity 
building, implementing partners themselves have limited capacity to support FO capacity 
development, and activities outlined in the capacity building strategy are poorly sequenced, 
lack coordination, and do not provide follow-up support required to change behaviors, 
norms, and attitudes. Power within FOs is highly concentrated among elite leaders, and their 
consultative participation is limited to the implementation stage, rather than planning, 
decision-making, and M&E. Furthermore, most capacity building initiatives focus upon 
technical skills at the individual level, while functional capacities such as trust-building, 
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conflict management, diplomacy, networking, leadership, and advocacy languish 
unsupported. Exacerbating the problem of inappropriate content, learning needs 
assessments are frequently foregone, with training materials undifferentiated across FO-
specific contexts, capacity levels, and strategic objectives. 
If the activities align with FO objectives and FOs have reached a capacity threshold 
enabling collaborative participation, participation in learning needs assessments, capacity 
assessments, and M&E can build FO capacity to learn, analyze, plan, monitor, and negotiate. 
If not, required participation will lean toward the consultative, and the reluctantly undertaken 
activities will be perceived as a burdensome requirement of a continued partnership. Chapter 
4 explores the principles, roles, and tools of organizational capacity assessments targeting 
FOs.    
 Participatory capacity building generates risks such as elite capture and exacerbating 
existing, though unrecognized, power dynamics. Safeguards against elite capture include 
staggered bundles, informing members about the timing and flow of benefits, regular 
elections accompanied by social accountability mechanisms, and FO contributions from 
members to stimulate internal monitoring. Acknowledging the power derived from 
controlling resources, recognizing that communities are not a monolith, and overtly 
establishing the assumptions, values, and priorities of all stakeholders can create the 
conditions required for an open and equitable participatory process.  
The evidence on participatory capacity building is not clear, and M&E for capacity 
building faces challenges such as spillover effects, imprecise theories of change, and the use 
of tools designed to monitor product indicators for administrative requirements, rather than 
process indicators for capacity building. In the absence of empirical evidence documenting 
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its effects, the broad-based commitment to participatory capacity building is not grounded in 
proven impact, but rather reflects unproven, implicit values about participation and 
empowerment. Justifying the additional expense and effort associated with participatory 
capacity building requires a unifying framework enabling comparative studies with 
generalizable findings, indicators for measuring participation throughout the capacity 
building process, and robust research exploring the impact of participatory capacity building 
on empowerment, effectiveness, efficiency, equity and sustainability.  
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Chapter 4 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENTS FOR FARMERS’ 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
All organizations grapple with internal crises and external shocks. While some 
organizations with limited resources manage to thrive amid severe challenges, others with 
significant external support stagnate or flounder in response to minor setbacks. What 
accounts for these different outcomes and responses to adversity? How can partners best 
support the capacity of groups to adapt to dynamic conditions while continuing to serve 
evolving member interests?   
IFAD distinguishes between organizational capacity, the “combination of human, 
technical and institutional elements (culture, laws, rules, procedures, etc.) which enable an 
organization to achieve its objectives, especially in relation to its vision” (IFAD, 2015, p.7), 
and the narrower concept of organizational maturity describing the level of functional 
capacities attained “in key areas such as management, governance, leadership, capacity 
development and resilience” (IFAD, 2015, p. 6). Both organizational maturity and capacity 
influence the range of response options available to FOs when confronting challenges and 
opportunities.  
Organizational capacity assessments (OCAs) explore, and potentially enhance, the 
capacity and maturity of FOs and play an integral role in participatory capacity building. 
Drawing upon SLA, adapted to meso-level analysis through the adoption of organizational 
capital, this chapter identifies key components of FO maturity and capacity to be assessed in 
OCA, and how the assessment process and results can be harnessed internally by FOs and 
externally by partners in development.  
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The chapter then reviews existing capacity assessment tools used by seven 
development practitioners and one professional assessor, proposes functional capacity 
indicators to include in P4P’s FO assessments, and explores how outputs from FO 
assessments can support WFP targeting, planning, procurement, and M&E.   
 
 
 
Both organizational capacity and organizational maturity are non-linear and dynamic, 
sensitive to changes in membership, leaders, partners, attitudes, norms, and institutions as 
well as events such as failed contracts, suspended bank accounts, and accusations of 
corruption. Appropriate FO structures and institutionalized processes can buttress 
organizations to negative shocks.  
Organizational capacity refers to the “the ability of an organization to mobilize its 
internal energy to achieve its goals” within the broader institutional and biophysical 
environment (Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013, p. 26), and encompasses the narrower concept of 
organizational maturity, a measure of functional capacities. Chapters 4 and 5 draw upon the 
elements of organizational capacity and maturity presented in Figure 10.  
 
4.1  Key Concepts and Definitions  
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Figure 10.   FO maturity and capacity. 
 
 
Though organizational maturity has well-established meanings within the fields of 
software and workforce development (Curtis, Hefley, & Miller, 2009; Paulk, 2002), this 
research adopts a working definition based on IFAD’s conceptualization of FO functional 
capacities, illustrated in Figure 2. As developed in Section 3.2.1, technical capacities include 
structures, process, and technical skills specific to FO strategic objectives, while functional 
capacities comprise policy and normative capacities, knowledge capacities, partnership 
4.1.1 Farmers’ organization maturity 
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capacities, project implementation capacities, and adaptive capacity, which support a wide 
range of potential strategic objectives.  
As represented in Figure 1, FOs, nested within institutional and biophysical 
environments, generate their own organizational environment. Organizational capacity, “the 
capability of an organization to achieve what it sets out to do” (Fowler, Goold, & James, 
1995, p.3), reflects how well-suited the organization is to achieving its goals given the 
institutional parameters defining the operational space of the organization. This effectiveness 
is sensitive to factors beyond the group’s control, such as trade policies, rainfall, and land 
tenure arrangements.  
The maturity of an FO encapsulates its functional capacities, which broadly support 
a wide range of potential strategic objectives, underpin individual and organizational 
effectiveness, and enable empowerment. To achieve downward accountability and greater 
equity in benefit allocation, IFAD (2013) supports FO maturity by coupling the promotion 
of regular elections with social accountability mechanisms, such as the sharing of financial 
information, improving channels for members to voice concerns, the establishment of 
internal audit bodies and processes, and periodic external audits. 
Relative to capacity, FO’s have a greater degree of control over maturity, though 
shocks dramatically altering the membership base and/or leadership, generate non-linear 
changes in both capacity and maturity. Distinguishing between the concepts assists in 
assessing capacity building initiatives, particularly in cases of external shocks diminishing FO 
capacity with muted influence on FO maturity, such as export bans or droughts. 
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This research draws upon SLA to categorize components of organizational capacity 
and maturity. For organizational maturity, these include the functional capacity of members, 
financial capital, functional organizational capital, and bonding social capital.  
Human capital: “soft skills”. The knowledge, skill sets, and health of FO leaders 
and members serve as the building blocks available to FOs in the form of human capital, 
“the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health that together enable people to 
pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood objectives” (DFID, 1999, 
p.7). Individual-level capacity in this context refers to the ways individuals utilize their skills 
and knowledge to configure an FO response or action. Decisions to implement information 
into behavioral change depend not only upon individual will, but also the incentives offered 
and constraints imposed by organizations and the broader institutional and biophysical 
environments. In line with the distinction between functional and technical capacity, 
presented in Figure 1, the human capital component of FO maturity focuses on “soft skills” 
such as leadership, negotiations, and consensus-building, as well as financial management 
and reporting skills which support FOs across strategic objectives.   
 Financial capital. Financial capital refers to the flows and stocks of money (DFID, 
1999) available to the FO, as well as the diversity of internal and external sources of revenue. 
Though financial capital is not commonly included in maturity assessments, working capital, 
financial reserves, and diversity in income broaden the range of options available to the 
group, contributing to functional capacity.  
Functional organizational capital. Organizational structures, processes, and 
motivation establish incentives and influence member behavior.  
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Structures. Functional organizational structures include the group’s constitution and 
bylaws, executive committee (EC), and sub-committees (SCs). Though technically formal 
institutions nested within the organization, this research categorizes the constitution, bylaws, 
and internal policies as FO structures to avoid confusion with formal and informal 
institutions of the wider society in which the FO is embedded. Legal status through 
registration with government entities is also categorized as a functional organizational 
structure.   
While the EC is ultimately responsible for FO performance, active and empowered 
sub-committees (SCs) diffuse power out of the EC and strengthen FO ability to manage 
operations and issues related to member behavior and attitudes. Audit SCs can review and 
reconcile bank statements and FO records, and investigate allegations of corruption and 
mismanagement should they arise. Production SCs can visit members’ farms to ensure 
adoption of agreed-upon varieties and practices, and can help organize labor exchange if a 
member requires assistance with time-sensitive activities. Discipline SCs can intervene in 
cases of members, or leaders, not abiding by the rules and norms of the FO. Welfare SCs 
can evaluate member requests for assistance and present the case for contributions before 
the group.  
A distinction is drawn between SCs supporting functional and technical capacities. A 
Marketing SC, for example, will not build organizational maturity if the FO has not 
internalized collective marketing as a strategic objective. Furthermore, to contribute toward 
FO mission and vision, SCs must be empowered to undertake their responsibilities. Sub-
committees formed in compliance with donor requirements and populated with token 
  
89 
 
members lacking the appropriate skills and incentives required to do their job do not 
meaningfully contribute to functional capacity.     
Processes. Functional organizational processes describe how FOs undertake activities, 
and can be formal or informal. Formal processes are codified into formal structures such as 
constitutions and by-laws, governing the elections process or the process through which 
member dues are amended. Informal processes are not documented, but rather describe the 
way FOs do things. Informal processes often become codified into formal processes in 
response to crises, which draw attention to missing functional capacities, or to reduce 
uncertainty as FOs engage in more complex mediations between members and the greater 
rural environment. A mature FO “explicitly and consistently deploy(s) processes that are 
documented, managed, measured, controlled, and continually improved” (IFAD, 2015, p. 6).   
Functional organizational processes including how leaders transmit information to 
members, how members voice ideas to and register complaints with leaders, and how the 
FO builds consensus, manages conflict, reviews progress, and keeps records. The FAO 
capacity development framework represented in Figure 2 organizes functional capacities into 
four components supporting a wide range of strategic objectives. The knowledge 
component, defined as “the capacity to create, access and exchange information and 
knowledge” (FAO, 2015, p. 26), includes how leaders learn about member priorities, how 
the FO assesses its strengths and weaknesses, and how the FO learns from its experiences. 
As such, knowledge capacity encompasses adaptive capacity, the ability to transform 
knowledge gained through experience into changes in structures and processes, a particularly 
relevant capacity for organizations operating under conditions of extreme uncertainty or 
navigating complex and tacit knowledge (Staber & Sydow, 2002), such as social norms.  
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Adaptive capacity can be interpreted as double-loop learning, a term emanating from 
the field of education, which describes the organization’s ability to develop new rules and 
methods of decision making (Argyris & Schon, 1974). As opposed to single-loop learning, 
relevant to stable organizational goals, double-loop learning assumes that organizations 
undergo continual reinvention, incorporating feedback from members and the environment 
to remain relevant, vibrant, and viable (Staber & Sydow, 2002). This conceptualization of 
adaptive capacity neatly fits into the teleological family of organizational change models, and 
is obliquely referenced in the iterative, final step of the Kotter (1995) model, Institutionalize 
new approaches.  
Functional capacities are generated through the combination of member capacity 
plus the organizational structures and processes which incentivize individuals to activate 
their competencies and apply their human capital toward the achievement of collective goals. 
Thriving FOs generate functional structures and processes supporting “governance that is 
based on its members’ accountability and not just on a centralized decision-making system in 
the hands of one or two people in the organization” (Elbehri et al., 2013, p. 6). 
Motivation. In FAO’s definition, organizational motivation “stimulates the desire, 
efforts and energy of the members and staff to be continually interested and committed to 
… common goals. It results from the interaction of both conscious and unconscious factors: 
vision and mission, culture, history and incentives” (Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013, p. 26). This 
research includes group cohesion and identity as additional elements of FO motivation.  
While mission expresses the goals, characteristics, values, direction, and core purpose 
of the organization, vision is a compelling statement describing the organization’s mid- to 
long-term aspirations. As developed in Section 3.3.3, clear vision and mission statements 
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shared throughout the leadership and membership base are essential components of 
successful organizational change efforts. Analyzing the vision and mission of FOs offers 
insights into the organization itself, especially the degree to which the statements are 
understood and internalized by members (Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013).  
In response to dynamic conditions, organizational mission necessarily evolves over 
time. This progression risks alienating members and undermining group cohesion if the 
group fails to generate consensus about shifting objectives. Group cohesion, the “total field 
of forces which act on members to remain in the group” (Festinger, Back, & Schachter, 
1950, p. 37), encompasses several dimensions. Multiple frameworks consider social cohesion 
and task cohesion as primary dimensions across all groups, with additional candidates 
including vertical cohesion and belongingness (Dion, 2000); consensus among members 
about values, behavioral rules, and resisting disruptive forces (Cota, Evans, Dion, Kilik, & 
Longman, 1995); as well as collective cohesion, emotional cohesion, and structural cohesion 
(Forsyth, 2009).  
In addition to compelling members to continue their group association, group 
cohesion motivates members to achieve organizational goals and objectives (Hansen et al., 
2002), in addition to enhancing member satisfaction, increasing group engagement, reducing 
turnover, and lengthening membership duration (Forsyth, 2009).  
The impacts of group cohesion depend upon organizational culture. Groups with 
high levels of cohesion thrive in organizational cultures supportive of hard work, but 
collectively attain lower levels of achievement relative to groups with low levels of cohesion 
if the organizational culture does not support high effort (Forsyth, 2009). Organizational 
culture is “a set of shared mental assumptions that guide interpretation and action in 
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organizations by defining appropriate behavior for various situations” (Ravasi & Schultz, 
2006, p. 437). The degree to which organizational culture and norms are internalized 
depends on group identity, defined as “how individuals or subunit parts of an organization 
define what they do in relation to their understanding of what the organization is” (Fiol, 
1991, p. 193).  
Group identity enables collective interests to override individual interests, providing 
“an incentive for cooperative behavior, (and) empowering action in the interests of the 
group”(Thorp et al., 2005, p. 909). Identification with the organization has been shown to 
directly and uniquely impact members’ cooperative behaviors and performance (spontaneous 
sociability in the social capital literature), and group identity is expected to improve    
performance at individual, team, and organizational levels (Mesmer-Magnus, Asencio, Seely, 
& Dechurch, 2015). Group identity in member-based cooperative organizations generates 
identification-based trust (Ole Borgen, 2001), a demanding type of trust resulting from the 
internalization of group preferences (Sheppard & Tuchinsky, 1996).   
Mission and vision, along with group identity, cohesion, and culture, all reflect the 
group’s history, including the motivation behind group formation, previous responses to 
threats and opportunities, and the results obtained and learning engendered from past 
experience. An IFAD review of institution and organization strengthening projects (2013) 
identifies group formation as particularly relevant to sustainability. Unlike groups leveraging 
a common-interest enterprise as a focal point for collective mission and vision which 
continue to evolve and mature after the funding cycle, groups formed mainly to benefit from 
project resources collapse after phase out, continuing in name only, and emerging from 
dormancy only in response to meeting requests from prospective partners. Of the latter 
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groups, IFAD describes their engagement with the capacity building project as “cosmetic 
(i.e. preparing a constitution, holding meetings and paying membership subscriptions) and 
designed to meet eligibility criteria for project support, rather than being genuine attempts to 
organize and progress into mature viable groupings” (IFAD, 2013, pp. 27-28).  
Social capital: bonding. FO motivation, structures and processes, financial and 
human capital combine to yield bonding social capital, or trust within the group (Narayan, 
1999). Within organizations, levels of trust include affective trust between members and 
other members, based upon feelings or emotions about the trustworthiness of peers; and 
cognitive trust between FO members and leaders, based upon a rational process of 
evaluating leaders’ ability to advance the interests of members (Hansen et al., 2002). Multiple 
bases of trust in organizations exist (Kramer, 1999), and a great deal of work has been done 
on rule-based trust to address a full spectrum of social dilemmas and collective-action 
problems. Ostrom (1990) distills rules empirically proven to overcome co-ordination 
problems, distributional struggles, and incentive problems by sustainable, self-organized 
groups into eight design principles, presented in Section 2.3.    
As membership can be withdrawn from voluntary associations such as FOs at any 
given time, organizational survival depends on the ability to instill and sustain perceptions of 
mutual trustworthiness among members and between members and leaders (Fine & 
Holyfield, 1996). Furthermore, trust reduces FO transaction costs by limiting the need for 
costly negotiations and contracting (Bromiley & Cummings, 1998; Creed & Miles, 1993; 
Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Stockbridge et al., 2003), though it should be noted that for 
collective sales of low-margin staple commodities, the transaction costs of organizing 
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collective sales can be higher than the sum of transaction costs incurred on individual-level 
sales (Berdegué, 2004). 
 
 
As featured in Figure 10, FO capacity extends beyond functional capacities to 
include member technical capacity, physical capital, technical FO structures and processes, 
institutional capacity, as well as access to and interactions with the biophysical environment. 
While FO maturity is a measure of the organization’s ability to achieve a wide range of 
objectives, FO capacity includes components relevant to specific FO objectives as well as 
the institutional and biophysical environments which influence capacity development.  
Human capital: “hard skills”. The “hard skills” of this component comprise 
technical skills specific to particular strategic objectives, such as testing of incoming 
commodity and warehouse management for FOs engaging in collective sales of commodity; 
maintenance skills specific to FO equipment such as mills, threshers, reapers, tractors, and 
drying lines; and ability to liquidate collateral for FOs extending secured loans to members.  
Physical capital. Hard skills may be tied to the efficient utilization of physical 
capital, the assets and equipment of the FO, harnessed toward the attainment of strategic 
objectives. Skills not utilized by the FO, and inappropriate, dormant, or under-employed 
equipment does not enhance FO capacity.      
Organizational capital. The specific SCs and processes contributing to technical 
organizational capital depend upon FO strategic objectives. For example, Asset Management 
SCs can schedule member usage of jointly-owned equipment, collecting user fees, and 
arrange for upkeep and maintenance. Marketing SCs can find buyers, negotiate the terms of 
4.1.2 Farmers’ organization capacity. 
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collective sales, and arrange transport from fields to collection points to the point of 
ownership transfer. Credit SCs can screen loan applications and collect cash or in-kind 
payments for credits issued. These functional structures and processes are irrelevant to FOs 
without assets to manage, which do not engage in group sales, or which do not extend 
credits to members. However, for FOs which do provide these goods and services to 
members, the technical structures and processes directly determine the distribution of 
benefits and costs throughout the membership base and the sustainability of activities. 
Organizations which cannot maintain and service their equipment, are unable to find 
advantageous terms of exchange for their members, or fail to screen out bad credit risks will 
not engage in those activities for any length of time, undermining task cohesion and group 
cohesion, and diminishing members’ cognitive trust of their leaders.  
These above examples highlight the importance of double-loop learning and 
adaptive capacity. The types of failures do not condemn FOs to irrelevance and collapse; 
members and development agencies alike expect learning curves. However, FO ability to 
learn from experience by adapting its structures and processes to mitigate against similar 
types of future challenges represents a critical component of FO maturity distinguishing 
groups able to respond to crises from those which flounder.  
Social capital: bridging. Bridging social capital refers to cross-cutting ties across 
groups (Narayan, 1999), and includes public image and branding, as well as linkages to peer 
FO and to other actors along the supply chain. Strengthening bridging social capital by 
enhancing an FO’s horizontal and vertical network of partners is established as a low-cost, 
high-return investment in FO capacity building (IFAD, 2013).   
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Institutional environment. Framing the context within which organizations 
operate, institutions provide incentives, opportunities and resources binding the quality and 
extent of services and outcomes FOs provide to their members (IFAD, 2008). 
Organizational capacity assessments should include the formal and informal rules 
influencing organizations, their members, and the society in which they are embedded (CRS, 
2011; Pact, 2010; Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013). Formal institutions such as laws regarding 
activities available to FOs, bank regulations on accessing credit, procurement procedures, 
reporting requirements, and group constitutions establish the boundaries within which FOs 
operate. Informal institutions such as local weights and measures, trading practices, gender 
roles, and local conceptualizations of agriculture as a business further shape the activities of 
FOs and their members. Writes Eversole (2003), “It is in these informal standards, 
assumptions, and interrelationships that many of the obstacles to achieving development 
goals may be found” (pp. 792-793). 
Due to the considerable influence of institutions upon FO performance, most FO 
capacity building supports not only organizational development, but also institutional 
strengthening to render the institutional environment more conducive to achieving FO 
objectives and progressing toward FO goals (FAO, 2012; Lusthaus, Adrien, Anderson, 
Carden, & Montalván, 2002; TASCO, 2014).  
Natural capital. In Figure 1, the biophysical environment frames the institutional 
context in which FOs are embedded. The biophysical environment is comprised natural 
capital, or “the natural resource stocks from which resource flows and services (e.g. nutrient 
cycling, erosion protection) useful for livelihoods are derived” (DFID, 1999, p. 11). This 
component of FO capacity captures the influence of biophysical environment on member 
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choices and member interactions with the biophysical template including the number of 
growing seasons, access to land and water, erosion and storm protection, biodiversity, 
adoption of good agricultural practices appropriate to the agroecology, as well as 
agrochemical application, management, and disposal. Natural capital establishes the limits of 
farmer productivity, and sustainable and equitable access to natural capital frequently 
motivates collective action in the agricultural sector (Ostrom, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
Having distinguished between the components of organizational maturity and 
capacity, this study turns to the principles of OCA and the potential of OCA to achieve 
multiple purposes at different levels. Whose interests OCAs serve depends upon how the 
assessment is designed and how the outputs are harnessed.  
The second stage of the participatory capacity building process, as illustrated in 
Figure 11, OCA identify the strengths and weaknesses of FOs, as well as the multi-level 
constraints and incentives which shape the assessed group’s responses to opportunities and 
threats.  
4.2  Participatory Capacity Assessments for Farmers’ Organizations 
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The OCA process is characterized as multi-level, participatory, inclusive, transparent, 
and empowering. In recognition that organizations are both comprised of individuals and 
embedded within the institutional environment, OCAs examine the three dimensions 
established in the FAO framework for capacity development, illustrated in Figure 2.     
Most OCAs explicitly aim to increase empowerment of the assessed organizations 
and its members. Empowerment occurs through 3 avenues: by building functional capacity 
in knowledge generation, by giving members a voice to express their perspectives on the FO 
and its activities, and by enhancing FO ability to seek solutions and mobilize resources 
toward their identified capacity gaps (Elbehri et al., 2013).  
Figure 11.  Capacity assessments in the capacity building process.  
4.2.1 OCA principles and process. 
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To achieve the goal of empowering FOs and their members, OCA methods must be 
participatory, inclusive, and transparent. As described in FAO’s Fourth Learning Module on 
Capacity Development, “organization analysis needs to be conceived from the beginning as a 
participatory process” (Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013, p. 35). This approach frames 
beneficiaries as active participants in their own development, however as developed in 
Chapter 3, the degree to which beneficiaries participate and who participates impacts the 
likelihood that participation yields empowerment and other posited benefits such as 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity and sustainability. As participation in the OCA process 
generates knowledge about the organization, the literature promotes “engag(ing) members 
from all parts of the organization” (Pact, 2012, p. 8) and not limiting the OCA experience to 
FO leaders. A transparent OCA process not only facilitates knowledge generation, but also 
creates the space for empowerment of less privileged members, which can occur “only … if 
they are given access to information as a right and are involved in all significant aspects of a 
particular intervention. By being involved, not only can they make their preferences known 
and competencies availed of, but they can also broaden their horizons, acquire fresh 
perspectives and learn new skills” (IFAD, 2008, p. 31).  
Finally, “a participatory organizational assessment process should itself build 
capacity” (Fowler et al., 1995, p. 3), and the outputs of OCA should facilitate knowledge 
generation rather than inform external judgment regarding organizational performance. 
Tying assessment results to funding decisions not only generates biased results, but may lead 
to potential abuses of the assessment process to justify funding cuts (Simister & Smith, 
2010).  
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4.2.2 OCA benefits at multiple levels 
 
Rocchigiani & Herbel (2013) attribute FO failure to leaders’ and members’ 
misunderstandings about organizational strengths and weaknesses, as well as misconceptions 
about external challenges and opportunities. The authors call for regular OCA, creating the 
opportunity for FOs to process the dynamic changes occurring at the individual, 
organizational, and institutional levels.  
Benefits to assessed organizations. Capacity assessments serve multiple purposes 
at the FO level. Creating a forum for members to share their perspectives on FO 
performance and the degree to which the FO represents their interests enables feedback 
between members and leaders, and may empower members. Through the process of 
integrating multiple perspectives on FO effectiveness in achieving organizational and 
member objectives, participants build a shared understanding of FO strengths and 
weaknesses. This process increases not only functional capacities in consensus building and 
knowledge creation, but can also support planning capacity if the FO harnesses OCA results 
toward solutions to address capacity gaps. “The merit of this methodology is that it is built 
on making organization members more responsible and on encouraging them to develop 
their own solutions” (Elbehri et al., 2013, p. 99). Solutions may include designing or 
updating a capacity building strategy, revitalizing partnerships or seeking new partnerships, 
as well as changing organizational structures and process for better alignment with 
organizational mission and vision. By providing a venue for processing lessons from 
organizational failures and successes, OCA can stimulate the transformation of endogenous 
knowledge generated into organizational change, thereby strengthening adaptive capacity.    
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Catholic Relief Services expects significant benefits to accrue at the organizational 
level, with OCA rendering “stronger, healthier organizations better able to survive in 
uncertain times; improved service delivery and financial management; improved partner 
relations; better stewardship; accountability to donors and constituents; reduced risk; and 
increased opportunity for growth” (CRS, 2011, p. 3).    
The CRS expectations and the principles of participatory OCAs reflect the ideal of 
OCA privileging the learning and empowerment of the assessed organization. However, in 
practice, many OCA are conducted utilizing consultative, as opposed to collaborative or 
collegial, participation with the administrative objective of satisfying donor reporting 
requirements, rather than enhancing FO capacities and promoting long-term sustainability 
(The Learning Agenda on Local Capacity Development, 2014).    
Benefits beyond assessed organizations. The benefits to outsiders of OCA are 
not negligible. The OCA process builds implementing partner capacity to facilitate FO 
capacity development. For development agencies working to build FO capacity, OCA can 
improve targeting, inform a customized capacity building strategy, guide procurement, and 
feed into M&E. 
Lack of congruence between project objectives and FO vision, mission, and 
objectives hinders the change process (Kotter, 1995). Though organizational capital and 
maturity tend to be low in rural Africa, many projects assume both can be rapidly expanded 
(Stringfellow et al., 1997), generating false expectations about the potential of capacity 
building, and ensuing disappointments. Capacity assessments can improve targeting of 
groups for inclusion into projects by documenting organizational mission, objectives, and 
vision. The onus falls on the development agency to select beneficiaries with goals in line 
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with project objectives. Additional screening criteria may include threshold levels of bonding 
social capital and maturity levels. To select FOs into projects, IFAD utilizes three-hour focus 
group discussions (FGD) to conduct a rapid OCA covering organizational motivation, 
bonding social capital, and functional capacities, with more detailed OCA conducted after 
adoption to provide baseline measurements of organizational maturity and capacity (IFAD, 
2015). The rapid OCA gauges receptivity of the group to the expected project outcomes, 
determines whether or not the group has an organizational culture which supports improved 
performance and “can find within itself the resources and wherewithal, even if latent, to 
confront and overcome its internal constraints and contradictions. Without these minimum 
prerequisites, progress and growth will not be achievable and sustainable” (IFAD, 2008, p. 
44).    
For P4P, ensuring that FOs adopted into the program have a vision which involves 
collective marketing would align project and FO interests. Ideally, FOs included into P4P 
would have collective sales as a strong feature of their group identity, an endogenous shared 
vision of formal market access, and a high level of bonding social capital. In addition, OCA 
including technical marketing capacity can assist WFP in selecting appropriate contracting 
modalities.  
As developed in Section 3.3, OCA feeds into a customized capacity building strategy 
by generating a basis of comparison between FO current state and FO vision. Not only can 
an initial OCA generate baseline measures of FO maturity and capacity, but subsequent 
OCA can monitor changes in process outcomes including developments in organizational 
maturity though external shocks may sabotage organizational capacity.  
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For P4P, M&E at the FO level has comprised of FO records and FO surveys. 
Farmers’ organization records capture information such as number of SHF contributing to 
collective sales and contributions of non-FO members to collective sales, however these 
self-reported records have not been collected, processed, and/or analyzed in many P4P 
countries, with Ghana an exception with the data collected annually through a partnership 
with the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science & Technology. Baseline, midterm, and end 
of pilot FO surveys capture information on sales, access to credit, assets, and trainings, but 
no indicators on member participation or distribution of opportunities within the group. 
Neither FO records nor FO surveys incorporate member feedback, nor do they feed into 
the capacity building strategy. Complementing OCA into P4P M&E would document 
process outcomes resulting from P4P interventions.   
 
 
This section provides an overview of 11 OCA tools, identified by the name of the 
agency utilizing the tool followed by the tool name.   
WFP. The Ghana tool, in Appendix A, is one of the most advanced among P4P 
countries, measuring 23 indicators related to group governance, group assets, and group 
marketing, with responses classified as High, Medium, or Low. Indicators are not assigned 
equal weights, but rather are scaled to reflect their relative contribution to FO capacity. 
Scores are summed and a quartile approach is utilized to separated groups into one of four 
capacity categories: low, medium-low, medium-high, and high.    
The Malawi FO Classification criteria, available in Appendix B, includes eight indicators 
related to group marketing, storage and warehouse management, trust issues, strategic 
4.3  Survey of  Existing OCA Tools and Methodologies. 
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thinking, and vendor status, with responses classified as High, Medium, or Low, though not 
scored. 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). IFAD engages in 
capacity building of institutions and organizations, including FOs, savings and credit groups, 
and natural resource management groups. When analyzing rural grassroots organizations in 
advance of capacity development planning, the IFAD Maturity assessment (MA) measures 25 
indicators across 5 domains: governance, management, leadership, capacity building, and 
resilience (IFAD, 2015). Each indicator has six to 12 responses which are not mutually 
exclusive, with responses scored from -6 to 18. Unlike other assessment tools, the response 
options are not along a graded scaled; each response item is attributed a score, and multiple 
responses are acceptable. Multiple responses allow indicators to capture multi-faceted 
concepts, and applying indicator typology presented in Table 8 yields 28 indicators. Summed 
scores are reported for each domain, and totals across the five domains are aggregated, 
yielding a total maturity score categorizing the organization as beginner, intermediate, or 
mature.  
IFAD emphasizes a participatory approach to selecting areas targeted for capacity 
building, as well as identification of priority indicators used to monitor and assess 
organizational change. The tool reviewed is used in the selection of beneficiaries to 
determine whether prospective organizations have sufficient capacity to benefit from project 
support, as well as the in monitoring of selected beneficiaries to track progress in 
organizational capacity.   
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). FAO utilizes an Organizational 
Performance Assessment (OPA) tool, adapted from Lusthaus et al.’s organizational assessment 
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framework (2002) developed for the Inter-American Development Bank and the 
International Development Research Centre. The OPA tool can be adapted for use with 
FOs, extension organizations, ministry departments, or ministries. The light version of the 
tool, used for an initial capacity assessment, employs 35 indicators across four domains: 
Performance, Motivation, Capacity, and External Environment. The in-depth tool, used to 
obtain a deeper understanding of organizational weaknesses and to identify capacity building 
opportunities, measures 284 indicators across eight domains: Human Resources, Capital 
Resources, Infrastructure, Systems and Processes, Organizational Structure, Process 
Management, Programme Management, and External Environment (Rocchigiani & Herbel, 
2013). In addition to measuring internal organizational capacity and motivation, these tools 
assess the external environment, including institutions and stakeholders influencing the 
organization and its relationships. Unlike the other tools, the OPA is presented as a checklist 
of open-ended questions, without scoring assigned to responses.  
In the participatory process, FAO and the target organization determine whether the 
assessment will be self-administered or whether an external actor will conduct the OPA, 
identify priority issues and areas for targeted capacity building, and tailor the assessment tool. 
The understanding generated by application of the OPA informs an organizational design 
plan, generates internal support for organizational change, and in later iterations monitors 
progress toward change.  
Catholic Relief Services (CRS). For use with non-profit organizations working to 
support communities, the Holistic Organizational Capacity Assessment Instrument (HOCAI) 
measures 286 indicators across nine domains: Supply, Operations, Internal Management, 
Financial Management, External Risks, Market, Financial Performance, Enablers, and 
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Sustainability (CRS, 2011). Each indicator is assigned a level of priority (Top, Medium, and 
Low) as well as a level of achievement: Strong – meets present needs, Good – will benefit 
from improvement, Weak – requires improvement, Poor – requires substantial 
improvement.  
The HOCAI guide emphasizes the participatory nature of the tool, from 
prioritization of capacity areas, to assessment and data analysis, through the design of a 
capacity building action plan. The capacity assessment matrix does not yield scores, but is 
used to identify organizational strengths and weaknesses, directly feeding into a capacity 
building action plan. The HOCAI process promotes organizational resilience, risk 
management, partner relations, and accountability.   
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Originally 
developed for the health sector, USAID’s Organizational Capacity Assessment (OCA) for CBOs 
measures 26 indicators across six domains: Governance, Administration, Human Resource 
Management, Financial Management, Organizational Management, and Program 
Management (USAID, 2012). The tool describes characteristics of Basic, Moderate, and 
Robust organizations for each indicator. 
Designed as a self-assessment tool administered with the support of a skilled 
facilitator, the OCA requires participation across levels and departments within the 
organization. For each indicator, participants assess where their organization’s current status 
and also establish their preferred level of organizational capacity in 6 months’ time. In this 
manner, the USAID OCA identifies priority areas for capacity development and 
simultaneously establishes an organizational development road map. In later iterations, the 
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tool serves to monitor effectiveness of previous actions and interventions, to evaluate 
capacity development, and to identify priority areas for capacity building.  
Eastern Africa Farmers Federation (EAFF). EAFF modified the USAID OCA 
tool to administer to the EAFF Secretariat. The tool measures 43 indicators across seven 
domains: Governance and Legal Structure, Financial Management and Internal Controls, 
Administrative and Procurement Systems, Human Resource Systems, Program Management, 
Project Performance Management, as well as Organizational Management and Sustainability 
(Eastern Africa Farmers Federation, 2014a). The tool includes procurement and project 
management, and captures additional indicators related to human and financial resource 
management. As with the USAID OCA, EAFF’s describes the characteristics of Low, 
Moderate, and Strong capacity organizations for each indicator (Eastern Africa Farmers 
Federation, 2014a).   
In 2014, EAFF invited representatives from 16 federations to workshops convened 
to assess the organizational capacity of members. The tool was used to assess each 
federation, to identify the dynamics of an ideal federation, and to develop customized 
organizational development plans (Eastern Africa Farmers Federation, 2014b).  
Pact. The Pact tool, developed with funding from USAID, assesses the 
organizational capacity of CBOs, NGOs, and government institutions working in 
HIV/AIDS, peace building, livelihoods, governance, and natural resource management. The 
tool measures 286 indicators across six domains: Governance, Human Resource 
Management, Financial Management, Program Management, External Relations, and 
Sustainability (Pact, 2006). Each indicator is scored along an organizational development 
scale where: 1 = Needs very urgent attention, 2 = Needs urgent attention, 3 = Needs many 
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improvements, but without urgency, 4 = Needs to improve some aspects, but without 
urgency, 5 = Needs some minor adjustments, but without urgency, and 6 = No need for 
improvements. Total scores categorize organizations into a five-stage typology: Nascent, 
Emerging, Moderate, Expanding, and Mature.  
Pact screens potential beneficiaries using three simpler tools to assess management 
control, program capacity, as well as monitoring, evaluation and reporting. The in-depth 
OCA tool is utilized at the beginning of organizational development interventions to identify 
partner strengths and weaknesses and to generate buy-in for capacity building. Partners 
participate in contextualizing and customizing the tool, but scoring and analysis is conducted 
by trained facilitators. Assessment results not only identify “quick wins” for organizational 
change, but also feed into customized institutional strengthening plans specifying 
organizational development activities as well as M&E systems and communication tools 
(Pact, 2010).  
SCOPEinsight. SCOPEinsight is a global assessment firm which has conducted 
over 600 assessments in 20 countries spanning 40 agricultural sectors (SCOPEinsight, 2016). 
The assessments analyze FO strengths and weaknesses for use in self-improvement, capacity 
building, and M&E, with established products including an In-depth assessment tool 
targeting professional FOs and a Basic tool for emerging FOs. This research examines the 
Basic tool in Section 4.5, as the more appropriate assessment tool for the FOs in the case 
study countries, however the In-depth tool is likely more appropriate for P4P FOs in Latin 
America.  
Two products in development by SCOPEinsight include a tool assessing field agents 
such as lead farmers or village coordinators, and a tool assessing the character, capacity, 
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capital, collateral, and context of individual smallholder farmers. The latter could be 
particularly helpful for P4P in monitoring changes at the SHF level and could potentially be 
leveraged to incorporate member participation into the SCOPEinsight OCA process.   
The Basic assessment measures 93 categories across eight domains: Supply, 
Operations, Internal Management, Financial Management, External Risks, Market, Financial 
Performance, Enablers, and Sustainability (SCOPEinsight, 2014b). Each domain contains 2 
to 4 categories, and 4 and 21 elements. The assessor summarizes the FO’s level of 
achievement for each element in a few sentences, and assigns a score to each element on a 
scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicative of a very immature organization and 5 reflecting a very 
professional organization. In addition, the assessor includes recommendations for each 
element, and a description of the level attained by a very professional organization is 
included in the report.  
The assessment generates scores for each of the eight domains, calculated as an 
average across the elements of the domain, as well as a total capacity score, averaging across 
domains. By identifying organizational strengths and weakness, the Basic report enables self-
improvement, capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, and can be used to signal 
graduation from support programs. The audience for the Basic tool includes the assessed 
FOs and their capacity building partners for gap assessment and training needs. 
 
 
Harnessing the typology of indicators established in Table 8, this section compares 
tool content. While the P4P and SCOPEinsight tools are designed specifically for FOs and 
address technical marketing capacity, the remaining tools reviewed in Section 4.3 do not 
4.4  Comparison of  OCA Tools and Methodologies. 
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investigate marketing capacity and include FOs among a range of potential targets, including 
NGOs, CBOs, and even government sectors. Table 7 presents an overview of the tools, 
ordered from most to least comprehensive.  
 
 
Six of the 11 tools measure fewer than 50 indicators, two examine between 100 and 
200 indicators, while the three most extensive collect data on more than 200 indicators. The 
Agency
Name of Tool/ 
Publication
Year
Target 
Organization
Indica-   
tors
Response 
options
Data collection process
Data collection 
time requirement
SCOPE 
Insight
SCOPE Pro 2014 Professional 
FOs 
386 5 FGDs with FO 
management & 
accountant review
2 days
CRS HOCAI 2011 Non-profit 
organizations 
290 4 Self-assessment through 
FGDs, workshop, &/or 
interviews 
Not specified - 
dependent on data 
collection process  
FAO In-Depth OPA 2013 Public or private 
non-profits, 
including FOs
265 Not 
specified
Interviews & FGDs Not specified
PACT OCA 2010 CBOs, NGOs, 
and government 
institutions 
175 5 & 1 non- 
response 
option
Interviews & FGDs 
with EC & staff
3 days
SCOPE 
Insight
SCOPE Basic 2014 Emerging FOs 124 5 FGDs with FO 
management
4-6 hours
EAFF OCA 2014 Third-tier FOs 43 3 Self-assessment by 
broad range of staff
Not specified
FAO OPA Light 2013 Public or private 
non-profits, 
including FOs
35 Not 
specified
Interviews & FGDs Not specified
IFAD Maturity 
assessment
2015 Rural Grassroot 
Organizations
29 6-12 Interviews 4-5 days
USAID OCA 2012 CBOs 26 3 Focus group including 
all levels of CBO
2-3 days
WFP 
Ghana
FO classification 
criteria
2015 FOs 23 3 FGDs with EC 4 hours
WFP 
Malawi
FO classification 
criteria
2015 FOs 8 3 FGDs with EC 2 hours
Table 7.  
Overview of  organizational capacity assessment tools 
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P4P tools are the lightest of the group, with the Malawi criteria examining the fewest 
indicators.  
To enable comparison, indicators are reclassified into the typology presented in 
Table 8, complementing the five assets of the SLA framework with organizational capital 
and the institutional environment. Not every assessment identifies specific indicators. Some 
present questions such as “Does the group maintain and utilize up-to-date equipment, and is 
the equipment maintenance fully budgeted?” which references several categories of 
indicators: asset maintenance, financial management, and physical capital. This research 
disaggregates assessment questions into multiple component indicators as appropriate.  
The distinction between functional and technical capacities is not explicit in this 
typology, though most of the organizational processes and structures were functional as only 
the SCOPEinsight and WFP Ghana tools address technical structures and capacities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
112 
 
 
Description
Human capital
Skills People, their skills, and their health
Gender Womens' representation and participation
Financial capital Cash reserves, sources of income
Organizational capital
Motivation Group identity, FO culture, 
Structures EC, SCs, constitution, by-laws;                                   
Manuals, job descriptions, institutionalized policies;              
Legal status
Processes
Adaptive capacity  & 
change management
Incorporation of feedback into structures and processes, 
incentives to adopt changes
Advocacy & negotiations Advocacy on behalf of members;                              
Negotiations with donors, buyers, and other stakeholders
Asset management Maintenance of assets
Communications Internal and external
Conflict management Conflict resolution processes and outcomes
Finance management Accounting practices, financial reporting, audits
Governance Elections, leadership, oversight, & guidance
Human resource 
management
Reccruitment, compensation, performance evaluations
Knowledge management Monitoring against plans and evaluation of progress, M&E;                          
Training & learning initiatives;                                          
Report and record management;                                        
Awareness of policies, risks, member production
Member participation Bottom-up input into FO activities, decisions & finance
Behaviour Monitoring of member and leader behaviour and 
enforcement of sanctions
Operations, management, 
& administration
(Non-financial) record-keeping, reporting, services, decision-
making
Planning Strategic, budgetary, contingency, succession & operations
Social capital
Bonding Perceptions of trustworthiness within the FO
Bridging Partnerships beyond the FO; image and reputation
Physical capital Assets, equipment, technology
Natural capital Access to and interactions with water & land 
Institutional environment
Infrastructure Roads, bridges
Institutions Formal and informal institutions
Category
Table 8.   
Indicator typology 
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Table 9 presents the distribution of indicators across the seven first-level categories. 
Financial, physical, and natural capitals are skipped completely by some OCA tools. The 
WFP Ghana assessment places an unusual emphasis on physical capital, which differentiates 
between P4P and non-P4P FOs as most of the indicators capture the assets and equipment 
transferred to P4P FOs on a cost-sharing basis.   
 
Tool Human Financial Organizational Social Physical Natural
SCOPE Pro 18 9 292 13 4 17 13
5% 2% 79% 4% 1% 5% 4%
CRS HOCAI 24 7 234 19 3 3
8% 2% 81% 7% 1% 1%
FAO in-depth 12 173 25 8 47
5% 65% 9% 3% 18%
PACT OCA 9 5 140 20 1
5% 3% 80% 11% 1%
SCOPE Basic 10 3 90 5 5 2 9
8% 2% 73% 4% 4% 2% 7%
EAFF OCA 2 39 1 1
5% 91% 2% 0% 2%
FAO light 1 24 2 1 7
3% 69% 6% 3% 20%
IFAD MA 3 1 17 6 1 1
10% 3% 59% 21% 3% 3%
USAID OCA 3 19 4
12% 73% 15%
WFP Ghana 3 11 1 7 1
13% 48% 4% 30% 4%
WFP Malawi 6 1 1
75% 13% 13%
Total 85 25 1,042 97 27 24 81
Weighted average 6% 2% 75% 7% 2% 2% 6%
Type of capital Institutional 
environment
Table 9.   
 
Indicators of  first-level categories across assessment tools and percentage share of  total indicators relative to 
each assessment. 
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All the tools but the WFP Malawi classification include human capital indicators, 
with half including gender indicators, as illustrated in Figure 12. Most of these gender 
indicators capture women’s representation the member base and leadership positions, with 
the SCOPE Basic tool including questions about the treatment of pregnant women and their 
involvement in risky agricultural tasks including exposure to agrochemicals and heavy lifting. 
None of the tools address women’s voice or participation with the organization, such as how 
women contribute to collective activities, such as community outreach or group sales, nor 
the extent to which women participate organizational decision-making.  
 
 
 
All reviewed tools include social capital indicators, with an emphasis on bridging 
rather than bonding social capital, as presented in Figure 13. Only four OCA measure social 
bonding indicators, a glaring omission given that “bonding capital ensures cohesiveness and 
trust among people and is a necessary precondition for attaining common goals” (Anyonge 
Figure 12.  Human capital indicators across assessment tools 
  
115 
 
et al., 2014, p. 2). The FAO in-depth tool exhibits the greatest commitment to social capital, 
including 11 bonding indicators and 14 bridging indicators, representing nearly 10% of the 
assessment. The SCOPE Pro tool neglects bonding indicators, while the Basic tool includes 
only one, Strength of the membership base, evaluating member “satisfaction with the services 
provided to them, the economic performance, the performance of the management, their 
trust in the management, their feeling of ownership, etc. The difference between active 
members and official members is also an indicator” (SCOPEinsight, 2014a, p. 17). The WFP 
tools each contain one bridging social capital indicator capturing the FO’s number of buyers 
beyond WFP.  
 
 
 
 Though the literature emphasizes the significant influence of the institutional 
environment in shaping organizational outcomes, only the FAO tools emphasize 
institutional indicators, comprising one-fifth of their tools. The SCOPE tools nod to 
Figure 13. Social capital indicators across assessment tools. 
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infrastructure, competition in terms of suppliers, buyers and other FOs, as well as awareness 
of national policies on human and worker rights, and child labor laws. None of the OCA 
tools delve into how economic policies, food quality standards, weights and measures, 
contracting mechanisms, credit terms, traditional authorities, social norms, and gender roles 
impact the assessed group. Given the influence of institutions, particularly informal 
institutions, upon capacity development (IFAD, 2013, 2014; Pritchard, 2014), this dearth, 
presented in Figure 14, is surprising. A greater focus on the institutional environment would 
not only develop local perspectives on theories of change and help interpret discrepancies 
between changes in FO maturity and FO capacity, but also confirm or repudiate 
assumptions underlying the design of the capacity building initiative, and enable course 
corrections to accommodate the reality of institutional constraints.  
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Institutional environment indicators across assessment tools.  
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The plurality of indicators for each tool captures the FO structures, processes, and 
motivation comprising organizational capital, with particular emphasis on processes, as 
presented in Figure 15. Relative to the smaller tools, the larger tools place greater emphasis 
on organizational structures, particularly internal policies and the division of responsibilities 
between hierarchies within the organization.   
 
 
 
Given the importance of mission and vision to organizational change (Kotter, 1995), 
and the revocable nature of voluntary membership in FOs and the other target organizations 
of OCA, cursory attention to organizational motivation represents a glaring deficit among 
the reviewed tools. The IFAD and WFP Malawi tools neglect this category completely, and 
the EAFF OCA, USAID OCA, and WFP Ghana tools each include exactly one indicator 
related either to mission and vision or to an element of group history, culture, identity, or 
cohesion. The WFP Ghana tool captures a history-related indicator, the number of years the 
Figure 15.  Organizational capital indicators across assessment tools.  
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FO has been in existence, a weak measure of either motivation or maturity. The FAO light 
and CRS HOCAI tools place substantial emphasis on organizational motivation, at 17% and 
13% of their content, respectively. Organizational motivational indicators comprise about 
3% of the SCOPE tools, focusing upon mission, vision, and objectives as delineated in the 
business plan in the Basic tool, and organizational history in the Pro tool. Though the drivers 
of group formation influence group motivation and sustainability (IFAD, 2013), none of the 
tools examine the intentions underlying group formation.  
  Across the tools, 80% of the organizational capital indictors capture processes. 
Aggregated across tools, Figure 16 illustrates the distribution of indicators across Table 8’s 
processes sub-categories. Nearly half of process indicators fall into one of three sub-
categories: operations, management, and administration (18%), financial management (16%), 
and knowledge management (13%).  
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Processes reflecting soft skills such as advocacy and negotiations, as well as conflict 
resolution, total 4% of the process indicators across tools. Member participation, including 
meeting and training attendance, as well as bottom-up interactions including those between 
managers and governors, accounts for 6% of process indicators. Though rules-based trust 
plays in integral role in enabling collective action, monitoring of behaviors and enforcement 
of sanctions constitutes only 6% of process indicators. Adaptive capacity and change 
management, capturing the incorporation of internal and external feedback into changes in 
organizational structures, processes, and incentives to change organizational systems and 
individual behaviors, comprise 9% of process indicators.    
Figure 16.  Process indicators of  organizational capital aggregated across assessment tools.  
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Eight percent of process indicators capture communications. With smaller tools 
measuring at most one communications indicator, the larger tools include both internal and 
external communications, as disaggregated in Table 10. Of the bottom-up internal 
communications indicators, only 3 relate to voice from the membership base; others capture 
communications from staff to managers, or from managers to governing boards. 
 
Table 11 presents the distribution of indicators across organizational process 
categories and assessments. The tools have varying strengths in line with their prioritization 
of different facets of organizational maturity and capacity. While the PACT OCA tool excels 
in financial management, the FAO tools surpass its peers in institutional assessment. The 
FAO in-depth tool draws attention to gender issues and bonding social capital, while the 
CRS HOCAI tool delves into organizational communications. SCOPEinsight tools are 
distinguished by their Focus on technical marketing capacity and attention to natural capital 
distinguish the SCOPEinsight tools.  
Tool Top-down Bottom-up Unspecified FO-out Outside-FO Unspecified
SCOPE Pro 4 4 1 4
CRS HOCAI 1 5 2 3 3 3
FAO in-depth 2 2 3
PACT OCA 1 4 3
SCOPE Basic 1 1 1 1
EAFF OCA
FAO light 1
IFAD MA 1
USAID OCA 1
WFP Ghana 1
WFP Malawi
Internal External
Table 10. 
Communications indicators across assessments 
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Tool
Adaptive 
capacity Advocacy
Asset 
mgmt
Commu-
nications
Conflict 
mgmt
Finance 
mgmt
Gover-
nance
HR 
mgmt
Know-
ledge 
Partici-
pation
Beha-
viour
Opera-
tions
Plan-
ning
SCOPE Pro 15 5 12 14 1 28 3 10 49 9 33 59 20
4% 1% 3% 4% 0% 8% 1% 3% 13% 2% 9% 16% 5%
CRS HOCAI 15 8 15 21 5 21 1 8 29 14 18 3
5% 3% 5% 7% 2% 7% 0% 3% 10% 5% 6% 1%
FAO in-depth 25 2 3 8 8 23 9 9 29 3 8 7
9% 1% 1% 3% 3% 9% 3% 3% 11% 1% 3% 3%
PACT OCA 6 2 1 8 37 14 12 10 10 1 11 3
3% 1% 1% 5% 21% 8% 7% 6% 6% 1% 6% 2%
SCOPE Basic 1 2 7 6 3 1 24 2 5 25 6
1% 2% 6% 5% 2% 1% 20% 2% 4% 20% 5%
EAFF OCA 2 1 6 1 9 3 2 8 2
5% 2% 14% 2% 21% 7% 5% 19% 5%
FAO lite 3 1 3 2 1 2 2 3
9% 3% 9% 6% 3% 6% 6% 9%
IFAD MA 3 1 1 1 4 4 1 1
10% 3% 3% 3% 14% 14% 3% 3%
USAID OCA 1 3 1 2 1 1 4 2
4% 12% 4% 8% 4% 4% 15% 8%
WFP Ghana 1 1 8
4% 4% 35%
WFP Malawi 1 1 3
13% 13% 38%
Total 69 18 35 60 16 128 35 52 102 45 40 146 46
Weighted average 5% 1% 3% 4% 1% 9% 3% 4% 7% 3% 3% 11% 3%
Table 11.  
Distribution of  indicators across organizational capacity process categories and percentage share of  total indicators relative to each assessment. 
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The smaller tools, of 50 or fewer indicators, are better described by the facets they 
lack. With the exception of the FAO light tool, they do not address the institutional 
environment, nor bonding social capital. In aggregate, the smaller tools do not focus on 
financial capital, organizational structures, motivation, or communications, especially internal 
communications. Their coverage varies, as indicated in Table 11. 
The classification criteria used in Ghana and Malawi are less comprehensive and less 
resource intensive relative to the set of OCAs reviewed. In addition to sharing the gaps 
exhibited by the smaller tools, the Malawi tool does not include indicators of human capital, 
natural capital, nor communications. The Ghana tool places heavy emphasis on physical 
capital, as well as WFP marketing history. It also includes an indicator estimating risk of 
default on WFP contracts, which should be determined from OCA findings rather than 
contribute to the assessment.   
In terms of methodology, the P4P tools are less participatory than the other OCAs, 
save the SCOPEinsight tools, and are utilized for the narrow purpose of grouping FOs into 
capacity categories to determine appropriate contract modalities, rather than aiming to 
contribute to the assessed organization’s capacity development.   
 
 
The SCOPEinsight and WFP Ghana tools are the only ones exploring the technical 
structures, processes, and physical capital associated with collective marketing. In terms of 
organizational processes, the Ghana tool investigates previous marketing experience, while 
the SCOPEinsight tools delve into critical processes such as oversight of member 
4.5  Analysis of  the SCOPEinsight Basic Tool  
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production activities, inbound logistics, testing commodity, management of stocks, and 
outbound logistics.  
Among the OCAs reviewed, the SCOPEinsight tools stand out for their assessment 
of technical capacity in collective marketing and processing. They have the potential to 
greatly strengthen P4P assessments by adding significant depth to OCAs, standardizing 
assessments across countries harmonize classification and to enable comparability. The 
SCOPEinsight assessment of technical marketing capacity can help WFP determine 
appropriate contracting modalities. This sub-section examines the SCOPEinsight Basic 
methodology, methods, and content within the framework for participatory capacity building 
developed in Chapter 3.  
It should be acknowledged that the SCOPEinsight tools did not emerge from 
participatory capacity building. The great strength of these tools lies in their objective 
assessment of technical capacities relevant to the interests of P4P and the interests of actors 
along the supply chain. However, for development organizations committed to capacity 
building, technical marketing assessments do not provide a robust understanding of FO 
motivation, bonding social capital, and the structures and processes which enable member 
voice and non-token participation within the organization. These functional capacities 
improve FO capacity to succeed across a wide range of prospective endeavors and enable 
collective action, including group sales. Given that 50% of SHF will not be able to connect 
with formal markets (Ferris et al., 2014), FOs with empowered membership bases likely have 
goals and objectives beyond collective marketing which reflect member priorities and can be 
supported through capacity building initiatives. Tailoring a capacity building strategy to 
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support objectives endogenous to the FO requires understanding FO vision and member 
priorities.    
Elite capture is a well-documented phenomenon among FOs, and functional 
capacities determine the distribution of program benefits within an organization. An FO 
with a high level of technical marketing capacity may participate in “group” sales by 
aggregating commodity from a few wealthy members or FO executives, topping off with 
market purchases or lower-priced purchases from poorer FO members. In this case, the 
benefits of formal market access provided by P4P are captured by elites. This distributional 
issue does not pose a challenge for private sector buyers seeking commodity sources, for 
banks financing FO investments, or for WFP’s Procurement Unit ensuring a well-stocked 
pipeline. However, for development agencies committed to FO capacity building, including 
the P4P Unit, a regressive distribution of benefits sabotages the goal of increasing SHF 
market access and altering the “sell-low, buy-high” SHF market dynamic.    
 
 
The SCOPEinsight reports identifying organizational strengths and weakness can be 
harnessed into the capacity development, however the SCOPEinsight approach does not 
reflect a participatory capacity building methodology. This manifests in data collection, the 
knowledge generation process, independence as a stand-alone assessment, and the basis for 
capacity gap identification. 
Data gathered to produce the SCOPEinsight assessments include documents 
submitted by the FO and primary data collected through FGDs with FO leaders. Members 
beyond the leadership ranks do not participate in the assessment, in contrast with the other 
4.5.1 Methodology. 
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OCA methodologies, excepting the P4P classification criteria. Gathering primary data 
exclusively from leaders subjects the assessment to bias, as leaders are wealthier and better 
educated than members, and well-versed in the language of development agencies, as 
detailed in Section 3.5.2.   
SCOPEinsight offers an external evaluation conducted by professional assessors, 
generating consultative, rather than collaborative, participation from FO leaders. Assessed 
FOs do not participate in the selection or prioritization of indicators, the scoring of results, 
or assessment analysis. Assessed groups own neither the process nor the outputs of the 
OCA. The SCOPEinsight process does not support functional organizational capacity 
through the generation of endogeneous knowledge. 
Assuming that FOs receive copies of the assessment reports, that FOs have access to 
the human capital required to read and interpret the reports, and that the assessed FOs 
communicate findings with members, the SCOPEinsight outputs, such as the Basic report, 
can serve as a springboard for internal reflection, analysis, and planning. The functional 
capacities of the FO determine the degree to which this set of assumptions is realistic. The 
Basic report includes a side-by-side comparison of the assessed group’s total score and 
domain scores against those averaged across 4 peer FOs in the project, a useful metric for 
understanding FO strengths and weaknesses relative to comparable groups.      
The Basic report identifies organizational strengths and weaknesses, which can serve 
as a basis for capacity building. However, as a professional assessment firm, SCOPEinsight 
does not facilitate visioning or strategic planning. The SCOPEinsight OCA is a stand-alone 
exercise; it is contingent upon the development agency and assessed organizations to 
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incorporate assessment results into capacity building. Failure to take advantage of the 
findings represents a missed opportunity.  
If indeed the Basic reports are integrated into capacity building, the capacity gaps 
identified by the SCOPEinsight assessor reflect differences between FO current state and 
the assessor’s conceptualization of “very professional organizations.” Failing to ground 
capacity gaps in a vision of preferred future state endogeneous to the assessed group not 
only risks categorizing gaps in areas irrelevant to the FO’s mission, vision, and strategic 
objectives as weakness, but also threatens to undermines FO autonomy. If gaps identified by 
SCOPEinsight serve as the sole basis of a capacity building strategy, lack of alignment with 
group vision will likely hinder implementation.  
 
 
As noted in Section 4.3, SCOPEinsight tools do not specify indicators. The Basic 
tool has 8 domains; with each domain populated by 2 to 4 categories, each containing 
between 4 and 21 elements. Elements may reference multiple indicators, and the 93 elements 
of the Basic tool yield 124 indicators according to this study’s indicator typology.  
To attain a final capacity score, SCOPEinsight adopts a two-tiered averaging 
methodology, with all elements weighted equally within a tier. The final capacity score is an 
average of domain scores, with all 8 domains bearing equal weight. Each domain score 
represents the average of element scores, with each element weighted equally.  
Due to this scoring method, the contribution of a particular element to the final 
capacity score directly depends upon the number of elements in the domain. For example, 
the element Mitigation strategies for weather and natural risks in the External Risks domain carries 
4.5.2 Methods. 
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five times more weight in the final score than the Objectives of executives element in the Internal 
Management domain because External Risks includes four elements, while Internal 
Management includes 21 elements.  
The inclusion of multiple indicators within some elements privileges some indicators 
over others in terms of contribution to the final score. For example, the Maintenance and 
cleaning element in the Operations domain includes one indicator, whether the storage facility 
is properly maintained. As one of 7 elements in the Operations domain, the Maintenance and 
cleaning indicator constitutes 1.78% of the total score,                                            
( 
1 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
1 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗
1 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
7 𝑠𝑢𝑏−𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛
∗
1 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛
8 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠
= 1.78% ). 
By contrast, the Strength of membership base element, one of 12 within the Supply 
domain, measures member “satisfaction with the services provided to them, the economic 
performance, the performance of the management, their trust in the management, their 
feeling of ownership, etc. The difference between active members and official members is 
also an indicator” (SCOPEinsight, 2014a, p. 17).  
Comprised of at least 6 indicators, Strength of membership base is the only Basic tool 
element capturing member perception of the FO and bonding social capital. A great deal of 
rich information on member satisfaction, trust, and ownership is compressed into this one 
element, which contributes only minimally to the total capacity score, 
(
1 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
12 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛
∗
1 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛
8 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠
= 1.04%). Any of the specific indicators within the 
Strength of membership base element, such as the sole bonding social capital indicator measuring 
cognitive trust between members and leaders, contributes 
1.04
6
= 0.17% to the total score. 
While maintenance and cleaning is clearly important for FOs utilizing storage facilities to 
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process and aggregate commodity for collective sales, member’s trust in FO leaders 
underpins all FO undertakings. Due to SCOPEinsight methods, storage maintenance bears 
10 times the weight of members’ trust in FO leaders in determining the assessed group’s 
final score.    
 
 
In terms of content, the SCOPEinsight strengths in technical capacity are 
complemented by weaknesses in certain facets of functional capacities, as exemplified in 
Strength of membership base. In percentage terms, Figure 17 presents the Basic tool’s distribution 
of indicators across the Table 8 categories compared against an aggregate of the OCA tools 
reviewed. The tool’s focus on the organizational processes of knowledge generation and 
management, as well as operations and management, is readily apparent, with these two sub-
categories of organizational capital processes accounting for nearly 40% of tool content.  
The knowledge indicators include multiple types of awareness: of external 
institutions, of FO performance, of member production, of waste management practices, of 
water body protection, of agrochemical storage and disposal, and of risks to operations, 
including market, price, weather, natural, and biological risks. The degree to which some 
awarenesses are operationalized at the FO-level are measured in the Operations and Internal 
management domains, however operationalization at the member level is not assessed.  
The Basic tool mirrors the aggregated OCA content with respect to institutions, with 
slightly greater attention to human capital, financial capital, and infrastructure. Due to the 
focus on technical capacities, the SCOPE tool places greater emphasis on physical capital 
and infrastructure relative to other tools.  
4.5.3 Content.  
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Relative to the aggregate OCA, the SCOPEinsight Basic tool places less emphasis on 
social capital, organizational structures and motivation, and the organizational processes of 
adaptive capacity, conflict resolution, human resource management, and member 
participation. The next section proposes additions to the SCOPEinsight Basic tool to 
address these lacunae, with the exception of human resource management, which 
Figure 17.  Distribution of  SCOPEinsight Basic indicators across categories. 
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contributes to incentivizing and retaining employees, but is not identified as a critical 
component of sustainable collective action or organizational change.  
 
 
Between its focus on technical marketing capacity and its objective methodology, the 
SCOPEinsight Basic tool holds great promise for standardizing FO assessments and for 
informing P4P procurement strategies. As a tool to achieve WFP administrative and 
procurmement objectives, the SCOPEinsight Basic OCA excels. With some enhancements, 
a SCOPEinsight Basic Plus tool could also build FO capacity while improving WFP’s 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of P4P FOs. This section presents additions 
and changes to the SCOPEinsight Basic tool and methodology to enable a robust 
assessment of FO functional capacities as conceptualized within the participatory capacity 
building framework established in Chapter 3.   
 
 
As established in Section 3.2.2, the teleological family of organizational change 
models highlights the importance of organizational motivation in driving organizational 
change and the role of adaptive capacity in codifying change into organizational structures 
and processes. Section 2.3 develops member participation and voice, rules and trust, as well 
as effective conflict resolution mechanisms as foundations of successful and sustainable 
organizations. 
This section draws on the literature on rules-based trust and organizational change to 
propose additions toward a SCOPEinsight Basic Plus tool. These additions encompass 3 
4.6  Recommendations Toward SCOPEinsight Basic Plus 
4.6.1 Proposed content. 
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domains, Organizational Motivation, Member Participation, and Organizational Structures, 
as well as an Adaptive capacity category. The domains, categories, and elements presented in 
this sub-section are further developed alongside scoring criteria in Appendix C.  
Organizational Motivation domain. An Organizational Motivation domain 
unpacks the multiple elements in the Strength of membership base element, bringing clarity to 
important elements and outcomes of organizational motivation. The SCOPEinsight tool 
already includes five indicators of organizational motivation: Objectives of executives’ in the 
Internal Management domain, measuring alignment between executives’ and FO objectives; 
Mission and vision and Business objectives also in the Internal Management domain, exploring 
these elements as documented in the business plan; Value of services to members in the Supply 
domain, measuring the services offered to members and the loyalty inspired by service 
provision; and Branding in the Market domain, which explores awareness of FO identity. Of 
these, only Value of services to members belongs in an Organizational Motivation domain, the 
others are well placed where they are.  
Given the importance of mission and vision in motivating organizational change, it is 
surprising to observe these elements are assessed only as components of the business plan. 
A group without a business plan scores a 0 in the Mission and vision element (and in Business 
objectives, as well), though elements are typically scored between 1 to 5. This scoring method 
is fair within the limited scope of business plan assessment, however “analysing the vision 
and mission of an organization offers insight into the organization itself” (Rocchigiani & 
Herbel, 2013, p. 27), and can be easily incorporated into the OCA. Even more revealing is 
the degree to which members have internalized the mission and vision of the FO, however 
obtaining this information would require methodological changes, as developed in the next 
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sub-section. Determining “the degree to which the formal mission statement is understood 
and internalized by members and stakeholders of the organization; that is, … the congruence 
of the perceived and stated missions” (Lusthaus et al., 2002, p. 96) is a critical function of 
OCA for capacity building.     
This study proposes three categories within the Organizational Motivation domain: 
Mission and vision, History, and Group cohesion. The Mission and vision category includes 
three elements. Mission and vision assesses the clarity and feasibility of these statements as 
articulated by leaders and members. Operational plans measures the indicators of the Business 
objectives element, independent of the written business plan. The final element, Marketing 
identity, examines the degree to which collective marketing features in FO vision and mission. 
Though Marketing identity does reflect not functional capacity, it signals compatibility between 
capacity building strategies designed to increase technical marketing capacity and FO 
priorities. As a common, compelling vision is the driver of organizational change, this 
indicator is particularly relevant to P4P and other programs supporting market access.      
The History category includes only one element, Group formation, which examines the 
drivers of group formation, identified as being particularly relevant to the organizational 
sustainability and continuation of project activities after the funding cycle (IFAD, 2013).  
The Group cohesion category adopts Value of services to members, currently in the 
Supply domain, and adds five additional elements: Member satisfaction with contributions, which 
explores members’ understanding of and satisfaction with the use of their cash, in-kind, and 
labor contributions to the FO; Member assistance, which examines assistance rendered to 
group members in times of need and the process through which the group confers 
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assistance; and three indicators of trust, affective trust between members, cognitive trust in 
leaders, and perceived trustworthiness of the FO.  
Appendix D presents the methodology utilized to generate the three trust indicators 
during the case study. Both study teams (including P4P staff and implementing partners in 
Ghana) identify the section on bonding social capital as the most revealing. As framed by 
this research, these indicators are a measure of functional capacity outcomes.     
Member Participation domain. A participatory approach to capacity building 
explicitly values member participation as a means toward member empowerment 
(Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013) and a counter-weight against elite capture (Herbel et al., 2012). 
The SCOPE Basic tool includes two indicators of Member Participation: Reliability of supplies 
from members in the Supply domain which assesses the timeliness of member contributions to 
collective sales; and Membership fees in the Financial Management domain, which examines the 
percentage of members current on their dues.  
This study proposes four categories within the Membership Participation domain: 
Conflict resolution; Meetings, dues, and sales; Learning; and Planning. Conflict resolution 
includes three elements: Raising concerns, which investigates the paths available for members 
to raise concerns about FO plans, rules, activities, and members’ satisfaction with the 
process; Conflict resolution mechanisms, which explores the internal structures and processes 
available to the FO for resolving conflict; and Conflict resolution history, which explores the 
timeframe for and member satisfaction with the resolution of previous conflicts. Though 
categorized as a Conflict resolution element, Raising concerns also serves as an indicator of 
Bottom-up communications. This domain category captures aspects of Ostrom’s design 
principles related to rules modification and conflict resolution, developed in Section 2.3. 
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The Meetings, dues, and sales category includes five elements: General meeting frequency, 
which captures the number of general meetings open to the membership base during the 
previous year; General meeting attendance, which estimates the average percentage of members 
present at last year’s general meetings; Membership fees, currently categorized in the Financial 
Management domain, examines the percentage of members current or expected to be 
current on their membership fees by the end of the season; Trend in active members, which aims 
to capture a three-year trend in the number of members fulfilling all conditions of active 
membership, such as dues payment, share purchase, meeting attendance, labor requirements, 
and so on; and Percentage of members contributing to group sales, which examines the average 
percentage of members contributing to collective sales over the last three years. For 
programs with a gender focus, such as P4P, indicators such as Percentage of group sales 
contributed by women or Percentage of women members contributing to group sales can be included.   
The Learning category includes two elements: Production learning and Business Learning, 
which both measures the degree to which transmission of information to members includes 
active learning through workshops, field days, and plot inspection, as opposed to passive 
classroom learning. The Planning category includes two elements: Member involvement in 
planning decisions and Member involvement in operational decisions, which categorize member 
involvement into different levels of participation (Arnstein, 1969).  
Organizational Structure domain. Organizational structures, including rules, their 
monitoring and enforcement, and bodies which enable monitoring and enforcement, serve 
as the basis for rules-based trust, which enables successful collective action and 
organizational performance. Rules governing member behaviors, and way and degree to 
which they are monitored and enforced, influence how members participate within 
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organizations. This domain develops elements reflecting Ostrom’s design principles related 
to rules, monitoring and enforcement, and the right to organize.     
The Organizational Structure domain includes 4 categories: Rules, Sales rules, 
Interference, & Active SCs. Rules includes three elements: Rules, Rules monitoring, and Rules 
enforcement. Rules captures the number of formal and informal rules elaborating the terms of 
membership with associated sanctions. Rules outlining expected fee contributions, share 
investments, meeting attendance, and member assistance can be formalized into 
constitutions, by-lays, and procedures, or remain unwritten as informal FO norms. 
Associated penalties may include fees or fines, deductions from share investments, written or 
verbal warnings, restriction from group activities, and membership revocation.  
Rules are effective to the degree they are monitored, enforced, and adhered to. Rules 
monitoring captures parties tasked with monitoring while Rules enforcement measures the degree 
to which rules are enforced. Adapted to focus on collective marketing, the Sales rules 
category includes elements parallel to those in the Rules category: Sales rules, Sales rules 
monitoring, and Sales rules enforcement.     
The remaining categories in the Organizational Structures domain each contain 
singular elements: Interference and Active sub-committees. Interference assesses the influence and 
degree to which actors external to the organization, such as traditional authorities, political 
figures, financial institutions, as well as partners, limit the group's autonomy and self-
determination. In recognition that SCs diffuse power out of the Executive Committee, 
protect against elite capture, and enable stronger management and oversight, Active sub-
committees counts the number of SCs that meet regularly, address challenges facing the 
organization, and manage or oversee FO operations.   
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Adaptive capacity category. Given the importance of double-loop learning 
(Argyris & Schon, 1974) to organizational change (Kotter, 1995), relevance, and longevity 
(Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013), this research proposes a final category for inclusion into 
SCOPEinsight Basic Plus, an Adaptive capacity category with 4 elements: Market response, 
Structural response, Risk mitigation, and Phase-out impact. Market response assesses the FO’s history 
in grappling with unexpected market dynamics, such as unpredicted price changes, buyers' 
inability to fulfill promises, export bans, and other potentially deleterious changes. Structural 
response investigates the FO’s history of adapting organizational structures and processes in 
response to learning from experience. These changes be formal, such as amendments to the 
constitution, or informal, such as changing the way the group does business without 
documenting the changes in by-laws, procedures, or manuals.  
Though the SCOPEinsight Basic tool includes an External Risks domain, and the 
assessed group’s awareness of different types of risk is evaluated through elements across 
multiple domains. By contrast, the proposed Risk mitigation element does not differentiate 
between risk types, but rather examines the FO’s posture toward risk mitigation. Does the 
organization proactively diversify its members, crops, buyers, and activities to minimize risk 
exposure, or does it react to changes after they occur? 
The final element of the Adaptive capacity category, Phase-out impact, captures 
organizational response to the end of supply-side partner support.  
The domains, categories, and elements presented in this sub-section, are further 
developed in Appendix C, alongside scoring criteria.  
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4.6.2 Proposed methodologies. 
 
Adding elements and re-categorizing content to prioritize functional capacity 
indicators utilizing the SCOPEinsight methods are relatively changes simple to adopt. On 
the other hand, adopting principles of participatory capacity building into the SCOPEinsight 
methodology requires significant modifications and additional costs. This sub-section 
motivates a more participatory methodology and proposes options for achieving greater 
member participation.  
The objective of changing the SCOPEinsight methodology is to increase member 
voice in the OCA to achieve both process and product outcomes. In terms of process, 
including members in the assessment provides them an opportunity to learn about their FO, 
as well as to share their perspectives of FO strengths and weaknesses with other members 
and leaders. This process of sharing, reflecting, and learning increases functional knowledge 
capacities at the individual and organizational levels, increases group cohesion and 
identification, and may shift power dynamics within the organization, empowering members 
by validating their perspectives. Participatory OCA may double as training experiences, with 
inclusive, collaborative participation providing “the first time (members) were faced with an 
assessment exercise where they were given the right to speak and the time to express 
themselves” (Elbehri et al., 2013, p. 99).  
In terms of product, including members provides the perspective of farmers who are 
not as well-educated and not as well-versed FO operations and partner relations. Member 
perceptions of and trust in the FO influences their participation within the group, and 
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reveals to outsiders group dynamics which are not discernable from FO records and 
discussions with leaders.  
Leaders of FOs are elites (Kumar, 2002; Mansuri & Rao, 2013; Uphoff et al., 1998). 
Well-versed in the language of development agencies (Mosse, 2001), leaders tailor their 
message to their understandings of donor expectations (Michener 1998), hold considerable 
control over FO operations (Elbehri et al., 2013), and benefit disproportionately from FO 
capacity building initiatives (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980). Including regular members in the OCA 
process improves assessment outputs by providing a non-elite perspective on FO priorities 
and relevance. This creates the opportunity for members to contradict leader proclamations, 
either directly, or indirectly through body language, cueing the assessor to probe into 
statements generating discomfort within the group.  
Elements of the SCOPEinsight Basic tool, such as Strength of membership base, cannot 
be accurately measured in the absence of member participation. Similarly, proposed elements 
of the SCOPEinsight Basic Plus tool, such as Member satisfaction with contributions, Trust in 
leaders, and Raising concerns, require member input. Should members be included in 
SCOPEinsight assessments, budgets should foresee the participation of members located far 
from FO headquarters, who likely have different perspectives on FO strengths and 
weaknesses compared to members physically proximate to the FO (Amani, 2014a). 
Including members in FGDs as part of the OCA process bears non-negligible 
expenses, however it provides the greatest opportunity for collaborative participation from 
members and reflects the value of inclusion participation shared by the tools reviewed, save 
WFP and SCOPEinsight OCA. If adopted, the assessor would need to be sensitive to power 
dynamics between FO members and leaders, intentionally creating space for member voice 
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in the interest of an equitable and transparent assessment process (Barnaud & van Paassen, 
2013).  
An alternate and less costly means of incorporating member perspectives into the 
assessment would be through text messages. The SCOPEinsight Farmer pilot tool collects 
data from SHF via text message on the character, capacity, capital, collateral, and context of 
FO members. Assuming SCOPEinsight has the equipment and methodology for collecting 
this type of information from a randomized sample of FO members, and further assuming 
that members have the capacity to understand and respond to the questions, this approach 
can be utilized gather member perspectives on their understanding of FO mission, vision 
and objectives; the degree to which the FO represents their interests; their participation in 
and satisfaction with FO activities; as well as their trust in peers and leaders.    
Member participation through this avenue represents an improvement over 
SCOPEinsight’s current methodology. However, relative to the FGD option, consultative 
participation through text messages does not build functional knowledge capacities of 
members nor organizational motivation, does not provide direct feedback from members to 
leaders, and cannot empower members. Furthermore, unless member responses are 
collected and analyzed in advance of FGDs with leaders, contradictions between leader and 
member perspectives cannot be explored.  
In the interest of maintaining objectivity and comparability across assessments, this 
research does not recommend that FOs participate in scoring the assessments, leaving that 
critical function to objective assessors. However, as developed in the following section, an 
internal validation workshop could provide the opportunity for FOs to process assessment 
results, to compare current capacities against those required to realize their vision of success, 
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and to prioritize capacity gaps through the creation or adjustment of a capacity building 
strategy.  
 
 
Challenges in conducting participatory OCA for capacity building include lack of 
staff skilled in facilitation for capacity development. Confirming, rather than assuming, the 
qualifications of SCOPEinsight assessors is a worthwhile investment, and if the 
methodology is expanded to include collaborative participation from members, assessors 
should be trained in facilitating FGDs to ensure equitable participation from groups with 
entrenched power dynamics.   
 Reluctance to initiate and commit to the time-consuming, effort-intensive 
assessment is an additional constraint (CRS, 2011). Though OCA yields long-term benefits, 
it draws attention and resources away from short-term, seemingly-imperative demands. 
Framing the OCA as a learning opportunity designed to build FO functional capacity, rather 
than an administrative requirement, and scheduling the assessment well in advance around 
FO activities can ease this concern.  
Mistakes to avoid include framing OCA as a test and linking support to assessment 
outcomes (Simister & Smith, 2010), generating unrealistic expectations regarding appropriate 
capacity building strategies (ICRAF, 2013), and failure to harness OCA outcomes into a 
customized capacity building strategy (Pact, 2012). The first mistake can be avoided by 
keeping P4P support independent of OCA analysis. The second can be circumvented by 
including FOs screened for P4P inclusion into the planning stage of the capacity building 
process, being transparent about the objectives and priorities of all stakeholders, and 
4.7  OCA Lessons Learnt and Best Practices  
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empowering assessed groups to use OCA results to forge their own solutions in remediating 
endogenously identified capacity gaps.  
The SCOPEinsight OCA process can be utilized within a capacity building process.  
However as professional assessors, SCOPEinsight does not conduct visioning exercises, 
identify capacity gaps relative to the FO preferred future state, nor does it facilitate the 
creation of a customized capacity building strategy, the 3 stages following the capacity 
assessment as illustrated in Figure 11. By working with SCOPEinsight as the implementing 
partner for FO OCA, P4P runs the risk of “put(ting) the results of such powerful processes 
on a shelf, or produc(ing) and fil(ing) the report without further action” (Pact, 2012, p. 18). 
Some assessed FOs with sufficiently high levels of knowledge and planning capacity, 
coupled with a dense network of partners, may be able to harness the SCOPEinsight Basic 
report in support of their functional capacities and strategic plan. However, lower maturity 
FOs with fewer prospective partners will encounter difficulties in bearing full responsibility 
for their capacity building if they have not attained the threshold level of empowerment 
required for collegial participation.  
 To actualize the potential of SCOPEinsight Basic Plus to build FO capacity and to 
ground a customized capacity building strategy, it is recommended that P4P follow up on 
OCA results with workshops convening FO leaders, FO members, and stakeholders, 
including P4P partners and prospective partners. Depending on FO maturity, the workshop 
can be internally conducted or facilitated by outsiders, but should serve the objectives of: 1) 
reviewing and validating OCA results, 2) clarifying FO vision, 3) identifying capacity gaps 
between assessed capacity and preferred future state, and 4) designing, or updating, a 
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customized capacity building strategy reflecting the priorities and objectives of the FO, as 
well as resources availed by the FO, supply-side partners, and WFP in pursuit of FO vision.    
Best practices of OCA include ensuring full support from FOs and the 
wholehearted, active engagement of leaders (Fowler et al., 1995); appropriate facilitation 
techniques which build trust and create the opportunity for collaborative participation from 
all participants (Pact, 2012), particularly in isolated rural areas with socio-economically 
marginalized populations (Rocchigiani & Herbel, 2013); and staying true to the principles of 
OCA by ensuring that the process builds FO capacity (CRS, 2011). Though self-assessments 
with external validation have great potential to build FO capacity, as developed in Section 
3.3.2, external OCA can be harnessed into the participatory capacity building process 
through an internal validation, visioning, and strategy building workshop.   
4.8  Conclusion and Recommendations 
Organizational maturity and capacity can be assessed through participatory OCA, 
which are multi-level, participatory, inclusive, transparent, and empowering. When 
determining indicators to collect in OCA, the literature on collective action suggests focusing 
on rules, their monitoring and enforcement; conflict resolution mechanisms; member 
participation in voicing concerns and changing rules which impact them; and minimal 
external interference in internal governance decisions (Ostrom, 1990). These indicators 
capture the mechanisms generating rules-based trust and social capital, which enables groups 
of people to overcome coordination problems and achieve collective action (Ostrom, 2000). 
The literature on organizational change, specifically teleological organizational 
change which underlies the iterative capacity building framework (Van de Ven & Poole, 
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1995), suggests inclusion of indicators capturing organizational motivation, especially vision, 
and double-loop learning in which lessons learned from experience are transformed into 
organizational structures and processes (Kotter, 1995). Bonding social capital, organizational 
motivation, and incentives incorporated into organizational structures and processes shape 
how information transmitted through learning activities is transformed by individuals into 
behavioral and organizational change (de Rosa & Belman, 2012). 
Comparing the suite of OCA tools to the findings from the collective action and 
organizational change literatures suggests greater attention to organizational motivation, 
conflict resolution, rules-based trust, member participation, and bonding social capital. 
Furthermore, though both the institutional environment and the biophysical environment 
exert a great deal of influence on FO capacity, the OCA tools reviewed, as a set, do not 
adequately address these constraints.  
The SCOPEinsight Basic tool excels at capturing technical marketing capacity, and 
bringing SCOPEinsight into the P4P network of partners would bring great value to WFP in 
terms of generating objective and comparable assessments of P4P FOs. The SCOPEinsight 
Basic tool can be harnessed by WFP to standardize FO classification, to serve as a basis for 
M&E, to inform procurement, and to select FOs into P4P. Selection criteria should include 
alignment of FO mission, vision, and strategic objectives with the P4P goal of connecting 
SHF to formal markets. Additional selection criteria may include threshold levels of bonding 
social capital and organizational maturity. Purchase for Progress would benefit from further 
refining its target beyond “smallholder farmers capable of producing surpluses” (WFP, 2012, 
p. 10), and re-specifying project goals based upon the SHF segment targeted. 
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As an objective, external assessment, the SCOPEinsight Basic tool achieves the 
administrative goals of OCA, but does not satisfy the conditions of OCA for participatory 
capacity building. This chapter compares SCOPEinsight Basic against the other OCA tools 
and the literature. The study develops content to address functional capacity gaps in the 
SCOPEinsight Basic tool, including Organizational Motivation, Member Participation, and 
Organizational Structure domains, as well as an Adaptive capacity category, detailed in 
Appendix C. Proposed methodologies for aligning a SCOPEinsight Basic Plus tool with the 
principles of participatory OCA include greater member participation either through FGDs 
or text messaging, as well as internal workshops to validate and incorporate OCA findings 
into the participatory capacity building process. Follow-up is required to ensure that P4P and 
participating FOs leverage the capacity building opportunity created by the SCOPEinsight 
assessments.   
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Chapter 5 
PURCHASE FOR PROGRESS IN GHANA AND MALAWI 
5.1  P4P Overview: Background, objectives, and interventions 
WFP has sourced food commodity from developing countries since at least 1985. 
From 1986 - 2002, purchases from developing countries hovered around 20-30% of total 
food procurement (WFP, 2012). In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 
December 2000, an outpouring of cash flooded the relief effort, encouraging the food aid 
community to explore alternatives to transoceanic food aid. Figure 18 illustrates this shift in 
willingness to procure from developing countries, which has hovered around 70% since 
2008. Against the backdrop of significant LRP, WFP considered how to structure 
procurement to generate development impacts, particularly for SHF, to achieve the dual 
purpose of providing food assistance while simultaneously reducing poverty through 
improving SHF access to markets. 
 
Figure 18. Food procured by WFP (1990 - 2010). Adapted from Purchase for Progress: A Primer, 
by WFP, 2012 and Food Procurement Annual Report 2010, by WFP, 2011.  
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Smallholder farmers face significant barriers to formal market access including 
inability to produce in regular and sufficient quantities to satisfy demand from large buyers, 
inability to meet exacting buyers’ quality standards, and lack of awareness about sales 
opportunities (Markelova et al., 2009). Compelled by immediate cash needs and 
inaccessibility of more remunerative markets, SHF typically sell their crops to intermediaries 
at the farm gate after harvest, when supply is high and prices drop (Fafchamps & Vargas 
Hill, 2005).  
Purchase for Progress aims to alter this dynamic. An integral component of the P4P 
development hypothesis is the shift from informal farm-gate sales to formal markets 
compensating for aggregated commodity meeting exacting quality criteria. Though informal 
marketing channels offer lower prices at harvest and non-standardized weights unfavorable 
to producers, these markets offer seller benefits such as instantaneous cash payments for 
spot transactions of multiple commodities with minimal quality standards, as well as 
flexibility in the timing of transactions and cash inflows (Amani, 2014a).  Formal market 
contracts reduce the uncertainty of prices, weights, and measures, and participation offers 
farmers longer-term, transparent buying arrangements, as well as access to services and social 
investments (Ferris et al., 2014). 
However, formal market sales require production of specific commodities to rigid 
specifications, necessitating investments to attain quality standards. Participating in formal 
market sales requires individual to sacrifice choice regarding the timing of transactions and 
to wait through the lengthy transaction process. In addition, when considering prices 
averaged over time rather than weighted by sales volume, formal markets offer lower average 
prices relative to informal markets (Neven et al., 2009).  
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As identified in WFP’s P4P Primer (2012), the objectives of the pilot are fourfold: 
1. To identify and share best practices for WFP, NGOs, governments and 
agricultural market stakeholders to increase profitable smallholders’ 
engagement in markets. 
2. To increase smallholders’ capacities so they may increase their income from 
agricultural markets. 
3. To identify and implement best practices for increasing sales by low-income 
farmers to WFP with a particular focus on small-scale farmers. 
4. To transform the WFP food purchase model to support sustainable 
production and address the root causes of hunger. 
 
To achieve these objectives, the pilot adopts a three-pronged approach: learning and 
sharing, supply-side interventions, and demand-side interventions.  
 
 
Learning and sharing. Double-loop learning (Argyris & Schon, 1974) within P4P 
occurs largely through national and international fora gathering partners to share country-
specific lessons on connecting SHF to institutional markets (Mitchell & Leturque, 2011).  
The P4P pilot underwent a mid-term evaluation in 2011 and a final evaluation in 
2014. In addition, a series of seven primarily qualitative studies were conducted by 
Management Systems International in support of the P4P Global Learning Agenda in 2013-
5.1.1 P4P objectives. 
5.1.2 P4P activities. 
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2014. Researchers at the Local and Regional Procurement Learning Alliance produced a 
series of studies exploring tradeoffs between the multiple objectives of food interventions, 
and between different modalities of food assistance, including P4P (Lentz, Barrett, Gómez, 
& Maxwell, 2013).  
To reach a wider audience, WFP has submitted several reports for peer-review, and 
the African Economic Research Consortium will publish a book summarizing lessons 
learned from the P4P pilot at global, regional, and country levels in 2016. This study 
represents part of the effort to consolidate learning on FO capacity building and capacity 
assessment, and to expand lessons learned from P4P beyond WFP.    
Supply-side interventions. Supply-side interventions include support along the 
value chain to increase SHF access to formal markets. This family of interventions includes: 
 Building the capacity of farmers to achieve higher yields, to reduce post-
harvest losses, and to improve the quality of their commodities;  
 Building the capacity of farmers’ organizations to govern, to access credit, to 
distribute inputs to members, to test for quality, to store and handle 
commodity, to increase female SHF participation, and to negotiate contracts;  
 Strengthening market information systems and innovative market platforms 
such as commodity exchanges (CEX) and warehouse receipt systems (WRS); 
and  
 Strengthening and shaping relations between different categories of actors 
along the value chain, including SHFs, FOs, implementing partners, traders, 
transporters, agrodealers, financial institutions, and government (WFP, 
2012). 
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While the Procurement and P4P Units provide some trainings in quality standards, 
contracting, and negotiations, most capacity building trainings are designed and conducted 
by a network of more than 500 supply-side partners, including government ministries, 
international and national NGOs, RBAs, as well as research and financial institutions (WFP, 
2014). As illustrated in Figure 19, most trainings focus on technical capacities such as 
Production and productivity, and Post-harvest handling, with less attention to functional capacities 
such as Agribusiness management, Credit and finance, and M&E. FO institutional capacity building 
refers to trainings on functional capacities such as leadership and communications, while 
Gender trainings draw attention to gender roles in agriculture and marketing, and the formal 
and informal institutions which generate inequitable access to resources, such as gendered 
land tenure restrictions. During the pilot phase, trainings conducted by WFP and P4P 
partners reached over 768,000 attendees, primarily through FOs (WFP, 2014). 
 
Figure 19. Training topics under P4P by percentage of  trainees (September 2008 – December 
2013). Reproduced from Purchase for Progress Final Consolidated Farmers’ Organizations and 
Capacity Development Report, by WFP, 2014. 
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Working directly with farmers and providing an organizational basis for collective 
action and service delivery, FOs provide a viable entry point for WFP to support SHF. 
During the 5-year pilot period, P4P engaged with over 830 FOs with a total membership 
base of 1.6 million farmers (WFP, 2013a). Over the same period, 474 FOs signed contracts 
with WFP for 280,341 mt of food, representing 65% of the total quantity contracted through 
P4P, with the remaining 35% (151,201 mt) was contracted through traders, processors, or 
structured trading systems (WFP, 2013b).  
The criteria for FO selection into P4P is country specific, and includes characteristics 
such as production potential, administrative capacity, availability of partners to provide 
capacity building support, member demographics, and commitment to increasing female 
SHF participation (Riley & Rinck, 2014). Utilizing the Table 8 indicator typology, Table 12 
presents the FO selection criteria elaborated in P4P country implementation plans.  
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Source: Adapted from Farmer Organization Capacity Building, by J. Riley & D. Rinck, 2014. 
 At least half of P4P countries utilized gender, legal registration, and location within a 
surplus zone to select FOs into the pilot. Nearly half of P4P countries utilized the 
percentage of membership comprised of SHF; financial management, interpreted Malawi 
Countries
Percentage 
of countries
Human capital
Numbers & expansion capacity 5 25%
SHF 9 45%
Gender 11 55%
Financial capital: Access to/extension of credit 4 20%
Organizational capital
Structures: Legal status 11 55%
Processes
Finance management &/or bank account 9 45%
Management 5 25%
Motivation 0  0%
Social capital
Bonding 0  0%
Bridging: Linkages to partners 9 45%
Physical capital: Warehouse & equipment 8 40%
Natural capital: Surplus zone 10 50%
Institutional environment
Institutions
Legal compliance 1  5%
Attitudes toward risk and technology 1  5%
Infrastructure 0  0%
Other
Focus on staples 7 35%
Proximity to WFP programs & logistics 6 30%
Marketing history 6 30%
Organizational maturity 2 10%
Category
Table 12. 
FO selection criteria. 
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and other countries as having a bank account; linkages to partners, including NGOs, 
financial intermediaries, and food processors; and access to storage and processing 
equipment.  
These criteria neglect functional capacities, which determine not only how the 
benefits and costs of P4P opportunities are distributed among FO members, but also how 
and the extent to which SHF participate within the FO. Neither social bonding capital nor 
organizational motivation were considered as selection criteria, despite their role as enablers 
of collective action (Ostrom, 1990) and drivers of organizational change (Kotter, 1995). 
Similarly, organizational processes such as adaptive capacity, communications, conflict 
management, member participation, as well as rules, monitoring and enforcement were not 
evaluated. 
The selection criteria reflect the assumption that in a context of an enabling 
environment and market development, coupling WFP’s institutional demand with increased 
FO capacity to produce, to minimize post-harvest losses, and to aggregate quality produce 
would be sufficient to shepherd smallholder/low-income farmers into the formal market 
(WFP, 2012).  
Demand-side interventions. Though many of the supply-side interventions mirror 
traditional agricultural extension programs, P4P incentivizes high-quality production from 
SHF through access to the assured demand of the largest purchaser of food aid in the world 
(WFP, 2012).  
As a United Nations (UN) agency, however, WFP is constrained by a general 
procurement strategy, requiring open tenders, high volumes, performance bonds, bagging 
and delivery requirements, stringent quality criteria, and administrative requirements 
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resulting in a one- to two-month delay in farmer payment after delivery of their deposit to 
the FO (Bymolt et al., 2011). Purchase for Progress ushered in institutional reform within 
WFP through the adoption of smallholder-friendly, also known as “pro-poor”, procurement 
modalities which do not compromise quality standards nor cost efficiency, but include 
accommodations for SHF such as reduced quantities, simplified contract verbiage, waived 
performance bonds, relaxed bagging and delivery terms, and expedited payment (WFP, 
2012).  
Listed in order of increasing complexity, WFP utilizes direct contracts, forward 
contracts, and soft tenders to procure from P4P FOs. The P4P pilot posits that successful 
FOs will progress from simple to more complex contracting mechanisms, as trainings 
coupled with the learning generated through the experience of selling to WFP builds FO 
technical capacity to produce, aggregate, manage, and sell significant quantities of graded 
commodity (WFP, 2012). The ability to successfully navigate a competitive WFP tendering 
process suggests that the FO can supply other formal market buyers and institutions, a long-
term goal of the project.   
To assure a continued demand beyond WFP, P4P links FOs to other institutional 
markets, primarily schools and strategic grain reserves. Public institutions utilize 
procurement strategies similar to the UN’s, have high levels of demand for foodgrains in 
many of the P4P countries, and their non-commercial interests may justify purchase from 
less competitive SHF to advance the national rural development agenda (Kelly & Mbizule, 
2013).  
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As established in Chapter 3, capacity building is a multi-level concept posing 
challenges in definition and measurement. WFP conducted 6 country studies and 3 regional 
write-shops in 2011 to define success parameters of P4P and P4P contributions to FO 
capacity building (Bymolt et al., 2011). The consensus built during that process defined the 
goal of P4P as increasing “the capacity of smallholders to access formal markets” (WFP, 
2012, p. 7). As conduits for collective SHF sales, P4P conceptualizes FO capacity as the 
extent to which “they can sustainably access markets without external support” (WFP, 2012, 
p. 8). Within this framework, capacity building of FOs includes multi-level interventions 
designed to remove obstacles to market access. This contrasts with definitions emerging 
from a participative capacity building framework, in which FO capacity is defined as “the 
capability of an organization to achieve what it sets out to do” (Fowler, Goold, & James, 
1995, p.3), and capacity building occurs through a multi-stakeholder process of planning, 
designing, implementing, and monitoring interventions designed to change power, identity, 
and relationships (Pritchard, 2014). 
In recognition that FO capacity influences the quantities WFP can procure from P4P 
groups as well as the contracting modalities appropriate to specific FOs, P4P countries 
undertook FO capacity assessments in 2011, in response to high levels of defaults from FOs 
as highlighted by the mid-term evaluation. The goal of the capacity assessments was to 
address high levels of FO defaults on WFP contracts through organizing FOs into high, 
medium, or low capacity categories. Honing in on FO capacity to successfully navigate a 
competitive tendering process, the classification exercise did not include the set of indicators 
5.1.3 FO capacity and capacity assessments. 
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presented in Table 12, further narrowing the focus on technical marketing capacity and 
group marketing history. Country offices measured FO capacity in different ways, Table 13 
presents an illustrative composite of common classification indicators used by P4P countries 
and corresponding capacity levels.  
The FO classifications represent steps on the ladder toward P4P graduation, signaled 
by ability to compete without concessions on formal markets. The illustrative criteria in 
Table 13 include some functional capacity indicators such as trust issues and maturity, both 
utilized in Malawi, but it is not clear to what extent these were adopted by other countries. In 
addition, OCA should be harnessed to determine organizational maturity, rather than include 
organizational maturity as a component of the assessment.  
Neither the selection nor the classification OCA utilized by P4P investigated FO 
mission and vision, missing the opportunity to determine alignment of P4P and FO 
objectives. If P4P is to change the way FOs do business, FOs and their members must be 
committed to making the organizational changes required to sell on formal markets as a 
unifying vision shared by members drives the long-term process of organizational change 
(Kotter, 1995).  
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Source: Adapted from Farmer Organization Capacity Building, by J. Riley & D. Rinck, 2014. 
Indicator Low Medium High
Procurement Modality Direct contracts 
only
Experience with 
direct and soft 
tendering 
Direct, soft tenders, 
and Bid Volume 
Only auctions 
Volume traded 50-800 mt 801-1500mt >1500 mt
Reasons for default Market price 
fluctuations
Issues with P4P 
procurement & 
procedures
Internal 
management issues
Contract term adherence Average Good Very good
Access to storage Lease or 
temporary loan
Long-term 
lease/loan
Own permanent 
store
Warehouse management None Yes, but not 
effective
Yes and effective
Membership/trust issues Yes, could not 
overcome
Yes, could 
overcome
None
Credit arrears Greater than 20% 10-20% Less than 10%
Length of supply-side 
support 
Not consistent At least 5 years More than 10 years
Maturity Less than 5 years 5-10 years More than 10 years
Services to members 1-2 services 3-5 services More than 5 
services
Technical & admin staff None 1-2 staff More than 2 staff
Strategic thinking No planning Planning that is 
unclear, 
unrealistic
Effective planning 
and follow up
Markets beyond WFP Local markets and 
small traders
Local markets and 
traders
Traders
Competes with regular 
WFP suppliers post-pilot
No Yes Yes
Capacity
Table 13. 
Illustrative composite of  P4P’s FO capacity classification indicators. 
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Similarly, the P4P OCA do not examine which FO members contribute to collective 
sales, and the distribution of benefits associated with P4P and WFP sales opportunities. Elite 
capture is a well-documented phenomenon in FOs (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980), and neglecting 
to assess the contribution of smallholder or low-income farmers to collective sales represents 
a missed opportunity for monitoring the P4P goal of “increasing sales by low-income 
farmers to WFP with a particular focus on small-scale farmers” (WFP, 2012, p. 7). It was 
envisioned that SHF contributions to collective sales would be monitored through FO 
records, however these have not been well-maintained and processed unto usable data in 
many P4P countries.  
By focusing on volumes traded by FOs, rather than the distribution of volumes 
traded across members, WFP OCA do not distinguish between an FO with 100 members, 
each of whom contribute 1 mt to collective sales, and an FO with 100 members whose 
Chairman sells 100 mt in the name of the FO. In this example, the first FO has the potential 
to intermediate between members and the rural milieu, interrupting the “sell-low, buy-high” 
market dynamic which sabotages SHF asset accumulation and curtails SHF livelihood 
strategies. By contrast, the example of the second FO entrenches and exacerbates existing 
power dynamics within rural communities.     
Assuming that OCA results feed into the capacity building strategy, defining FO 
capacity in terms of formal market access limits capacity building. For FOs without an 
endogenous motivation to engage in formal market sales, capacity building strategies 
designed to launch the group onto the formal market not only undermine FO self-
determination, but also are likely encounter FO resistance. Rather than framing WFP sales as 
an opportunity, members of these FOs likely perceive WFP sales as a requirement of 
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maintaining P4P support, which confers a host of benefits such as enhancing bridging social 
capital through linkages with P4P partners, human capital enrichment through trainings and 
other learning activities, and cost-sharing on physical capital acquisition.   
 
 
 Ghana’s participation in P4P began in 2011, program implementation in two areas, 
Northern Region in Ghana (henceforth referred to as “Northern”), and Ashanti Region in 
Ghana (henceforth referred to as “Ashanti”). While the 10 Northern FOs benefit from 
proximity to WFP’s Tamale sub-office, the 16 Ashanti FOs are approximately equidistant 
from the county office in Accra and the Tamale sub-office, operating with relatively less 
oversight from P4P. The program procures maize from FOs through direct contracts with 
FOs, and conducted three rounds of soft tenders through December 2014.    
 Malawi’s participation in P4P began during pilot inception in 2008, and FOs have 
been adopted into the program each year starting in 2009. At the time of the field study 
WFP had registered 39 FOs on the P4P roster prior to the fourth quarter of 2014, as well as 
25 FO adopted into P4P since the last quarter of 2014 in response to expansion of the 
home-grown school feeding (HGSF) project which links FOs to schools. The program 
procured maize and peas from FOs via direct contract through 2012, then shifted exclusively 
to competitive purchases through ACE, including limited numbers of soft tenders restricted 
to P4P FOs.  
 This section provides an overview of capacity building, procurement, and FO 
capacity assessments in each country.  
5.2  Overview of  P4P in Ghana and Malawi.  
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Capacity building occurred at both multiple levels in both counties. In Ghana, 
institutional capacity building occurred through support of Farm Radio, a radio service 
serving the interests of SHF; partnerships with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOFA) and 
NGOs in agricultural sector; and negotiations with the media, law makers, traditional 
authorities, security officers, and market authorities to standardize weights in Ejura- 
Sekyedumasi District. The latter achievement is recognized as providing immediate and 
tangible benefits to both P4P and non-P4P producers, and has the potential to scale-up 
across districts and broadly shift market dynamics in favor of producers.    
In Malawi, institutional capacity building focused upon supporting ACE, with WFP 
purchases constituting 63% of ACE’s sales volume in 2011 and 84% in 2012 (Hernandez, 
2012). Though the percentage of sales to WFP decreased in 2013,  WFP accounts for most 
of trade across the ACE exchange and “without the support of the WFP … it is not clear 
that ACE would be able to cover its costs or expand beyond its currently limited role in 
agricultural markets” (Jayne, Sturgess, Kopicki, & Sitko, 2014, p. 15). In total, ACE has 
150,000 mt of warehouse capacity across 30 certified, bonded warehouses located 
throughout Malawi.  
In both countries, organizational capacity building occurred primarily through 
providing learning opportunities to individuals, including demonstration plots, farmer field 
days, and an exchange visit to Rwanda for members of P4P FOs in Ghana. In both 
countries, trainings served as the most common learning platform, with content delivered by 
WFP and supply-side partners. In Ghana, 5,924 farmers were trained, while in Malawi, 
5.2.1 Capacity building.  
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29,784 farmers were trained from program inception through early-2015. Table 14 details 
training content in both countries.  
 
Source: Adapted from P4P training records, by WFP Ghana and WFP Malawi. 
 
Due to the smaller size of participating FOs in Ghana, many of the trainings 
included all members, while in Malawi, trainings targeted management and lead farmers. 
Partners interviewed in Malawi during the field study voiced concerns about the 
effectiveness of the training of trainers (ToT) strategy. These concerns manifest during 
FGDs, in which members, particularly those located in periphery areas, were both unaware 
that P4P trainings had occurred an unexposed to the training content through trickle-down 
strategies.   
In Ghana, when asked about technical trainings in production and PHHS, all 
sampled FOs referred to Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) trainings, dating back 
to 2008, when most of the sampled groups were formed. As all the control and experimental 
groups underwent a comprehensive training package through MiDA, and the P4P training 
modules were developed without FO-level learning needs assessments, it is not clear 
whether the P4P’s production trainings addressed capacity gaps and contributed to capacity.  
Country
Agribusiness 
Management
Food 
Processing Gender M & E PHHS
Production & 
Productivity
WFP/P4P 
Procurement 
& Logistics
WRS & ACE 
operations
Ghana 52              164          281    2,612 2,815            
Malawi 16,728        780     28      9,655 2,123            193              277               
Table 14. 
 
P4P farmer trainings, from August 2011 – February 2015 in Ghana, July 2009 – April 2015 in 
Malawi  
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In neither country was the training linked to the P4P capacity assessment, and 
though Production and Productivity, PHHS, and Food Processing modules differentiated 
between the two program regions in Ghana, the trainings were not tailored to FO capacity 
needs or capacity levels. Learning needs assessments were not conducted, with training 
needs identified by supply-side partners implementing the trainings, rather than by 
participating FOs. Neither country utilized post-training verification exercises to determine 
adoption rates, behavior modifications, and barriers to change implementation. The absence 
of learning needs assessment coupled with lack of post-training verification render it difficult 
to determine the effectiveness of trainings.  
The following example of cassava flour trainings highlights the importance of 
learning needs assessments. In Ghana, FGDs inquired about a recent 2014 training targeting 
women members of P4P FOs located in Ashanti region sharing information about the 
production of baked goods from cassava flour. During the training, participants were told 
they needed ovens to dry the cassava. Without access to ovens, women from six of the seven 
groups receiving the training did not uptake the skills, due to failure to understand 
constraints imposed on SHF through lack of access physical capital (ovens) which prevented 
the information on cassava flour from translating into behavioral change. It has been 
established that the primary reason individual learning does not transfer into practice is lack 
of learning needs assessments (FAO, 2010; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 
2008).  
In this example, one of the trained groups, which proves to have the highest level of 
maturity and capacity among the sampled FOs in Section 5.4.6, managed to transfer 
knowledge of moringa leaf drying techniques to cassava drying. Through one member’s 
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adaptation of skills developed from participation in a previous training and broadcasting of 
this knowledge, multiple members were engaged in the profitable production of baked goods 
using cassava flour at the time of field work. This skills adaptation and utilization within the 
group was enabled by functional organizational capacities with high levels of bonding social 
capital and organizational capital creating a safe space for the member to innovate, high 
levels of member voice prompting the farmer to share her insights with the group, and high 
levels of group cohesion incentivizing members to follow suit. Though the field study did 
not investigate whether members of other FOs were aware of moringa drying techniques, it 
is likely that members of other, lower maturity, groups had the requisite knowledge, but did 
not adapt their skills, did not innovate through experimentation, did not broadcast their 
success within the group, and subsequently did not influence member behavior.    
 
 
WFP procures commodity from SHF in Ghana and Malawi through different 
strategies. Though WFP originally intended to procure rice from the northern FOs in 
Ghana, high local prices relative to the import parity price (IPP) required an adjustment in 
2012, through a shift to maize. In both Northern and Ashanti regions, WFP’s P4P purchases 
included only maize in Ghana, almost exclusively from FOs and primarily through direct 
contracts, though three rounds of soft tendering occurred starting in 2013. In Malawi, the 
basket of goods purchased through P4P included maize, maize meal, corn-soya blend, beans, 
and peas. While Ghana relied heavily upon FOs to supply commodity, only 5.1% of 
commodity procured in Malawi was supplied by FOs, while the vast majority (94.4%) was 
purchased from traders through ACE (WFP P4P Unit, 2015). Among the pilot countries, the 
5.2.2 Procurement.  
  
163 
 
amount procured in Malawi through P4P is second only to Ethiopia, and the quantity 
purchased in Malawi dwarfs Ghanaian purchases, as seen in Figure 20 (WFP, 2013b). The 
2010 purchases in Ghana predate the official launch of the pilot, and represent test 
purchases from agricultural service providers.  
 
 
 
 
FOs in Ghana participated in direct contracts prior to engaging in soft tendering, and 
no group which won a soft tender was granted further direct contracts. Defaults were not 
significant in Ghana; among the 47 contracts issued to FOs through the first half of 2015, 
only 1 default occurred (WFP P4P Unit, 2015).  
In Malawi, FO direct contracts were only issued through 2012, after which 
procurement was facilitated by ACE, and procurement records do not provide details of 
suppliers. As calculated from the data in Table 15, tonnage procured through direct 
Figure 20. Total quantities contracted by WFP through P4P in Ghana and Malawi 
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contracts with FOs represents a mere 5% of the commodity procured through ACE (WFP 
P4P Unit, 2015). 
Source: Procurement records (2008-2014) for Ghana and Malawi, by WFP P4P Unit, 2015. 
 
In contrast with Ghana, direct contracts with FOs in Malawi were subject to 
significant rates of default, totaling 44% of the 3,129 mt contracted through 2012, as 
presented in Table 16. At only 8% of 63,281 mt contracted, defaults on tenders through 
ACE were significantly lower.    
 
Source: Procurement records (2008-2014) for Ghana and Malawi, by WFP P4P Unit, 2015. 
 
Country and type of contract 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Ghana
Quantity Directly Contracted  (mt) 1,024   1,162   727     337   3,250   
Quantity Competitively Tendered (mt) 849     849     
Malawi
Quantity Directly Contracted  (mt) 541  1,895   584      109     3,129   
Quantity Competitively Tendered (mt) 10,634 10,082  15,565 20,401 6,599 63,281 
Year Contracted Defaulted
2009 4 541           501         93%
2010 13 1,895        650         34%
2011 11 584           238         41%
2012 4 109           -          0%
Total 32 3,129        1,389       44%
Direct FO 
contracts
Percentage 
defaulted
Quantity (mt)
Table 15.  
P4P procurement modalities in Ghana and Malawi 
Table 16. 
Defaults on direct contracts with FOs in Malawi, 2009-2012 
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Procurement through ACE reduces defaults as contracts are signed after commodity 
has been aggregated and deposited with ACE. During the field visit, WFP’s Procurement 
Officers expressed appreciation for ACE’s facilitation of price discovery, a challenge in 
under-developed markets lacking spatial and temporal integration. However, procurement 
through ACE is not without controversy. In the course of field work, FOs expressed 
extreme dissatisfaction with non-transparent fees incurred through utilization of ACE 
services, the lengthy duration of storage prior to sales (during which daily storage fees are 
incurred), and loss of control over transactions after depositing with ACE. This latter 
problem is compounded when FOs avail themselves of the WRS credit available against 
their ACE deposit, which also incurs fees and interest.  
A review of ACE records documenting maize and pea transactions from rural ACE 
locations from 2013 and 2014 suggests that the concerns expressed in FGDs are warranted. 
Of these 30 transactions, the average duration in storage was 187 days (ACE, 2015). Though 
average increase in price between deposit and sale was 10%, due to costs incurred (of which 
74% was interest fees accruing to the financial institutions issuing credits against the 
warehouse receipt), the average gross margin was negative 20%. In other words, on average, 
prices increased on ACE deposits, but not by enough to offset the costs incurred during 6 
months of storage, netting depositors a 20% loss relative to a direct sale at the time of 
deposit. Of the 30 transactions investigated, only 1 yielded a positive net return, resulting 
from a particularly high increase in pea price (52%) between deposit and sale. Though 
interest fees comprised the lion’s share of fees incurred, the 8 deposits which did not access 
WRS financing also earned negative gross returns, though less significant compared to the 
leveraged deposits. In recognition of these challenges, ACE intends to shift out of maize, a 
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market subject to extreme price fluctuations and political interference (Ellis & Manda, 2012), 
concentrating rather on higher-margin crops such as soy beans, ground nuts, and peas (A. 
Chittock & J. Kumwenda, personal communication, June 4, 2015). It is not clear how this 
shift will impact P4P procurement in Malawi.  
 
 
As with the other P4P countries, Ghana and Malawi undertook the FO classification 
exercise in 2011. Utilizing the classification criteria in Appendix A, Ghana’s 26 P4P FOs are 
classified into low (27% of FOs), medium-low (50%), and medium-high (23%) capacity 
categories, with no FOs classified as high capacity (WFP Ghana P4P Unit, 2014). Utilizing 
the classification criteria in Appendix B, Malawi’s 31 FOs participating in P4P as of 2013 are 
classified as high capacity (10% of FOs), medium capacity (32%), and low capacity (58%) 
(WFP Malawi P4P Unit, 2013). 
As detailed in Section 4.4, the OCA utilized by P4P in Ghana and Malawi were the 
lightest of the OCA reviewed, and did not delve into the functional capacities enabling 
organizational change and collective action. Partnering with SCOPEinsight to conduct OCA 
in Ghana, Malawi, and the other P4P countries would represent a significant advancement in 
terms of understanding FO technical capacity in collective marketing. Adopting the 
indicators presented in Section 4.6.1. and detailed in Appendix C into a SCOPEinsight Basic 
Plus tool would increase attention to the functional capacities determining the distribution of 
benefits and costs within the FO and sustainability of FO operations.  
 Capacity assessments in both countries are conducted as external assessments with 
P4P staff collecting information from FO leaders without member input, without involving 
5.2.3 FO capacity assessments.  
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the FO in prioritization or scoring of indicators, and without sharing findings from the OCA 
with the assessed groups. In Ghana and Malawi, P4P’s OCA ignores member perspectives 
on FO strengths and weaknesses and does not contribute to capacity development of the 
assessed groups. Increasing member participation and conducting a post-assessment 
workshop, as developed in Section 4.6.2, would address these shortcomings, as well as 
harness P4P OCA into a customized capacity building strategy.  
 In both Ghana and Malawi, OCA is framed as an external process to inform 
appropriate procurement modalities with the objective of decreasing default rates. This 
narrow conceptualization ignores the potential of OCA to contribute to empowerment and 
capacity development, and misses the opportunity to harness OCA toward P4P’s goal of 
increasing SHF capacities.  
Assessments were not utilized in either country to inform the capacity building 
strategy or training content, nor were they linked to M&E or targeting. In Ghana, FOs were 
selected into P4P utilizing random selection from a list of MiDA FOs (WFP and AERC, 
2013). The process for selecting FOs into P4P in Malawi was not clear, and when probed, 
the WFP staff in the country office could not recall screening out any FOs requesting to 
participate in P4P.  
With regard to procurement, FOs participated in direct contracts before soft tenders 
in both countries, however the simpler mechanism was offered to FOs regardless of capacity 
classification, and the shift to competitive contracting was propelled by donor requirements 
and country-level Procurement Unit preferences, rather than documented changes in FO 
capacity.  
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5.3  Case Study  
Field work for the case study was conducted from 10 May through 6 June 2015 in 
Malawi, and from 27 July through 28 August 2015 in Ghana. This research has two study 
objectives: to apply the capacity assessment tool developed in Chapter 4 to control and 
experimental FOs in Ghana and Malawi; and to identify FO-level impacts resulting from 
P4P interventions. 
To achieve these objectives, the study addresses two questions: 
 What do findings on functional FO capacities suggest in terms of P4P 
targeting, strategic planning, procurement, and M&E?  
 Were differences observed between experimental and control groups to 
suggest P4P impacts at the FO level?  
 
This research assumes that P4P can leverage its capacity building initiatives for 
greater impact through an expanded conceptualization of FO capacity beyond the narrow 
definition of formal market access, and seeks to identify ways in which WFP and P4P 
partners can support FO capacity building.  
As outlined in Table 17, the mission in each country included three phases: staging, 
field work, and synthesis. 
 
 
 
  
169 
 
Phase Activities Malawi Ghana 
I. Staging Briefing, interviews with 
WFP staff and partners, 
mission planning, 
confirming logistics, training, 
revising tools 
11-14 May 2015 27-31 July 2015 
II. Field 
work 
Focus group discussions 
with FO representatives 
15 May-1 June 
2015 
1-9 August 2015 
III. 
Synthesis 
Interviews with WFP staff 
and partners, closing 
workshop with mission 
team, debriefing 
2-5 June 2015 24-28 August 
2015 
 
As presented in Table 18, data were collected through 16 semi-structured interviews 
with WFP staff and P4P partners and FGD with representatives of 34 FOs, including 20 
treatment groups (P4P FOs) and 14 control groups (non-P4P FOs). In Malawi, the FO 
chair, secretary, and treasurer sat for a one-hour interview prior to the FGD convening 
members and representatives from the Marketing and Credit sub-committees, if available. In 
Ghana, two simultaneous FGDs were conducted, one with FO leaders and the other with 
members. Focus group discussion instruments are presented in Appendix E.  
 
Country Interviews P4P Control Executives Members Executives Members
Malawi 9 7 6 51 50 36 32
Ghana 6 10 7 50 46 31 72
Total 15 17 13 101 96 67 104
FO women in FGDsFO men in FGDsFOs visited
Table 17.  
Primary data collection activities and timetable  
Table 18. 
Interviews, focus groups, and focus group participants 
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Four of the visited FOs were dropped from data analysis, including two groups in 
Malawi which were first-tier groups of the second-tier umbrella organizations targeted by 
P4P. Two additional groups were dropped in Ghana, one due to time constraints and the 
other because the gathered members may not have belonged to the sampled FO.  
While the initial sampling of FOs was randomly selected in both countries, one 
group unavailable to meet with the study team in Ghana was purposively replaced with an 
FO known to have experienced events straining organizational capacity. Another group 
similarly unavailable was replaced with a control FO from a location regarded as extremely 
trustworthy by neighboring FOs. 
 
 
Study limitations emerge from control group issues and labor constraints. In both 
countries, interrelations exist between control and experimental groups. As a P4P impact 
assessment country, Ghana collects FO- and household-level panel data from both P4P and 
non-P4P FOs. During FGDs, some members of non-P4P FOs acknowledged accessing 
P4P-enabled services through relations with members of P4P FOs, reflecting concerns about 
the prospect of “migration to treatment groups” identified in the Baseline Report (WFP and 
AERC, 2013, p. 62). As a non-impact assessment country, the P4P Unit in Malawi does not 
maintain relations with non-P4P FOs, therefore identification of comparable control groups 
posed a challenge, particularly as FOs not registered on P4P rosters sell to WFP through 
ACE. All but one of the control FOs in Malawi selected for the study had been recently 
recruited into P4P through expansion of the HGSF project. Proximity to a school in the 
5.3.1  Study limitations. 
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identified HGSF districts and presence of a supply-side partner were the two criteria used to 
select these FOs into P4P. At the time of data collection, these groups had received no WFP 
support, apart from an introduction to P4P.  
Due to labor constraints in Malawi, FO executives and members participated in one 
FGD per FO. Though the facilitator actively solicited responses from regular members, they 
may have been reticent to express their opinions or to contradict leaders for fear of 
retaliation. This challenge was avoided in Ghana as two FGDs were conducted with each 
FO, one with members of the executive committee and the second with non-office bearing 
members. 
While the researchers in Malawi were consultants unknown to participants, the 
research team in Ghana included both WFP staff and P4P partners, which may have resulted 
in different types of respondent bias in the data set. In both countries, researchers arrived in 
WFP vehicles, which may have influenced responses, though the consent processes 
highlighted that FGD results would in no way impact the likelihood of receiving benefits, 
including sales opportunities, from WFP.   
Further limitations include a small sample size, which limits ability to draw 
generalizable conclusions from study findings, and reliance upon non-parametric data 
techniques, developed in the following sub-section.  
 
 
The methods utilized test the null hypothesis that no differences can be detected 
between groups of FOs with respect to difference measures of central tendency and 
distribution. In this analysis, two separate groupings of sampled FOs are utilized. In the 
5.3.2 Statistical methods. 
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control versus experimental grouping, the median levels and distributions of non-P4P FOs 
are compared to those of P4P FOs.  
In the regional grouping, mean ranks and distributions of Malawi FOs (comprising 
both P4P and non-P4P FOs) are compared to Ashanti FOs and Northern FOs. Malawi is 
treated as a regional entity as strong regional differences between FOs are not apparent, 
despite differences in agro-climactic conditions. Ghana observations are disaggregated into 
two regions representing the “North-South Divide” which includes higher rates of poverty, 
lower rates of literacy, as well as higher rates of food insecurity and malnutrition in the 
North (WFP and Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 2012). Biophysical differences 
exist as well. While the lower half of the country has two rainy seasons, the northern half has 
only one, and the drylands in Northern Ghana suffer severe degradation, erosion, and 
siltation, leading to significant migration (Fredua, 2014). Many NGOs have flocked to 
Northern Ghana, providing both P4P as well as non-P4P FO with supply-side support. By 
contrast, NGOs providing services to P4P FOs in Ashanti are limited to P4P partners, and 
only one of the non-P4P FOs sampled in Ashanti sporadically receives NGO support, the 
others had no current supply-side partners.     
Limited observations of non-normal, ordinal data prevented ANOVA and t-tests, 
which both require satisfaction of three parametric assumptions: that samples are 
independent and unbiased, that distributions are normal, and homogeneity of variance 
(Sheshkin, 2011). Further, ANOVA requires numerical data, however both SCOPEinsight 
and this research utilize Likert-scale responses with non-equal intervals and reduce numerical 
data to ordinal categories.   
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This research adopts median, distribution, and mean ranks testing for nonparametric 
data with analysis following the below three-step approach, with a conditional fourth step:  
1. Test the null hypothesis that control (non-P4P) and experimental (P4P) 
groups have identical medians using Yate’s continuity-corrected chi-square; 
2. Test the null hypothesis that control and experimental groups have identical 
distributions using Wilcoxian rank sum testing; 
3. Test the null hypothesis that Malawi, Northern, and Ashanti FOs have 
identical mean ranks using the Kruchev Wallis H test, correcting for ties; and 
4. If the H test results are statistically significant, test the null hypothesis each 
pairing between regions, (Malawi-Northern, Malawi-Ashanti, and Northern-
Ashanti) has identical distributions using Wilcoxian rank sum tests, 
controlling for Type I error across tests by using the Bonferroni approach. 
 
In comparing medians between control and experimental groups, Yate’s continuity 
corrected chi-square is utilized rather than Fisher’s exact test due to lack of specificity 
regarding critical values (Kirch, 2008). The Yates correction is employed due to expected 
frequencies of less than 10 in each 2x2 box of the chi-square matrix, a direct result of a 
sample size of 30 (Sheshkin, 2011). The chi-square tests evaluate the null hypothesis that the 
variables are independent, with statistically significant chi-squares reflecting dependence and 
implying that group inclusion affects results of the outcome variable.  
Wilcoxian rank sums, alternately known as the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney U statistic, 
tests the null hypotheses that distributions of groups are identical, implying a 50% 
probability than a randomly selected observation from one group will exceed an observation 
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randomly selected from another. The reported p-value is the chance that a random sampling 
would result in the mean ranks being at least as far apart as they are observed in the data 
(Sheshkin, 2011).  
 Though Kruchev Wallis H tests can report on differences in medians in the case of 
equal distributions, the distribution across groups was not equal, rendering the reported chi-
square a test of mean ranks. Kruchev Wallis tests the null hypothesis that mean ranks are 
equal across groups.  
 If the Kruchev Wallis null hypothesis is rejected at a 90% level of confidence or 
higher, post-hoc Wilcoxian rank sums for all pairs are conducted. Debate exists as to which 
pairwise tests are appropriate following a significant H test (Polhert, 2016). This research 
utilizes the popular Holm’s sequential Bonferroni procedure which adjusts critical values 
dependent on the ranking of p-values generated from the pairwise comparisons (Holm, 
1979).     
This three-step approach, with a conditional fourth step, acknowledges that 
significant regional differences can overshadow differences between control and 
experimental groups.  
 
 
This section presents findings from the research relevant to the proposed additions 
to the SCOPEinsight Basic tool: Organizational Motivation, Member Participation, and 
Organizational Structures domains, as well as the Adaptive capacity category. The additions 
are presented in Section 4.6.1, with scoring criteria presented in Appendix C. As opposed to 
5.4  Select Observations 
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the 5-point scoring system presented in detailed in Appendix C, this research adopts a 4-
point scoring methodology, transformed to a 5-point scale ex-post.  
After reviewing findings related to proposed additions, this section examines two 
indices, FO maturity and FO capacity indices, as well as FO rankings utilizing the indices.  
  
 
The Organizational Motivation domain includes 10 elements organized into 3 
categories: Mission and vision, History, and Group cohesion. This sub-section presents 
findings related to these elements presented by category.  
Mission & vision. The Mission and vision category includes three elements: Mission 
and vision, Operational plans, and Marketing identity. For both the Mission and vision and the 
Marketing identity elements, P4P groups and non-P4P groups have statistically significant 
differences in distributions, and statistically significant differences in mean ranks between 
regions emerge as well. Among the six sets of pairwise comparisons, differences between 
Malawi and Ashanti are significant at the 1% level for both variables, and differences 
between Malawi and Northern Region at the 5% level in Marketing identity. Operational plans 
did not yield detectable differences in either median levels or distributions.   
Nearly half the control FOs articulated unclear or unrealistic missions in FGDs; by 
contrast the majority of P4P FOs expressed a clear mission, though vision lacked clarity. In 
only 3 of the FOs sampled were leaders and members alike able to communicate clear 
mission and vision statements. Groups in Ashanti regions garner the lowest scores in Mission 
and vision.  
5.4.1 Organizational motivation 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, P4P FOs have different marketing identities relative to 
control FOs, however differences in medians are not detectable, though differences in 
distributions are statistically significant. For more than half of P4P FOs, collective marketing 
is not a prominent feature of their mission and vision, and for 6 of the 10 P4P FOs visited in 
Ghana, collective sales to WFP are perceived as a peripheral activity, undertaken to maintain 
good relations with and continued support from WFP.  
Suggesting alignment between P4P objectives and those of the FOs recently adopted 
into the program in Malawi, 5 of the 6 control FOs sampled include collective marketing in 
either their mission, or in both mission and vision. The Malawi FOs have a stronger 
marketing identity compared to their counterparts in Ghana, though pairwise comparisons 
reveal statistically significant differences in mean ranks only between Malawi and Ashanti.   
History. The history category includes a lone element, Group formation, which 
registers statistically significant differences in distributions between P4P and non-P4P 
groups. The mean ranks across regions also yield significant differences, as well as between 
the Malawi-Northern and Malawi-Ashanti pairings. 
In both countries, most sampled FOs did not arise through self-organization but 
rather were formed as a result of supply-side partner’s vision. While 6 of Ghana’s 17 
sampled FOs were self-organized, the remainder were formed in 2008 as a direct response to 
MOFA’s the influential MiDA program, a five-year Millennium Challenge Account Project. 
The MiDA program left a strong legacy among FO participants, as developed in this section.  
Eleven of Malawi’s 13 FOs were formed by supply-side partners. Lower-level FOs, 
created by NGOs, were further consolidated into unions by the same partners, oftentimes as 
part of an exit strategy with the objective of increasing sustainability through improved 
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aggregation capacity and access to finance. Expansion, particularly if it increases member 
heterogeneity, increases coordination costs (Bernard et al., 2010), and many of the groups 
visited in Malawi did not have clear channels of communications with lower-tier component 
FOs. Lack of clear communication channels impeded information flows at many FOs, 
particularly in Malawi where discussions in about FO finances, contracts, and marketing 
generated very heated discussions and accusations of corruption. Discussions with peripheral 
members of secondary FOs revealed contradictions between membership fees reported by 
FO leaders and members, confusion regarding the purpose of the secondary FOs, and 
reports of unequal treatment by the secondary union in their relations with primary groups.    
 The two instances of self-formation in Malawi include a women’s primary FO and 
the federation organized by the brother of the late president. In the latter case, the FO came 
together around the significant political capital of the founder, however as a new and 
unproven group, the FO had yet to embark on collective activities at the time of research 
and was struggling to collect membership fees.  
Group cohesion. The group cohesion category includes six elements: Member 
satisfaction with contributions, Member assistance, Trust in members, Trust in leaders, Organizational 
trustworthiness, and Value of services to members. The Value of services to members, measuring the 
level of value-adding services provided by the FO and the level of membership loyalty to the 
group, was adopted into this category from the SCOPEinsight Basic tool. This research 
includes a proxy for the first indicator of the Value of services to members element, but as the 
proxy does not capture membership loyalty, it is evaluated separately and not included as an 
element of the Organizational Motivation domain. The Number of services proxy for Value of 
services to members, measures the number of services offered by the FO to its members, and 
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statistically significant differences between the distributions of P4P and non-P4P groups are 
detectable at the 5% level. Experimental FOs offered greater number of services to 
members, particularly in Ghana. While the defunct Ashanti control groups offer no member 
services, the Northern control groups continue to meet and provide member services in the 
post-MiDA period.  
Among the five elements of Group cohesion in the Organizational Motivation index, 
only Member satisfaction with contributions and Trust in leaders yield statistically significant results. 
The difference between regional distributions is discernable for Member satisfaction with 
contributions, but detection in mean ranks is limited to the Malawi-Northern pairing. While 
members in all of the Northern FOs understand and approve of the way the FO manages 
their contributions, members in the majority of FOs in Malawi and Ashanti either do not 
know how the FO utilizes their contributions, or do know, but do not approve of the way 
contributions are managed.  
Trust in leaders generates statistically significant differences in distributions between 
P4P and non-P4P groups, with leaders of P4P FOs faring better than non-P4P FOs in 
gaining the cognitive trust of members. All 4 of the non-P4P FOs in Ashanti, and 4 of the 6 
control FOs in Malawi did not rank their leaders in any of 6 trust categories measured. 
Neither Trust in members nor Organizational trustworthiness yield statistically significant 
results, with scores generally low across all groups, suggesting that functional capacities 
would benefit from capacity building designed to increase social bonding capital. It is worth 
noting that among all the sections of the FGDs, both study teams, including P4P staff and 
partners in Ghana, found the trust section the most revealing in terms of understanding 
group dynamics.   
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Table 19 presents results for Organizational Motivation index and its elements. The 
first two columns under the Differences between P4P and non-P4P FOs table heading report the 
Yate’s continuity-corrected chi-square and Z-score from the Wilcoxian rank sum test, which 
test for differences in medians and distributions between P4P and non-P4P groups. None of 
the items tested yielded group differences in medians, however the Organizational 
Motivation index and 4 of its 9 elements were detected to have statistically significant 
differences between the distributions of control and experimental groups.  
 
Note. n = 30; * p < .10, two-tailed. * * p < .05, two-tailed. * * * p < 0.01, two tailed.                      
ᶧ indicates item not included in Motivation index. 
 
The first column under the Differences between regional FOs table heading reports 
another chi-square statistic, testing for differences in mean ranks between regions. The 
following three columns report p-values from pairwise Wilcoxian rank sum tests, with 
M-N M-A A-N
Variable  χ2 (1)       Z  χ2 (2) p p p
Motivation index 0.54 1.70 * 4.71 * 0.751 0.076 0.050
Mission & vision 0.64 1.92 * 6.18 ** 0.095 0.024 *** 0.453
Operational plans 0.71 1.26 1.47
Marketing identity 0.54 1.83 * 11.69 *** 0.007 ** 0.003 *** 0.634
Formation 2.68 2.12 ** 3.91
Contributions 0.00 0.77 7.04 ** 0.031 * 0.688 0.007
Member assistance 0.23 -0.75 4.54
Trust members 0.04 -0.39 0.35
Trustworthiness 0.02 0.16 3.05
Trust EC 0.28 2.08 ** 4.04
ᶧNumber services 0.54 -1.98 ** 3.03
Differences between regional FOsDifferences between 
P4P and non-P4P FOs
Table 19. 
 
Statistics for the Organizational Motivation index and its elements 
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significance adjusted using the Holm’s sequential Bonferroni approach. The p-value from 
the Wilcoxian rank sum test comparing mean ranks between Malawi and Northern FOs is 
reported in the second column under the Differences between regional FOs heading, 
labelled as M-N. Similarly, M-A represents the Malawi-Ashanti pairing, and A-N represents 
the Ashanti-Northern pairing. The Organizational motivation index and 3 of its 9 elements 
were detected to have statistically significant differences between the mean ranks of regional 
groups. The effect size for the Organizational motivation index is 68%, meaning that a 
randomly selected FO from the P4P group has a 68% chance of having higher 
Organizational motivation score than a randomly selected FO from the non-P4P group.  
Figure 21 present a box plot of the Organizational Motivation index. For each group, 
the horizontal lines at the top and bottom represent scores of the lowest and highest scoring 
groups. The top and bottom boundaries of the shaded rectangles represent the boundaries 
between the first and second quartiles, and the third and fourth quartiles. The vertical line 
inside the shaded rectangle represents the median. While the distribution for Northern FOs 
is quite compact, both the distributions for P4P FOs in Ashanti and non-P4P FOs in Malawi 
are relatively dispersed. The generally defunct non-P4P FOs in Ashanti score poorly on the 
Organizational Motivation index, and P4P groups in Ashanti had similarly low medians, with 
a few groups on the high end of the spectrum, resulting in a long and asymmetric whisker 
above the shaded rectangle. By contrast, the P4P groups in Malawi had a tighter ranger 
relative to the non-P4P groups, suggesting that the newly adopted P4P groups are more 
heterogeneous in terms of motivation relative to their better-established P4P peers.    
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The Member Participation domain includes 12 elements organized into four 
categories: Conflict resolution; Meetings, dues, and sales; Learning; and Planning. This sub-
section develops findings presented by category. 
Conflict resolution. This category includes three elements: Raising concerns, Conflict 
mechanisms, and Conflict history. Of them, only Raising concerns yielded statistically significant 
differences in mean ranks between regions, specifically in the Malawi-Northern pairing. 
Nearly 40% of Malawi FOs (5 of 13) have no process enabling members to raise concerns to 
FO management. By contrast, members from all of the Ghana FOs can raise concerns to 
their leaders, and nearly half of the Ghana FOs, including the entire set of Northern P4P 
FOs, had not only raised concerns, but were satisfied with the process. This country-level 
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Figure 21.   Box plot of  Organizational Motivation index, by group and region.  
5.4.2 Member participation 
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difference reflects differences in size and structure of the primary FOs in Ghana and the 
mostly higher-level FOs in Malawi.   
Over 40% of FOs sampled (13 of 30) do not have conflict resolution mechanisms. 
The EC helps members to resolve conflicts in nearly 40% of the sample (11 of 13), while 
only 20% (6 of 30) have structures such as Audit or Discipline SCs available to assist with 
conflict resolution.  
For 6 of the FOs, conflict had not arisen. Among the rest, only 2 resolved their 
conflicts in less than 6 months. Of the 24 FOs faced with conflict, nearly half (11 of 24) took 
longer than one year to resolve conflict, and for 6 groups, including 2 P4P FOs in Ashanti 
and 5 FOs in Malawi, conflict extending beyond one year was ongoing at the time of data 
collection.  
In Malawi, conflict arose between members and executives due to poor-record 
keeping, low financial literacy, and unclear communications, particularly on margins captured 
by FOs on collective sales. Four Malawi FOs resolved conflicts in less than a year, in part 
due to external mediation from supply-side partners, complemented by the creation of audit 
sub-committees, internal and external investigations, and elections.   
In Ghana, conflict arose due to lack of checks and balances within organizational 
structures and process which generated opportunities for executives to abuse privileges 
related to P4P activities. Unlike their peers in Malawi, the Ghana FOs did not receive 
external support in grappling with corruption issues, and inability to engage in productive 
conflict stemmed from lack of conflict resolution structures and processes, coupled with 
inability to convene a quorum of members required to change leadership. The 2 Ghana FOs 
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which expedited the conflict resolution process validated member concerns through existing 
conflict resolution structures and addressed these concerns through transparent processes. 
Meetings, dues, and sales. This category includes 5 elements: General meeting 
frequency, General meeting attendance, Membership fees, Trend in active membership, and Percentage of 
members contributing to sales. Three of these elements are associated with statistically significant 
differences in mean ranks across regions, General meeting frequency, Membership fees, and Trend in 
active membership, and two generate significant differences between control and experimental 
groups, Trend in active membership, and Percentage of members contributing to sales. A significant 
difference is detected between control and experimental group median levels of Percentage of 
members contributing to sales as well. 
Almost half of the FOs in Malawi held between 1 and 5 general meetings in 2014; by 
contrast the primary groups in Northern meet at least monthly. The Northern FOs all have 
roots in microfinance, requiring regular meetings for contributions and collections. While 5 
of the 6 P4P FOs in Ashanti met more than 6 times in 2014, only 1 of the non-P4P FOs did. 
With the exception of the control P4P with an intermittent outside partner, the remaining 
Ashanti control FOs were defunct, convening only to receive prospective partners.        
Meeting attendance is strong among the Northern FOs, as well as the P4P Ashanti 
FOs, and lower, in percentage terms, for the larger Malawi groups, again reflecting 
differences between primary and higher-tier FOs.  Regional differences in the percentage of 
members current on dues at the time of data collection, or expected to be current by the end 
of the season, are significant between Malawi and Northern, as well as between Ashanti and 
Northern. While all members are current on dues across control and experimental groups in 
Northern, this drops to less than half in Malawi (6 of 13), half of the P4P FOs in Ashanti, 
  
184 
 
and only 1 of the non-P4P FOs in Ashanti, the group with an intermittent partner. Despite 
lack of current activity, this group remains current on membership fees to enhance their 
ability to attract partners. Though consolidation would reduce monthly fees, this FO 
maintains multiple bank account because partners have different banking requirements. 
Their savvy reflects Mosse’s (2001) observation about the influence of donor requirements 
and boundaries on beneficiary language and behavior.  
The FOs sampled in Ghana are smaller than those in Malawi. All the Ghana FOs are 
primary FOs with 50-60 members. By contrast, the Malawi set includes 4 primary-tier FOs, 8 
secondary-tier unions, and 1 tertiary-tier federation. In Malawi, membership numbers are 
difficult to gauge, with drastic differences between reported members, members active 
within the last year, and members current on dues. While the federation claims a 
membership base of 20,000, it had only 200 dues-paying members at the time of data 
collection.  
In both countries, perceived donor expectations influence participant responses to 
questions about membership, revealing the political nature of membership numbers, as well 
as limits to the assumption that FOs with larger membership bases have higher aggregation 
capacity.  
In Ghana, FO membership has remained static since 2008, with new members 
admitted only to replace those who have passed away or who have moved from the location. 
Some of the P4P FOs attract farmers interested in joining, however to safeguard 
membership benefits, for fear that new members may threaten group dynamics, and to 
satisfy perceived donor expectations that groups should have 50 members, a relic of MiDA’s 
insistence on groups of 50. 
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As opposed to the consistency of member numbers in Ghana, FO-constructed 
timelines of membership numbers and supply-side partners in Malawi established a clear 
pattern of membership ebbing and flowing in tandem with funding from supply-side 
partners. As in Ghana, perceptions of donor expectations impacted membership numbers, 
though in a different way. Initial requests for membership numbers in Malawi were met with 
inflated responses, though probing for a definition of active membership whittled down 
membership numbers by a factor of 10, on average. When asked about the discrepancy 
between initial responses and active members, participants explained that donors prefer high 
membership numbers due to increased ability to leverage impact through a larger 
membership base.  
The perception that donors want larger membership numbers was reiterated at WFP, 
both at the country offices and headquarters. Staff expressed disincentives to reducing the 
registered number of P4P FO members as knowledge of membership evolves due to 
concerns that reporting diminished numbers would signal failure at higher-levels within 
WFP and to donors.  
Trend in active membership generates statistically significant differences between regions, 
with the difference between Ashanti and Northern significant at the 10% level. Of the 
sampled FOs, only 2 in Malawi increased active membership over the last three years. All but 
one of the Northern FOs maintained a constant active membership over the same period, 
while the FOs in Ashanti, including half the P4P FOs reported decreases in active members, 
as did nearly 40% (5 of 13) Malawi FOs.   
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 The percentage of members contributing to group sales varies across control and 
experimental groups. Of the control groups in Ghana, none located in Northern participate 
in collective marketing, nor had 3 of the 4 control FOs in Ashanti. Among the FOs which 
collectively sold in the past year, about half within each category (P4P groups in all 3 regions 
and non-P4P groups in Malawi) had greater than 75% of their members contribute 
commodity. The remaining half were evenly distributed between quartiles, though 3 control 
groups in Malawi had less than a quarter of members contribute to collective sales, indicating 
of potential distributional inequities among the newly adopted P4P FOs.      
Learning. This category includes 2 elements, Production learning and Business learning, 
the former yielding statistically significant differences in mean ranks between regions, 
specifically between Malawi and Northern. In Ghana, trainings targeted all members, though 
the larger, higher-tiered groups in Malawi adopted a ToT model. Members in Malawi were 
not exposed to training concepts shared with the trainings (typically EC members and lead 
farmers), casting doubt on the efficacy of the ToT approach adopted by supply-side 
partners.  
Planning. This category includes 2 elements, Member involvement in planning decisions 
and Member involvement in operational decisions, neither of which generated statistically significant 
results. As presented in Figure 22, one-fifth of FOs reported that members have no 
involvement in strategic and budgetary planning. The proportion reduces to one-tenth of 
FOs when considering member participation in operational decisions, such as whether or 
not to agree to buyers’ terms, to accept loans, or to invest in a group asset. More than one-
third of FOs inform members of decisions, the lowest degree of token participation, as 
developed in Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation (1969). Just over 20% of FOs gather 
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feedback from members in the planning process through consultative participation. 
Members are more likely to participation collaboratively in operational decisions compared 
to planning decisions.  
 
 
 
 
Table 20 presents results for Member Participation index and its elements. 
Statistically significant differences between P4P and non-P4P FOs emerged in median levels 
of Percentage of members contributing to collective sales, with higher median levels in P4P groups, 
and in the distributions for the Percentage element, as well as the Trend in active members. Five of 
the 12 elements yielded statistically significant differences between the mean ranks of 
regional groups.  
Figure 22.  Type of  member participation in planning and operational decisions 
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Table 20. 
 
Statistics for the Member Participation index and its elements 
 
 
Note. n = 30; * p < .10, two-tailed. * * p < .05, two-tailed. * * * p < 0.01, two tailed.  
 
Figure 23 presents a box plot of the Member Participation index. As with the 
Organizational Motivation index, the distribution of Member Participation for Northern 
FOs is quite compact, particularly for P4P FOs, while the Ashanti and Malawi FOs display 
greater degrees of dispersion. The P4P groups in Malawi had a slightly tighter ranger relative 
to the non-P4P groups, and control groups in Ashanti and Malawi both had distributions 
skewed toward the lower range of participation, with extended whiskers above the shaded 
rectangles resulting from one or two FOs with high Member Participation scores.     
 
Variable  χ2 (1)         Z  χ2 (2)
Participation index 0.54 1.22 3.49
Raising concerns 0.04 0.37 5.85 * 0.028 * 0.168 0.141
Conflict mechanisms 0.01 0.38 1.61
Conflict history 0.18 0.68 4.06
GM frequency 0.00 1.49 8.62 ** 0.003 *** 0.254 0.066
GM attendance 0.71 1.48 3.06
Membership fees 0.00 0.26 6.89 ** 0.022 ** 0.353 0.015 **
Trend active 0.87 -1.68 * 5.87 * 0.649 0.056 0.026 *
% sales 3.59 * 2.43 ** 2.30
Production learning 1.03 1.58 7.29 ** 0.003 *** 0.491 0.1368

Business learning 0.00 0.19 4.14
Member planning 0.05 0.29 1.01
Member operations 0.24 -0.59 0.90
Differences between 
P4P and non-P4P FOs
Differences between regional FOs
p p p
M-N M-A A-N
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The Organizational structures category includes 8 elements organized into 4 
categories: Rules, Sales rules, Interference, and Active Subcommittees. This sub-section 
develops findings related to these elements by category.  
Rules. The Rules category includes three elements: Number of rules defining membership, 
Monitoring of rules, and Enforcement of rules. Number of rules and Enforcement of rules yield 
statistically significant differences between regions. The plurality of FOs, over 40%, have 1 
or 2 rules governing membership with associated penalties. Due to their microfinance 
activities, the Northern FOs have more rules regarding meeting attendance and member 
contributions, and mean ranks comparisons yield statistically significant differences between 
Malawi-Northern and Ashanti-Northern. Seven FOs, nearly a quarter of the sample, 
including the 3 defunct control groups in Ashanti, have no rules governing membership. 
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Figure 23.  Box plot for Member Participation index, by group and region 
5.4.3 Organizational structures 
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More than three-quarters of the sample (23 of 30) have rules governing membership, 
though in 20 of groups, monitoring is restricted to the EC. Rules enforcement is negligible 
or weak in nearly half the groups (14 of 30). Northern FOs are the most likely to enforce 
penalties, a necessity given their microfinance activities. Five FOs utilize SCs to monitor 
member behavior, and 2 P4P groups in Ghana embody the ideal of peer monitoring, which 
reduces and equitably distributes the costs of monitoring.    
Rules enforcement of rules was strongest in Northern and weakest in Ashanti. The 2 
FOs with the highest levels of maturity and capacity both attributed their success to strict 
rules enforcement.  
Sales rules. The Sales rules category adopts the Rules category elements, adapted to 
capture technical capacities in collective marketing. The category includes three elements: 
Collective sales rules, Monitoring of collective sales, and Enforcement of collective sales rules, with the final 
element capturing statistically significant differences between P4P and non-P4P groups in 
both medians and distributions.  
Twenty-two of the sampled FOs, including 60% of the P4P FOs, do not have rules 
guiding in-kind contributions to collective sales, nor penalties for members failing to provide 
formally or informally contracted commodity to the FO. In both countries, WFP contracts 
with FOs through P4P do not specify default penalties, reflecting pro-poor procurement 
principles such as waiving performance bonds and not removing defaulters from the vendor 
list. Other buyers supplied by the sampled FOs purchase through informal contracts, which 
similarly do not stipulate penalties for default. 
  A few FOs have rules regarding member contributions to collective sales, such as 
minimal contributions per member. None of the groups has rules regarding the withdrawal 
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of contributions after transfer into FO possession. This is not relevant for Ashanti FOs 
lacking storage facilities, but FOs aggregating commodity at central locations have to 
contend with members threatening to withdraw their contribution when unanticipated delays 
occur between deposit and uplift. Groups experienced in this scenario rely upon the EC to 
defuse tensions arising from members seeking to withdraw and side-sell, though none of the 
FOs adapted FO structures or processes to mitigate future occurrences.  
Interference. The sole element of this category, Interference measures the degree of 
negative external interference encountered by the FO in terms of governance, decision-
making, and operations. The Interference element yields statistically significant differences in 
mean ranks between regions, and between the Malawi-Northern and Ashanti-Northern 
pairings. While the Northern FOs were free from interference from external authorities, 
30% of FOs in Ashanti (3 of 10%) encountered frozen bank accounts due to financial 
institution collapse, and 70% of FOs in Malawi (9 of 13) encountered interference from 
traditional authorities, financial institutions, or other external entities.    
Sub-committees. Another solo element, Sub-committees provides a count of the 
number of active SCs within the FO. To assess whether SCs are active or not, leaders 
reported the number of SC meetings in the last year, agenda items covered, and outcomes of 
meetings. Forty percent of the sample (12 of 30 FOs) did not have active SCs, including one 
of the second-tier FOs in Malawi, cobbled together in the poorly-conceived exit strategy of 
the supply-side partner. For FOs without active SCs, power is concentrated exclusively in 
the EC. Marketing SCs in Malawi were particularly bloated and ineffective, populated by 
many members and though barely responsive to dynamic market conditions. 
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Table 21 presents results for Organizational Structure index and its elements. 
Differences between P4P and non-P4P FOs emerge in median levels and distributions of 
Sales rules emforcement. Three of the 12 elements yield statistically significant differences 
between the mean ranks of regional groups. Though only one element yields significant 
differences between control and experimental groups, the index itself captures statistically 
significant differences between P4P and non-P4P groups, suggesting that the gestalt of the 
elements captures discernable differences in organizational structure. The effect size for the 
Organizational Structure Index is 72%.   
 
 
Note. n = 30; * p < .10, two-tailed. * * p < .05, two-tailed. * * * p < 0.01, two tailed.  
 
Figure 24 presents a box plot of the Organizational Structure index. As with the 
previous indices, the distribution for Northern FOs is quite compact, particularly for P4P 
FOs, as well as for the defunct Ashanti control groups.  
Variable  χ2 (1)       Z  χ2 (2)
Organizational structures 3.59 * 2.25 ** 2.96
Rules 0.42 1.53 7.06 ** 0.032 * 0.462 0.015
Rules monitor 0.22 0.63 4.11 **
Rules enforce 0.00 0.91 5.56 * 0.169 0.116 0.038 *
Sales rules 2.69 2.02 0.69
Sales rules monitor 1.78 1.76 3.83
Sales rules enforce 2.71 * 2.10 ** 3.16
Interference 0.00 0.19 6.47 ** 0.018 * 0.107 0.393
Active SCs 2.05 1.89 3.50
Differences between 
P4P and non-P4P FOs
Differences between regional FOs
p p p
M-N M-A A-N
Table 21. 
Statistics for the Organizational Structure index and its elements 
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The Adaptive capacity category includes 4 elements: Market response, Structural response, 
Risk mitigation, and Phase out impact. Market response measures FOs ability to respond to 
changes in market conditions such as unpredicted price changes, cancelled contracts, and 
export bans. Statistically significant differences in median levels between control and 
experimental groups as well as in distributions emerge, with P4P FOs altering their 
marketing tactics with greater responsiveness compared to non-P4P FOs.  
Structural response measures changes in organizational structures or processes in 
response to challenges such as corruption charges, buyers failing to respect the terms of 
agreement, members breaking rules, or FOs not achieving their mission. Nearly half of the 
sample (13 of 30 FOs) have not changed organizational structures or processes, though 30% 
Figure 24.  Box plot of  Organizational Structures index, by group and region. 
5.4.4 Adaptive capacity 
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(9 of 30) have adopted changes deemed effective in preventing similar challenges from 
recurring. The remainder adopted changes, but are uncertain about efficacy. 
Though almost all the FOs have constitutions establishing the rules governing 
membership and elected posts, these have not been amended since inception. New 
arrangements, such as changes in dues payment, and new activities, such as collective sales 
and management of P4P-assisted assets are not formalized into constitutions, bylaws, 
procedures, or manuals. None of the 4 P4P groups in Northern receiving warehouses, 
threshers, reapers, and grinding mills from P4P on a cost-sharing basis have updated their 
constitutions to reflect the new activities, though management of group assets poses more 
challenges than management of collective activities such as group sales (Stringfellow et al., 
1997). For most groups, the constitution is not a living, breathing document guiding the FO, 
but rather a formality imposed by donors at formation.  
A single control group employs risk mitigation strategies, whereas 65% of the P4P 
groups (11 of 17) do. Only 3 of the sampled FOs, including a control group in Malawi, 
proactively diversifies members, crops, buyers, and activities to minimize risk. 
Phase out impact renders statistically significant differences between control and 
experimental groups, however because experimental groups have WFP and the suite of P4P 
partners available to them, the phase out of previous partners impacted control groups to a 
greater extent. While the MiDA exit strategy rendered almost all of the control groups in 
Ashanti non-functional, control groups in Northern continued their activities, thanks in part 
to the abundance of NGOs in the area. The exit strategy of partners in Malawi often 
included aggregation into second-tier FOs and asset transfer. In the absence of sufficient 
bonding social capital and organizational structures and processes to ensure member 
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representation and voice, many of the higher-tier FOs suffer from communications failures 
and lack of trust. 
Successful scaling up of smallholder organizations requires capacity building 
designed to facilitate bonding among members, bridging between the FOs targeted for 
inclusion in the umbrella organizations, and linking with upstream players in the public and 
private sectors (Anyonge & Messer, 2014b). Rather than an end in itself, the creation of a 
secondary FO is a means through which the goals of improving FO performance and 
increasing FO ability to adapt to changing contexts can be realized. 
Table 22 presents results for the Adaptive capacity category and its elements. 
Differences between P4P and non-P4P FOs emerge in median levels and distributions of 
Market response, Risk mitigation, Phase out impact, as well as the Adaptive capacity index. Five of 
the 12 elements yield statistically significant differences between the mean ranks of regional 
groups. The effect size for the Adaptive capacity category is 80%.   
 
 
Note. n = 30; * p < .10, two-tailed. * * p < .05, two-tailed. * * * p < 0.01, two tailed.  
Variable  χ2 (1)       Z  χ2 (2)
Adaptive capacity 4.12 ** 2.77 *** 2.66
Market response 4.90 ** 2.35 ** 0.72
Structural response 0.10 1.37 0.22
Risk mitigation 7.74 *** 2.80 *** 0.62
Phase out impact 3.00 * 2.13 ** 6.49 ** 0.099 0.103 0.029
p p p
Differences between 
P4P and non-P4P FOs
Differences between regional FOs
M-N M-A A-N
Table 22.   
Statistics for Adaptive capacity category and its elements 
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 Figure 25 presents a box plot of the Adaptive capacity index. As with previous 
indices, the range of Northern FOs is small compared to other groups, though the lack of 
capacity among Ashanti control groups stands out. Figure 25 presents 2 outliers, a P4P FO 
in Ashanti and non-P4P FO in Malawi with Adaptive capacity scores far beyond their peers. 
These two primary women’s FOs exhibit the greatest levels of FO maturity and FO capacity, 
as developed in the next section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
An FO maturity index aggregates the 33 elements developed in the previous sub-
section plus an additional 9 elements covering functional capacities already addressed in the 
SCOPEinsight Basic tool, such as human capital, financial capital, governance, and sources 
of price information. Each element is equally weighted in the index. The maturity index 
Figure 25.  Box plot of  Adaptive capacity category. 
5.4.6 FO maturity and capacity 
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captures statistically significant differences between P4P and non-P4P distributions at the 
5% level, with an effect size of 74%.  
An FO capacity index representing technical capacities, aggregated the FO maturity 
index and 30 additional elements related to physical capital, technical marketing capacity, and 
bridging social capital. As with the maturity index, all elements are equally weighted. This 
index does not reflect the full spectrum of FO capacity as developed in Section 4.1.2, as 
elements capturing the institutional and biophysical environment were not collected. The 
capacity index captures statistically significant differences in medians and distributions 
between control and experimental groups with an effect size of 80%. Table 23 presents 
statistics for the maturity and capacity indicators.   
 
 
 
Figures 26 and 27 present box plots of FO maturity and capacity, respectively. As 
with the other indices, the Northern distributions were more compact relative to Ashanti 
and Malawi. From these figures and the previous boxplots, it is clear that the Northern FOs 
are a distinct and relatively homogeneous group, though whether this is attributable to 
culture, to holding regular meetings, to focusing on microfinance, to P4P oversight, to 
Index  χ2 (1)     Z   ES  χ2 (2) p p p
Maturity 2.17 2.20 ** 0.74 4.63 * 0.5001 0.0823 0.0635
Capacity 3.59 * 2.81 *** 0.80 3.53
Differences between P4P 
and non-P4P FOs
Differences between regional FOs
M-N M-A A-N
Table 23. 
Statistics for maturity and capacity indices 
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having support from supply-side partners beyond P4P, or to a combination of factors is not 
clear.  
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Figure 26.  Box plot of  FO maturity, by group and region 
Figure 27.  Box plot of  FO capacity, by group and region 
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The range of capacity scores for Northern P4P FOs is very narrowly distributed, as 
these groups received the same assets from WFP and share collective sales experience selling 
to WFP, and schools through HGSF. While the distribution of Northern non-P4P FOs 
maturity scores is more compact than the Malawi and Ashanti groups, the middle half of the 
distribution, represented by the shaded rectangle, is roughly comparable to the middle half 
of the distribution of Malawi groups and Ashanti P4P groups. However, Northern control 
groups are penalized in the capacity assessment, falling relative to the other groups due to 
their lack of marketing technical capacity and experience.   
Separating functional capacities from technical capacities by differentiating between 
FO maturity and capacity is useful in terms of measuring capacity building, as developed in 
Section 4.1.1. Ranking FOs by maturity and capacity yields different results, as presented in 
Table 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
200 
 
 
 
Maturity Capacity
Region P4P FO Name ranking ranking
Ashanti 1 Enso Nyame Ye Womens Group 1 1
Malawi 0 Chimbiya Piggery Cooperative 2 2
Malawi 1 Mdeka Farmers and Marketing Co-op Society Ltd 3 4
Malawi 1 Likasi Producers and Marketing Co-op Society 4 3
Northern 1 Suglo Konbo 5 5
Northern 1 Pagazaa Sugro Mbori Buni Farmers Group 6 6
Ashanti 1 Lord is my Shepard 7 7
Northern 1 Kpalsi Zisung Association 8 10
Malawi 0 Tasanganapo Producers and Marketing Coop 9 12
Northern 1 Kobli Kom Maize Group 10 9
Malawi 1 Cheka Cooperative Society 11 8
Northern 0 Tiyumtaba Farmers Group 12 18
Malawi 1 Chilitudwa 13 13
Malawi 1 Chilanga Farmers Trust 14 19
Malawi 0 Masuku Smallholder Farmers Association 15 11
Malawi 1 Nanguluwe women club 16 14
Ashanti 0 Nyame Ne Buafoa 17 21
Malawi 0 Namibawa 18 16
Ashanti 1 Mayaden Maize Farmers 19 20
Northern 0 Puumaya Farmers' Association 20 24
Northern 0 Shigu Wumpini 21 25
Ashanti 1 Odo Farmers Association 22 23
Malawi 1 Kafulu Smallholder Farmers Association 23 15
Ashanti 1 United Farmers Association 24 17
Malawi 0 Mzizima cluster 25 26
Ashanti 1 Asuogya Farmers Group 26 22
Malawi 0 Mpale Producers and Marketing Cooperative 27 27
Ashanti 0 Nyame Bekyere 28 28
Ashanti 0 Asempa Maize Growers 29 29
Ashanti 0 Frante Farmers Association 30 30
Table 24.   
FO rankings in the maturity and capacity indices   
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While groups at the tails shifted by at most one position between indices, suggesting 
that very mature groups have high capacity, and very immature groups have low capacity, the 
groups in the middle of the distribution are more sensitive to index construction. For 
example, Kafulu Smallholder Farmers Association jumped from 23rd on the maturity ranking 
to 15th on the capacity ranking, due to their proven capacity to supply significant quantities 
of maize to WFP through ACE, despite elite capture, lack of member participation (some 
members of the Malawi Procurement Unit were not aware that Kafulu was an FO), and lack 
of adaptive capacity which rendered Kafulu completely dependent on ACE to market their 
aggregated commodity for consecutive years, despite a history of dissatisfaction with the wait 
times and fees associated with these sales. While Kafulu is categorized as a high capacity FO 
utilizing the Malawi classification criteria, it emerges as an immature group through the 
maturity index, and either a low capacity group, or a developing group through the capacity 
index, depending on the classification system used. Appendix F presents classification 
methods, maturity and capacity rankings, scores, and FO classifications.       
Figures 28 and 29 present distributions of FOs across maturity and capacity 
classifications. Almost two-thirds of FOs are classified as immature or maturing (19 of 30), 
and a single control group is classified as professional or very professional. Differences in 
median levels of maturity are not significant between P4P and non-P4P groups, though P4P 
FOs have higher median levels of capacity than non-P4P FOs, statistically significant at the 
10% level.  
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The two very professional, very high capacity groups are two outliers on the 
Adaptive capacity box plot, Figure 25. Enso Nyame Ye Womens Group, a P4P FO in 
Ashanti, and Chimbiya Piggery Cooperative, a control group in Malawi recently adopted into 
P4P through HGSF, are both self-organized, long-standing women’s primary FOs. The 
Figure 28.  Distribution of  sampled FOs across maturity classifications 
Figure 29.  Distribution of  sampled FOs across capacity classifications 
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groups both have cultivated relationships with many buyers including traders, processors and 
institutions such as schools and NGOs, however they utilize informal, oral contracts. 
Neither group specializes in undifferentiated foodgrains: Enso Nyame Ye collectively 
markets livestock, fresh produce, processed flours, and very dried maize for use poultry feed; 
Chimbiya’s main product is pigs, though members produce and contribute foodgrains as pig 
feed.   
Both of these FOs attribute their success to strict rules enforcement. Though factor 
analysis is not possible due to data, the correlation coefficient between the FO maturity 
index and Rules enforcement is 76%, though this drops to 67% between the FO capacity index 
and Rules enforcement. 
When examining the data for possible proxies of FO maturity and capacity, which 
could be useful for rapid OCA for targeting purposes, strong correlations emerge between 
the indices and some elements, as presented in Table 25.  
 
 
Of the elements examined, Mission and vision yield the highest correlation coefficients 
with the both indices, though it is outperformed by the Adaptive capacity index, comprised 
Element FO maturity FO capacity
Adaptive capacity index 88% 88%
Mission and vision 87% 83%
Risk mitigation 81% 80%
Rules enforcement 76% 67%
Marketing identity 53% 63%
Index
Table 25. 
Select correlation coefficients 
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of Risk mitigation and three other elements in the Adaptive capacity category. Risk mitigation 
itself is highly correlated with the FO maturity and capacity indices. That single elements and 
the four-element Adaptive capacity index have such high correlations with indices comprised 
of 42 and 72 equally-weighted elements highlights the importance of clear mission and vision 
shared across the membership base and double-loop learning emphasized throughout this 
study.  
Rules enforcement and Marketing identity were not as strongly correlated with FO 
maturity and capacity. Though lack of defaults in the Ghana procurement data and lack of 
specificity in the Malawi data on purchases through ACE prevented analysis, it would be 
interesting to examine the relationship between these elements and contract performance, as 
well as between the maturity and capacity indices and contract performance.     
 
 
 Despite the fact that capacity building strategies were not rooted in OCA, P4P has 
positively impacted a limited definition of FO capacity, though differences in Malawi cannot 
be directly attributed to P4P due to lack of baseline for control FOs. Relative to non-P4P 
groups, P4P groups had significantly higher median levels of adaptive capacity and 
organizational structures, as well as greater responsiveness to market changes, stricter 
enforcement of sales rules, and a more proactive stance toward risk mitigation.  
The P4P FOs, however, do not have detectably higher levels of organizational 
maturity compared to non-P4P groups, suggesting that capacity building to support 
functional capacities would further enhance FO capacity, member participation, equitable 
5.6  Conclusion and Recommendations. 
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distribution of P4P benefits across the membership base, and FO ability to sustainably 
engage in operations.        
In addition to country-specific targeting criteria, marketing identity and social 
bonding capital, as established in Chapter 4, findings from the case study suggest that P4P 
should include Mission and vision and either Risk mitigation or the Adaptive capacity index in its 
targeting criteria.     
The case study reveals several opportunities to leverage P4P’s impact on FO capacity 
building, including providing support to FOs when conflict arises, building social bonding 
capital to enhance the generally low levels of trust found in Ashanti and Malawi FOs, and 
establishing proportional penalties for FO defaults to signal the importance of FO sales 
rules, sales rules monitoring, and sales rules enforcement in preventing side-selling. 
In Malawi, the capacity of supply-side partners was assumed rather than vetted, with 
capacity building results varying across supply-side partners. The partners aggregating 
primary groups into secondary unions without facilitating bonding between members, 
bridging between primary groups, and linking to actors along the supply chain failed to 
increase FO capacity through their exit strategy. In addition, the poor returns on deposits of 
maize and peas in rural ACE-certified warehouses suggests a review of WFP purchases 
through ACE and investigation into the impact on SHF in terms of welfare and attitudes 
toward structured trade opportunities. At a minimum, farmers depositing commodity with 
ACE need to be well-informed about the fee structure, especially those associated with 
warehouse receipt financing, as well as average lengths between deposit and sale.  
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Though the trust indicators do not generate strong results, the process of collecting 
the trust elements, documented in Appendix D was valued by both study teams, including 
the P4P staff and supply-side partners conducting field work in Ghana, for the insights 
generated into power and trust dynamics within the FO.  
Chapter 3 presents a case for decoupling funding decisions from M&E designed to 
learn about capacity building effectiveness. With regards to member reporting, tension 
between honest representation and fear of sanctions arose at the FO level as well as at WFP. 
Across the multi-stakeholder partnership committed to capacity building, honesty should be 
incentivized rather than penalized.    
Case study results provide evidence that the conceptualization of FO capacity and 
maturity presented in Chapter 3 can be measured, and that the content additions toward a 
SCOPEinsight Basic Plus tool presented in Chapter 4 measure meaningful differences in 
functional capacities contributing to FO maturity and capacity.  
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Chapter 6  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
By clarifying the conceptualization of FO capacity, outlining a range of participation 
options for FOs through the capacity building process, analyzing OCAs within the 
participatory capacity building framework, as well as developing and applying indicators of 
functional capacity to FOs in Ghana and Malawi, this research contributes to the 
understanding of what FO capacity building means and how to measure it. 
While organizational functional capacities support a wide range of strategic 
objectives, determine the distribution of benefits and costs within an organization, and 
enable empowerment; organizational technical capacities support a group’s ability to achieve 
specific strategic objectives. Organizational capacity is “the capability of an organization to 
achieve what it sets out to do” (Fowler, Goold, & James, 1995, p.3). Capacity building 
initiatives supporting externally-identified goals which intended beneficiaries have not 
internalized do not generate capacity development. 
Failure to prioritize the goals, objectives, and priorities of groups targeted for 
capacity building remains a key obstacle hindering effectiveness. The subordination of 
beneficiary interests to those of development agencies manifests in a multitude of ways: 
assuming beneficiary needs rather than conducting learning needs assessments; designing 
capacity building strategies irrespective of group objectives and vision; ignoring capacity gaps 
between current state and beneficiaries’ preferred future state; and applying uniform 
strategies for building capacity across program areas which do not reflect the needs, vision, 
or priorities of the targeted groups.  
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These problems point to the core challenge of the paradigm shift away from top-
down development toward participatory capacity building: ceding control to beneficiaries to 
enable their empowerment and self-determination. Difficulties in implementing the ideals of 
participatory capacity building arise from two sources. On the one hand, targeted groups 
may lack sufficient levels of empowerment for collegial participation throughout the capacity 
building process. On the other hand, the need for accountability, for comparability, and for 
satisfying reporting requirements limits the degree to which outside experts responsible for 
the flow of resources can surrender control to beneficiaries. These limitations reinforce one 
another in an amplifying loop, combining to preserve the well-established dynamic of 
outsiders determining how aid is distributed and utilized, with targeted groups profiting from 
the distribution as best they can. Beneficiary participation is often consultative, a degree of 
tokenism per Arnstein’s (1969) classification, and occurs primarily during project 
implementation, rather than throughout the entire capacity building process, a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition of empowerment.   
Purchase for Progress is not immune from these challenges. The capacity building 
strategy reflects WFP’s goal of connecting SHF to market rather than FO goals; the support 
package is uniform across countries or regions, shaped by supply-side partner capacities 
rather than FO needs; and neither learning needs assessments nor post-training verification 
exercises are conducted, leaving unanswered the question of how SHF have changed their 
attitudes, behaviours, and participation within FOs in response to P4P initiatives. Monitoring 
and evaluation within P4P focuses on product indicators such as tonnes contracted and 
delivered, numbers trained, assets distributed on a cost-sharing basis, and events held, such 
as workshops, farmer field days, and field demonstrations. These product outcomes 
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represent a crude measure of P4P achievements, and do not reveal deeper changes in 
attitudes, behaviours, functional capacities, and power dynamics resulting from these 
interventions. What type of FO members contribute to the tonnage procured? How do 
trainings and other learning events generate changes in attitudes and behaviours at the 
individual level, and changes in structures, processes, and motivation at the FO level? Who 
utilizes the assets acquired by FOs through P4P assistance, how do they employ the assets, 
and how is asset maintenance and upkeep managed? How do bridging social capital events 
create, build, and change relationships between FOs, their peers, and actors along the supply 
chain? The true impact of P4P lies in the answers to these questions, which are not 
addressed in P4P M&E.   
Purchase for Progress deserves to claim significant achievements through product 
outcomes, but as with all capacity building programs, challenges in attribution arise due to 
scope, exacerbated due to lack of process indicators in M&E. In Ghana, standardizing 
weights in Ejura- Sekyedumasi District immediately altered market dynamics in favour of 
producers, and holds the promise of scaling-up enduring change. In Malawi, WFP purchases 
through ACE vitalized the CEX, which now provides structured trade and financing 
opportunities to farmers and traders accessing their network of 30 certified warehouses. 
These types of interventions impact the landscape in which SHF and FOs operate, but M&E 
has not documented how these initiatives changes the attitudes and behaviours of SHF, nor 
the structures and processes of FOs, nor how SHF participate within FOs.   
Despite the framing of OCA within P4P and disconnect between OCA results and 
capacity building, P4P participation has positively impacted a limited measure of FO capacity 
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which excludes indicators of the institutional and biophysical environments. Baseline 
measures were not available in Malawi, so the difference cannot be attributed to P4P, 
however as control and experimental groups were comparable at baseline in Ghana, it is 
reasonable to state that P4P effectively rescued the Ashanti FOs from collapse and boosted 
the capacity of groups in Northern FOs. The proposed content additions toward a 
SCOPEinsight Basic Plus tool would help discern and measure these impacts.  
As with other participatory capacity building programs, P4P suffers from lack of 
comparability between countries, stemming from different contexts, capacity building 
strategies, and classification systems. Partnering with SCOPEinsight to conduct objective 
assessments would represent significant progress in terms of measuring comparable changes 
in FO maturity and capacity across countries and harmonizing FO classification systems.  
Expanding the SCOPEinsight methodology to increase member voice would 
generate more valid results and contribute to FO capacity building. Utilizing the 
SCOPEinsight outputs as a basis for customized capacity building strategies through an 
internal workshop would harness the full potential of the assessments.  
Partnering with SCOPEinsight for OCA would not only inform capacity building, 
feed into M&E and procurement, but also improve targeting. In addition to targeting criteria 
established at the country-level, P4P should seek to partner with FOs exhibiting the factors 
driving organizational change and facilitating collective action: a strong marketing identity 
expressed through the mission and vision of the group and high levels of bonding social 
capital. Case study results suggest that Mission and vision, and either Risk mitigation or the 
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Adaptive capacity index should also be incorporated into the targeting criteria as proxies for 
organizational maturity and capacity.  
Over half of P4P countries utilize percentage of SHF to target FOs for inclusion into 
P4P, however WFP does not investigate how these SHF members participate within the FO. 
Rather, it is assumed that the P4P benefits extended to FOs will trickle down to SHF 
members. The extent to which this assumption is correct depends upon the functional 
capacities of the FO.  
To improve targeting of FOs for inclusion into P4P, WFP needs to further refine the 
type of SHF P4P aims to connect to market: non-commercial farmers with the potential to 
sell on formal markets, the entire segment of commercial SHF in loose value chains, or the 
upper-tier of commercial SHF in loose value chains. Regardless of the target group, capacity 
building initiatives should reflect the goals of P4P FOs and their members.   
If P4P targets non-commercial SHF, supporting their ability to produce a reliable 
surplus and to shift out of the “buy high, sell low” dynamic, WFP should expect to provide 
at least 2 years of intensive support, focusing on building social capital and empowerment, 
alongside technical production and PHHS.  
If P4P targets the entire segment of commercial SHF in loose value chains, WFP will 
need to pay close attention to the distribution of opportunities within FOs, which are prone 
to elite capture stemming from excessive power concentration within the EC and lack of 
checks and balances within organizational structures and processes. Capacity building for 
this segment should include supporting the functional capacities which enable meaningful 
participation across the membership base. 
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If P4P targets only the higher-tier producers within commercial SHF in loose value 
chains, then distributional issues within the FO are not as important to monitor. Capacity 
building strategies should reflect this group’s likely desire to shift production away from low-
margin staple foodgrains and into higher-value crops with tight value chains, which could 
pose challenges for WFP’s procurement strategy.   
The choice of target group within the SHF sector reflects an unsettled question 
regarding P4P identity; is P4P a procurement program or a development program? Is WFP’s 
primary objective to reliably procure safe commodity in a timely fashion from SHF, or to 
support enduring rural organizations capable of altering market dynamics in favor of SHF?  
Framing P4P as a procurement program targeting the higher-tier of commercial SHF 
in loose value chains has distinct advantages: clear administrative targets, continued focus on 
product as opposed to process outcomes, greater efficiency, and lower threat of disrupting 
the WFP pipeline. Disadvantages include limited ability to change market dynamics for SHF. 
Framing P4P as a development program has the advantage of prioritizing the 
capacity development of FOs, which mediate between SHF and the rural environment, and 
have the potential to both transform rural market dynamics and to endure beyond the 
project cycle. Disadvantages include increased transaction costs and loss of efficiency in 
procurement, the extended timeframe of capacity building, lack of control over FO capacity 
development, and additional M&E to document process outcomes.   
Purchase for Progress can continue straddling these identifies, striving to achieve 
efficiency in procurement while simultaneously aiming to build capacity of FOs and SHF, 
however trade-offs will continue to present themselves in operations, beginning with 
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targeting. The objective and target group of P4P determines whether the delivery at place of 
100 mt, aggregated exclusively by the Chairman, in full accordance with the terms of the FO 
contract issued through a soft tendering process should be categorized as a P4P success or 
failure.      
 
 
Several knowledge gaps emerge from this study. The first is the relationship between 
individual capacity, empowerment, and organizational change. How do trainings and other 
learning initiatives empower individuals and generate change at the organizational level? A 
better understanding of these mechanisms can help improve effectiveness of capacity 
building initiatives.   
Secondly, under what conditions is ToT an effective strategy for information 
dissemination leading to behavioral change? How can capacity building support the 
functional capacities necessary to enable effective ToT? Though ToT is an attractive 
platform due to the promise of empowerment, peer learning, learning in situ, and reduced 
costs, the experience of FOs in Malawi raises concerns about its efficacy.  
Thirdly, to what degree do findings from externally-validated, self-administered OCA 
diverge from external OCA? Comparing the product outputs and process outcomes 
resulting from self-administered OCA against external OCA would help inform 
development agencies deciding between the two methods.  
Additionally, is organizational maturity or marketing technical capacity a better 
predictor of WFP contract compliance? Do specific functional capacities help FOs achieve 
6.1  Further Research 
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their mission and vision while simultaneously decreasing the risk of default on formal market 
contracts? These question can be investigated by comparing standardized OCA results 
against P4P procurement data. Findings would help identify the sets of FO capacities that 
support WFP’s procurement objectives, that propel FOs toward their preferred future state, 
and the intersection between them.  
Finally, if SCOPEinsight Basic, or SCOPEinsight Basic Plus, is adopted as the OCA 
tool across P4P countries, what indicators can best proxy for the domain components, 
organizational maturity, and organizational capacity? This can be established through factor 
analysis, and findings could reduce the elements investigated in the assessment to the 
essentials. As a starting point, findings from this research suggest a high degree of 
correspondence between adaptive capacity and both organizational maturity and capacity.    
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APPENDIX A 
FO CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA IN GHANA 
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Source: Ghana P4P FO Classification Criteria (WFP Ghana P4P Unit, 2014) 
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APPENDIX B 
FO CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA IN MALAWI 
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Source: Classification of Malawi P4P FOs by Capacity Level (WFP Malawi P4P Unit, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Medium High
Procurement modality
No experience/Negative 
experience with Direct 
Contracting
Positive experience with 
Direct Contracting and/or 
Soft Tendering
Experience with DC, soft 
tendering and/or open 
BVO (Bid Volume Only)
Markets beyond WFP
Community/individual 
sales to small vendors
Small/medium traders
Medium and big 
traders/Warehouse 
Receipt System (WRS)
Reasons for default
Side selling (due to market 
price fluctuation)
Side selling (due to issues 
with WFP’s procurement 
procedures) or 
quality/quantity issues
Management issues (fraud, 
lack of internal control)
Membership/Trust issues Yes (could not overcome) Yes (could overcome) No
Access to storage No Yes (rented/owned) Yes (rented/owned)
Warehouse management None Yes (not effective) Yes (effective)
Strategic thinking No planning
Planning 
(unclear/unrealistic or not 
following)
Planning (and following up)
Indicators
Capacity level
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APPENDIX C 
PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO SCOPEINSIGHT BASIC OCA 
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Organizational motivation 
The organization’s motivation drives the change process and group cohesion allows the 
individual members to cooperate toward group objectives.   
 
 
 
Organizational Motivation
Mission and vision
History
Group cohesion
SCORES
Topic Scoring criteria
Mission and vision
Mission and vision Clear mission and unifying vision are required for organizational 
change. 
Score 1: Unclear or unrealistic mission and vision
Score 2: Clear mission, unclear or unrealistic vision
Score 3:  Leaders can articulate clear mission and unifying vision 
to members and other stakeholders
Score 4: Leaders can articulate clear mission and unifying vision 
to members and other stakeholders AND members understand 
the organization's mission and vision 
Score 5: Leaders and members can articulate clear mission and 
unifying vision to other stakeholders
Operational plans Operational plans (formal and informal, such as business plan, 
marketing plan, and budget) should be clear, realistic, and aligned 
with organizational mission and vision
Score 1: Plans not developed, unclear, or unrealistic
Score 2: Operational plans do not align with FO mission and vision
Score 3: Realistic operational plans reflecting FO mission and 
vision 
Score 4: Realistic operational plans reflecting FO mission and 
vision PLUS concrete action steps have been taken toward 
strategic objectives
Score 5: Documented, realistic operational plans reflect FO 
mission and vision PLUS concrete action steps have been taken 
toward strategic objectives
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Marketing identity Collective sales included as a component of mission and vision.
Score 1: Mission and vision do not include collective marketing 
organization does not participate in collective sales
Score 2: Mission and vision do not include collective marketing 
organization participates in collective sales as a peripheral activity
Score 3: Mission includes collective marketing
Score 4: Mission and vision include collective marketing
Score 5: Collective marketing is a prominent feature of the FO 
mission and vision
History
Group formation The drivers of group formation influence member motivation and 
organization development. 
Score 1: Formed by external partners to receive assistance
Score 2: Formed by external partners to improve access to loans
Score 3: Formed by external partners to participate in a specific 
income-generating project 
Score 4: Formed by members to receive assistance/ improve 
access to loans/ participate in a specific project
Score 5: Formed by members as a self-help group to assist one 
another
Group cohesion
Value of services to 
members*
Examples of services that add value to the members of the 
organization are: training, collective equipment use, storage, 
transport, financial services, advocacy, etcetera. 
The more of these services an organization provides to its 
members, the more loyal its members are likely to be. 
Score 1: Value-adding services are not provided and membership 
loyalty is low. 
Score 5: Value-adding services are regularly provided and 
membership loyalty is high.
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Member satisfaction 
with contributions
Do members understand what their cash, in-kind, and labor 
contributions are used for, and are they satisfied with how the 
organization manages these contribution?
Score 1: No, members do not understand how the organization 
utilizes their contributions, and they have concerns
Score 2: No, members do not understand how the organization 
utilizes their contributions, but they trust that leaders and 
managers are doing a good job managing their contributions
Score 3: Yes, members are aware, but they are not satisfied with 
how the organization manages their contributions
Score 4: Yes, members are aware of and are satisfied with how 
the FO manages contributions
Score 5: Yes, members are aware of and voted to approve the FO 
budget
Member assistance Assistance to members in times of need (illness, hospitalization, 
funeral, … ) builds goodwill.
Score 1: None
Score 2: The organization sometimes informally organizes 
members to contribute money or labor to assist members in 
need. 
Score 3: The organization has a committee which formally 
organizes members to contribute money or labor to assist 
members in need. 
Score 5: The organization has structures and processes to assist 
members in need with cash grants, which are not repaid 
Score 4: The organization has structures and processes to assist 
members in need with cash loans, to be repaid, with or without 
interest
Trust in members Do members trust other members?
Score 1: No, members are not indicated in any trust category
Score 2: No, members are not ranked in any trust category
Score 3: Yes, members are ranked in one trust category
Score 4: Yes, members are ranked in two trust categories
Score 5: Yes, members are ranked in three or more trust 
categories
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Trust in leaders Do members trust the organization's leaders?
Score 1: No, leaders are not indicated in any trust category
Score 2: No, leaders are not ranked in any trust category
Score 3: Yes, leaders are ranked in one trust category
Score 4: Yes, leaders are ranked in two trust categories
Score 5: Yes, leaders are ranked in three or more trust categories
Organizational 
trustworthiness
Do members perceive the organization to be trustworthy?
Score 1: Not mentioned, even when prompted, or categorized as 
not trustworthy
Score 3: Somewhat trustworthy
Score 5: Very trustworthy
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Member participation 
Active participation across the membership base enables empowerment and protects 
against elite capture. 
 
  
 
Topic Scoring criteria 
Conflict resolution   
Raising concerns Is there a way for members to raise concerns about FO plans, 
rules, activities, and decisions? Has this occurred? Were 
members satisfied with the process? 
  
 Score 1: Don't know 
 Score 2: No, members cannot raise concerns about the 
organization's activities 
 Score 3: Yes, members can raise concerns about the 
organization's activities, but this has not occurred 
 Score 4: Yes, members can raise concerns about the 
organization's activities. This has occurred, but members were 
not satisfied with the process 
 Score 5: Yes, members can raise concerns about the 
organization's activities. This has occurred, and members were 
satisfied with the process 
    
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
How does the FO resolve internal conflicts? 
  
 Score 1: The organization does not have access conflict 
resolution mechanisms 
 Score 2: The organization relies on partners to resolve conflicts 
 Score 3: Leaders helps members resolve conflicts 
 Score 4: Audit and/or Discipline SCs have been established, 
becoming active in case of complaints 
 Score 5: Audit and Discipline SCs proactively review records, 
providing checks and balances within the organization 
    
Member participation
Conflict resolution
Meetings, dues, and sales
Learning
Planning
SCORES
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Conflict resolution 
history
Have the conflicts which have arisen within the FO been 
adequately addressed? While not every member can be satisfied 
with the final outcome, are members broadly satisfied with the 
process through which conflict has been addressed?  
Score 1: Conflicts have lingered for more than one year, and the 
resolution process is unclear
Score 2: Conflicts have not arisen
Score 3: Conflicts were resolved, but took more than one year
Score 4: Conflicts were resolved, but took more than six months
Score 5: Conflicts have been resolved quickly and efficiently, and 
members consider the process fair and transparent 
Meetings, dues, and sales
General meeting 
frequency
General meeting frequency in the previous year.
Score 1: No meetings
Score 2: 1 general meeting
Score 3: 2-3 general meetings
Score 4: 4-5 general meetings
Score 5: 6+ general meetings
Attendance at general 
meetings
Average percentage attendance at general meetings in the 
previous year.
Score 1: 0-20%
Score 2: 21-40%
Score 3: 41-60%
Score 4: 61-80%
Score 5: >80%
Membership fees Percentage of members current or expected to be current on 
their membership fees by the end of the season.
Score 1: 0-20%
Score 2: 21-40%
Score 3: 41-60%
Score 4: 61-80%
Score 5: >80%
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Trend in active members Trend in number of members fulfilling all membership conditions 
(dues, shares, attending meetings, fulfilling labor requirements, …) 
over the last three years.
Score 1: Don't know
Score 2: Decreasing
Score 3: No clear trend
Score 4: Constant
Score 5: Increasing
Percentage of members 
contributing to group 
sales
Percentage of eligible members contributing to group sales over 
the last three years.
Score 1: 0-20%
Score 2: 21-40%
Score 3: 41-60%
Score 4: 61-80%
Score 5: >80%
Learning
Production learning How is production information (productivity, post-harvest and 
storage, grading and quality standards, …) shared through the 
member base?
Score 1: Information not shared with members
Score 2: All members present to receive information
Score 3: Through meetings organized by the group
Score 4: Through lead farmers, workshops, and/or farmer field 
days
Score 5: Through lead farmers, workshops, and/or farmer field 
days as well as Farm or Production SC's who inspect member 
fields and provide technical assistance
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Business learning
How is business information (marketing, negotiations, contracts, 
commodity exchanges, warehouse receipt systems, accounting 
and record-keeping, ... ) shared through the member base?
Score 1: Information not shared with members
Score 2: All members present to receive information
Score 3: Through meetings organized by the group
Score 4: Through lead farmers and mentors
Score 5: Through workshops organized by the group
Planning
Member involvement    
in planning decisions
To what extent are members involved in strategic and budgetary 
planning?
Score 1: None
Score 2: Leaders make plans and share information with members 
at meetings
Score 3:  Leaders present plans and members vote to approve 
plans
Score 4: Leaders gather feedback from members during meetings 
or through other means and incorporate member ideas into 
planning 
Score 5: Planning decisions made collectively and members vote 
to approve plans
Member involvement    
in operational decisions
To what extent are members involved in decisions about FO 
operations?
Score 1: None
Score 2: Leaders make plans and share information with members 
at meetings
Score 3:  Leaders present plans and members vote to approve 
plans
Score 4: Leaders gather feedback from members during meetings 
or through other means and incorporate member ideas into 
planning 
Score 5: Planning decisions made collectively and members vote 
to approve plans
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Organizational structures 
Organizational structures influence member behavior and participation.  
 
SCORES 
  Organizational structures 
  Rules 
  Sales rules 
  Interference 
  Sub-committees 
    
 
 
Topic Scoring criteria
Rules Rules elaborating the terms of membership, and penalties for 
breaking the rules, govern member behaviour.
Score 1: No rules with penalties
Score 2: 1-2 rules with penalties
Score 3: 3-4 rules with penalties
Score 4: 5-6 rules with penalties
Score 5: 7 or more rules with penalties
Rules monitoring Rules are effective to the degree they are monitored and adhered 
to.
Score 1: No rules to monitor
Score 2: No monitoring, rules are ineffective and irrelevant to 
member behaviour
Score 3: Executive Committee monitors rules
Score 4: Executive Committee and appropriate Sub-Committees 
monitor rules
Score 5: Leaders and members are share responsibility in 
monitoring behaviours
Rules
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Rules enforcement If rules are broken, enforcement of penalties promotes justice 
and deters others from breaking the rules.  
Score 1: No rules to enforce
Score 2: Rules exist, but are not enforced
Score 3: Selective enforcement of some rules, while others are 
ignored
Score 4: Strict enforcement of some rules, selective enforcement 
of other rules
Score 5: Strict enforcement of all rules
Sales rules Rules elaborating member contributions to group sales, and 
penalties for breaking the rules, govern member participation in 
collective marketing. 
Score 1: No rules on member contributions to group sales
Score 2: Unrealistic rules on member contributions to group sales
Score 3: Organization must aggregate commodity from members 
before buying/aggregating from non-members
Score 4: The organization has rules governing member 
contributions to group sales
Score 5: The organization has rules governing member 
contributions to group sales and penalties for side-selling
Sales rules monitoring Sales rules are effective to the degree they are monitored and 
adhered to.
Score 1: No sales rules to monitor
Score 2: No monitoring, sales rules are ineffective and irrelevant 
to member behaviour
Score 3: Executive Committee monitors sales rules
Score 4: Executive Committee and appropriate Sub-Committees 
monitor sales rules
Score 5: Leaders and members are share responsibility in 
monitoring sales behaviours
Sales rules
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Sales rules enforcement If sales rules are broken, enforcement of penalties promotes 
justice and deters others from breaking the rules.  
Score 1: No sales rules to enforce
Score 2: Sales rules exist, but are not enforced
Score 3: Selective enforcement of some sales rules, while others 
are ignored
Score 4: Strict enforcement of some sales rules, selective 
enforcement of other sales rules
Score 5: Strict enforcement of all sales rules
Interference Actors external to the organization, such as traditional 
authorities, political figures, financial institutions, as well as 
partners, can limit the group's autonomy, to positive or negative 
effect.  
Score 1: Excessive interference from external authorities has 
sabotaged organizational development
Score 2: Limited negative interference from external authorities
Score 3: No interference from external authorities
Score 4: Limited positive interference from external authorities 
Score 5: Positive interference from external authorities has 
boosted FO development
Active sub-committees Sub-committees diffuse power out of the Executive Committee, 
protect against elite capture, and enable stronger management 
and oversight. 
Score 1: No sub-committees
Score 2: Sub-committee exist, but do not meet and or actively 
participate in group governance
Score 3: 1-2 active sub-committees
Score 4: 3-4 active sub-committees
Score 5: 5 or more active sub-committees
Interference
Sub-committees
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SCORES 
  Adaptive capacity 
  Market response 
  Structural response 
  Risk mitigation 
  Phase out impact 
    
 
Topic Scoring criteria
Adaptive capacity
Market response Ability to respond to changes in market conditions, such as 
unpredicted price changes, buyers' inability to fulfill promises, 
export bans, etc.
Score 1: No collective marketing
Score 2: Unable to adapt to changing market conditions, hopes 
for the best; returns aggregated commodity back to members if 
buyer backs out of transaction  
Score 3: Organization reacts by relying on partners to find 
alternative markets 
Score 4: Leaders (such as Executive Committee, or Marketing Sub-
Committee) react by finding alternate buyers
Score 5: Organization proactively develops alternative, 
implementable marketing strategies in anticipation of market 
changes
Structural response Ability to respond to challenges and dynamic conditions 
encountered by the group by changing organizational structure, 
processes, and/or rules. Examples of changes include: creating or 
activating sub-committees, holding elections, voting to change 
rules, enforcing penalties, requiring written contracts, etc.
Score 1: No problems encountered or recognized
Score 2: No changes in organizational structures, processes, or 
rules made
Score 3: Some changes adopted, but it is not clear whether the 
changes were effective in preventing the problem for recurring
Score 4: Changes adopted were somewhat effective in preventing 
the problem for recurring
Score 5: Changes adopted were effective in preventing the 
problem from recurring
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Risk mitigation Organizations vary in their awareness and response to risk 
exposure, with less mature groups responding to change while 
more mature groups proactively protect themselves from 
negative risk. 
Score 1: No risk mitigation strategies, the organization reacts to 
changes after they occur
Score 2: The organization is aware of likely risks
Score 3: The organization is aware of likely risks and considers 
changes to mitigate risk
Score 4: The organization is aware of likely risks, considers 
changes, and has a strategy to mitigate risks should they occur
Score 5: The organization considers likely changes and makes 
back-up plans and proactively diversifies members, crops, buyers, 
and activities to minimize risk
Phase out impact How has phase out of partners impacted the organization?
Score 1: Has not occurred, organization has not grappled with 
partner phase-out
Score 2: Significant disruption of activities, organization is 
waiting/waited for other partners and donors to resume activities
Score 3: Significant disruption of activities,  organization leaders 
actively seeking/sought other partners and donors to resume 
activities
Score 4: Organization continues/continued core activities at a 
reduced scale
Score 5: Organization continues/continued all activities, adopting 
the roles and responsibilities of previously assumed by partners
  
255 
 
APPENDIX D 
TRUST INDICATOR METHODOLOGY 
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After experimentation with different approaches to collecting this data, the study 
settled upon the following methodology. 
The trust indicators were collected at the end of the FGD. A grid including different 
types of trust and different categories of people was presented to FGD participations, as in 
the below. Five different types of trust were explored in the rows: trust to help in times of 
need, trust to tell the truth, trust not to cheat you, trust to store your commodity, and trust 
to settle conflicts. 12 member categories were included in the columns: family, friends, 
neighbors, religious leaders, CEX, supply-side partners, MoFA, WFP, FO leaders, FO 
members, traders, and others (specified).  
 
After finding that group discussions led to vociferous members claiming their trust 
and others agreeing to form consensus, this study opted to convened members privately. In 
one-on-one conversations with a facilitator, each category of trust was explored and 
members offered their categories of people they trusted for each type of trust.  
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After collecting information from each participant, the facilitator tallied the counts 
for each entity category across members and trust categories. These totals were ranked, and 
the facilitator asked the group the rankings were correct, and if not why. In some cases, 
rankings were adjusted to incorporate member feedback.  
Utilizing total “votes” the facilitator then placed the ranked entities into one of three 
categories: most trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, and not at all trustworthy. Members 
again had the opportunity to provide feedback on this categorization,  
Clarifications were requested when rankings did not reflect previous statements. For 
example, if the group complained grievously about WFP breaking commitments in terms of 
logistics and payment, but placed WFP in the most trustworthy category, the facilitator 
would follow-up with probing questions. Similarly, failing to mention the FO, or neglecting 
to include it in a trust category prompted probing.    
 The study team found this approach superior in terms of generating unbiased 
feedback across all participants, and relieving participants of the public pressure to build 
consensus reflecting the priorities of more influential community members (Barnaud & van 
Paassen, 2013; Cleaver, 2005; Kothari, 2001; Muñoz, Paredes, & Thorp, 2007; Platteau & 
Abraham, 2002; Stadler, 1995).  
Of the information gathered during the mission, both study teams, including the P4P 
staff and implementing partners comprising the Ghana team, found this section on bonding 
social capital to be the most valuable in terms of understanding FO dynamics.  
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APPENDIX E 
FO LEADER AND MEMBER DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS 
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APPENDIX F 
FO RANKINGS AND CLASSIFICATION  
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Though this study utilizes a 4-point scale, total maturity and capacity scores are 
converted to a 5-point scale, divided into 5 classifications reflecting the SCOPEinsight 
typology: Very professional, professional, maturing, immature, and very immature for the 
maturity index; Very high capacity, high capacity, developing, low capacity, and very low 
capacity for the capacity index. Groups were classified using two methods: a relative 
approach, in which thresholds between categories are defined by quintiles between the 
highest and lowest scores attained; and an absolute approach, in which thresholds between 
categories are defined by quintiles between the highest and lowest possible score. While the 
first approach is more appropriate for comparisons within regions or countries, the latter 
allows for broader comparisons.  
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Note. * for maturity categories, 5 = very professional, 4 = professional, 3 = maturing, 2 = 
immature, 1 = very immature 
 
Maturity
ranking Region P4P FO Name Relative Absolute 
1 Ashanti 1 Enso Nyame Ye Womens Group 4.22 5 5
2 Malawi 0 Chimbiya Piggery Cooperative 4.19 5 4
3 Malawi 1 Mdeka Farmers and Marketing 
Cooperative Society Ltd
3.75 4 4
4 Malawi 1 Likasi Producers and Marketing 
Cooperative Society 
3.46 4 4
5 Northern 1 Suglo Konbo 3.46 4 4
6 Northern 1 Pagazaa Sugro Mbori Buni 
Farmers Group
3.31 4 3
7 Ashanti 1 Lord is my Shepard 3.20 3 3
8 Northern 1 Kpalsi Zisung Association 3.11 3 3
9 Malawi 0 Tasanganapo Producers and 
Marketing Cooperative
3.08 3 3
10 Northern 1 Kobli Kom Maize Group 3.08 3 3
11 Malawi 1 Cheka Cooperative Society 3.02 3 3
12 Northern 0 Tiyumtaba Farmers Group 2.97 3 3
13 Malawi 1 Chilitudwa 2.88 3 3
14 Malawi 1 Chilanga Farmers Trust 2.82 3 3
15 Malawi 0 Masuku Smallholder Farmers 
Association
2.73 3 3
16 Malawi 1 Nanguluwe women club 2.67 2 3
17 Ashanti 0 Nyame Ne Buafoa 2.65 2 3
18 Malawi 0 Namibawa 2.53 2 2
19 Ashanti 1 Mayaden Maize Farmers 2.53 2 2
20 Northern 0 Puumaya Farmers' Association 2.50 2 2
21 Northern 0 Shigu Wumpini 2.50 2 2
22 Ashanti 1 Odo Farmers Association 2.44 2 2
23 Malawi 1 Kafulu Smallholder Farmers 
Association 
2.33 2 2
24 Ashanti 1 United Farmers Association 2.33 2 2
25 Malawi 0 Mzizima cluster 2.12 2 2
26 Ashanti 1 Asuogya Farmers Group 2.01 1 2
27 Malawi 0 Mpale Producers and Marketing 
Cooperative
1.98 1 2
28 Ashanti 0 Nyame Bekyere 1.74 1 1
29 Ashanti 0 Asempa Maize Growers 1.63 1 1
30 Ashanti 0 Frante Farmers Association 1.60 1 1
Maturity category*Adjusted 
avg score
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Note. * for capacity categories, 5 = very professional, 4 = professional, 3 = developing, 2 = 
low capacity, 1 = very low capacity 
Capacity
ranking Region P4P FO Name Relative Absolute
1 Ashanti 1 Enso Nyame Ye Womens Group 3.87 5 4
2 Malawi 0 Chimbiya Piggery Cooperative 3.48 5 4
3 Malawi 1 Likasi Producers and Marketing 
Cooperative Society 
3.34 4 3
4 Malawi 1 Mdeka Farmers and Marketing 
Cooperative Society Ltd
3.32 4 3
5 Northern 1 Suglo Konbo 3.08 4 3
6 Northern 1 Pagazaa Sugro Mbori Buni 
Farmers Group
3.05 4 3
7 Ashanti 1 Lord is my Shepard 3.03 4 3
8 Malawi 1 Cheka Integrated Agriculture - 
Aquaculture Cooperative Society
3.01 4 3
9 Northern 1 Kobli Kom Maize Group 2.98 4 3
10 Northern 1 Kpalsi Zisung Association 2.96 4 3
11 Malawi 0 Masuku Smallholder Farmers 
Association
2.77 3 3
12 Malawi 0 Tasanganapo Producers and 
Marketing Cooperative
2.74 3 3
13 Malawi 1 Chilitudwa 2.71 3 3
14 Malawi 1 Nanguluwe women club 2.64 3 3
15 Malawi 1 Kafulu Smallholder Farmers 
Association 
2.59 3 2
16 Malawi 0 Namibawa 2.59 3 2
17 Ashanti 1 United Farmers Association 2.48 2 2
18 Northern 0 Tiyumtaba Farmers Group 2.45 2 2
19 Malawi 1 Chilanga Farmers Trust 2.43 2 2
20 Ashanti 1 Mayaden Maize Farmers 2.43 2 2
21 Ashanti 0 Nyame Ne Buafoa 2.23 2 2
22 Ashanti 1 Asuogya Farmers Group 2.21 2 2
23 Ashanti 1 Odo Farmers Association 2.17 2 2
24 Northern 0 Puumaya Farmers' Association 2.16 2 2
25 Northern 0 Shigu Wumpini 2.12 2 2
26 Malawi 0 Mzizima cluster 2.11 2 2
27 Malawi 0 Mpale Producers and Marketing 
Cooperative
1.92 1 2
28 Ashanti 0 Nyame Bekyere 1.68 1 1
29 Ashanti 0 Asempa Maize Growers 1.64 1 1
30 Ashanti 0 Frante Farmers Association 1.58 1 1
Adjusted 
avg score
Capacity category*
